


International Thinker's Views on Post-Corona Order



CORONAVIRUS
COVID-19


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
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An Introduction to a Book on Post Coronavirus WORLD

Prefaced by Mohammad Shojaian

The coronavirus outbreak and how governments have been able to deal with it have brought into discussion the effectiveness of political systems on the one hand, and on the other hand, the transition from the current order to the post-coronavirus order.

Most thinkers emphasize this key point that as a result of the outbreak, we are facing an order in the future the likes of which we did not see before the outbreak.

But the important questions to ask are, what is the order of the world system that is on the verge of collapse after the pandemic, and what are the characteristics of the new order?

Different schools of international relations have different interpretations and readings of the order governing the world system. The definition of each of these schools in the world system to some extent defines their behavior, actions and reactions in this system.

Even some structuralist schools, such as “neorealism,” see the order governing the international relations, which in the school’s view is “anarchy” (lack of supreme authority in the world system), as the main determining factor of countries’ behavior in the world system.

On the other hand, other schools such as liberalism and the English school of international relations theory stress the existence of order, institutions and principles in the world system. Schools such as liberalism even believe that countries will be able to bring peace to the world system by establishing areas of cooperation, including international institutions and regimes. From this perspective, after World War II, we saw the formation of institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization (formerly GATT), which in a way are the liberal kind of order governing the world system.

Of course, since the 1970s, liberal theorists have believed that this order is on the decline, and have prescribed other

guidelines for the domination of liberal order over the world system.

Contrary to this view, the school of realism argues that the world system lacks the supreme authority to establish order, and that the order governing international relations is in fact “anarchy.”

The school of “constructivism”, as something between realism and liberalism, believes that the order governing the international relations stems from the understanding of the actors of this system. Alexander Wendt, one of the school’s pioneers, believes that “Anarchy is what states make of it”. In other words, this school defines the order governing international relations as a concept that depends on the understanding and interpretation of the states rather than as something pre-existing and definite.

Now, with the outbreak of the coronavirus which revealed the weakness in the existing prescriptions for the world system, there has been talk of a “post-coronavirus order” and various theorists believe that the order of international relations after the pandemic will be different from the current order.

For example, Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State and an exemplar of the School of Realism, while referring to the global pandemic and its economic and political consequences, wrote that the virus will change the world system forever.

On the other hand, among the thinkers of the school of realism, Francis Fukuyama, the founder of the theory of the “end of history”, has dealt with the features of the post-Macronian order. “Once the disease is over, I doubt that the easy duplication of democracy / authoritarianism will be put aside,” he said.

On the other hand, among the thinkers of the school of realism, Francis Fukuyama, the founder of the theory of the “End of History”, has addressed the features of the post-coronavirus order. “When the pandemic is over, I doubt



that the easy dualizations of democracy/ authoritarianism will be abandoned,” he said. “My argument here is that the main determining factor in the functioning of governments is not the type of their political regime, but the ability and capacity of the government and, above all, the public confidence, in the government.”

In this regard, and given the importance of the issue, Mehr News Agency has conducted a series of interviews with theorists and international thinkers from different intellectual spectrums, which outlines the characteristics of this new order.

For example, realist thinker Shirin Hunter, a professor at Georgetown University in the United States, believes that in the post-coronavirus world, the role of governments in meeting basic needs such as health and employment will become all the more prominent.

This idea shows the realist approach of this thinker, because for realists, governments are the main actors in the world system.

In this series of interviews, there is another range of thinkers whose approach is liberal. The most important thinker from this school is Joseph Nye, who is the founder of the theory of Soft Power. In the post-coronavirus world, Nye is concerned about the soft power of the United States. He believes that the country’s soft power is currently declining and that the United States must continue to play a leading role in the world system.

He believes that “In a world where borders are being shaken by everything from narcotics to infectious diseases and cyber terrorism, the United States must use its attractive soft power to develop networks and institutions that target these

new threats. For example, the administration proposed halving the US share of the World Health Organization budget; However, we need this institution now more than ever.”

Among the prominent theorists interviewed in this collection who belong to the school of structuralism is Professor Nicholas Onuf, who is the founder of this theoretical school in international relations. Onuf believes that the coronavirus pandemic revealed the inefficiency of the modern order. According to him, “The modern state, in whatever form, has shown itself too easily overwhelmed by this crisis in human security.”

On that basis, Onuf argues that the main goal of the modern state is not “human security” in the true sense of the word.

The following collection of interviews covers a wide range of theoretical perspectives in the field of international relations, and thinkers from various schools have shared their views regarding the current order of the world system and its shortcomings, as well as the future order of the world system and its characteristics.

This order has been studied based on political economy, energy economy, soft power, hard power, international regimes, as well as cultural, normative and identity approaches, etc., and includes a wide range of theoretical views.

The purpose of compiling this collection by Mehr News Agency is to draw up the characteristics of the world system in the post-coronavirus world, in a bid to better understand the rules of the game in this new order.



Larry Cata Backer

Professor of Law and
International Affairs at
Penn State University

What will be the effects of coronavirus on the current world order?

First, it is important to underline that there WILL be effects on the current world order. That is an important premise because it was not at all necessary, nor was it necessarily predictable at the start of the pandemic. Thus, the first step in answering this question is to answer the question on which it must be based: have the influential elements with responsibility for the maintenance of the world order determined that the COVID-19 pandemic MUST produce effects. The answer to that question has become clear by the middle of April 2020—the COVID-19 pandemic must produce effects on a world order that, in retrospect will be understood, at the end of 2019, as a world order ready for change but unable to move by reason of inertia. In effect, then, COVID-19 will have effects on the world order precisely because those with the power to shape the narratives on the basis of which mass society understands and responds to the world have given that signification to the pandemic itself. Was it necessary to invest the pandemic with this change power? —NO! But does that matter anymore?—again NO!

Second, with the decision to invest the pandemic with this significance—that it must necessarily have an effect on the world order—the principal question comes into better focus. That question goes to the direction of the changes to the current world order that may emerge. Again—the effects and the direction cannot be understood as “natural” in



For liberal democratic states, the same is also true. Here the pandemic is also both a “test” and a “portal” through which the fundamental principles of the political economic order are tested, modified and from which they will emerge stronger.

the sense that there is an organic connection between the existence of pandemic and the vectors of change that it produces. The opposite is true. The changes to the world order triggered by the pandemic will reflect the application of rival ideologies through which the great powers see the world.

For Marxist-Leninist States, like China, the pandemic and their struggle against it proves and was crafted to exhibit, the virility and power of the Chinese political-economic model to meet and overcome the COVID-19 challenge. That, vindication, in turn, will likely enhance the possibility for the emergence of a more visible new Communist international around the principles (now internationalized) of the Chinese Marxist Leninist system with application first within developing states participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, and thereafter (again modified to suit context) in other states. The result, under a best-case scenario, will be the emergence of a new approach to international ordering grounded on the Chinese vision with the transnational application.

For liberal democratic states, the same

is also true. Here the pandemic is also both a “test” and a “portal” through which the fundamental principles of the political economic order are tested, modified and from which they will emerge stronger. In these cases, there will likely emerge two variations reflecting the ancient fissures between the old Roman world (the EU) and its northern frontier (now under the leadership of the US as its most perfected vanguard force). Where the Chinese system will emphasize centralization, planning, and the superiority of the political sector, the liberal democratic versions will emphasize decentralization, markets (private power), and the superiority of the economic and societal sectors.

Thus, the effects of COVID-19 will not be revolutionary in the sense of abandoning old systems. Rather it will accelerate tendencies already well observed. It will also further refine a tendency toward differentiation (and choice) rather than toward convergence. But again, these dominant ideologies invested the pandemic with a very specific signification—and an ancient one: it was a test (which could be rationalized in religious or secular “scien-

tific” terms). That test was meant to prove the value of the system tested. But it was also meant to serve as a furnace within which the weakness of those systems might be burned away, leaving only the strong core from which the system could emerge changed and re-invigorated. But changed in ways that will hyper emphasize some of its organizing principles (described above) and scorch away the rest.

It is in that context that one can consider the effects on globalization. Many members of the intellectual sector who produce analysis for a living, as well as the planning sectors of governmental organs, are now obsessed with what they might (mis)interpret as the rise (again) of the state. And yet a closer view of “pandemic effects” might suggest that something else is at work here. Consider the focus on the way in which states “take control” through the re-invigoration of borders. But borders have always been a key element of economic globalization. Global production, itself grounded in the organization of segments, require that those segments be policed and protected. Economic globalization could not have existed in its current forms if it did not maintain these compartments that then could be used to segregate and contain risk. States, then, within the global order, were meant to work like watertight compartments on a 20th century ship. The danger for globalization with respect to the state was that the compartments could not be sealed off when necessary. That, in part, was one

Thus, the effects of COVID-19 will not be revolutionary in the sense of abandoning old systems. Rather it will accelerate tendencies already well observed

of the reasons that migration erupted as a crisis in the 21st century. At least with respect to that, the state operated more like the compartments on the Titanic than as wholly self-contained units (with the possible exception of North Korea).

Thus understood, the role of the state—as cogs in translational orders—emerges more clearly. Pandemic was precisely the moment with the protection of global production required the state to use its police power and its borders. But at the same time, the pandemic drew much more clearly the difference between the state as an agent for the protection of the free movement of goods, capital, and investment (even where those might be divided among the big three emerging globalist empires) on the one hand, and the use of the state as the custodian of their respective human capital. While trade was affected (and sometimes severely) the organization of trade at its foundation was not. It will be re-arranged of course. That is the primary effect of the pandemic on globalization. But more importantly, it will

be used (its principal signification) to reposition the state as the shepherd of human capital corralled and to be utilized within their respective pens. These pens, once known as states, now serve an additional and important purpose not for the greater glory of the state necessarily but rather as the middle managers of global production. Of course, the other effect of the pandemic will be to make clearer the differentiation in the character of that role between apex states, and those below them. It will be to their organization around vertically differentiated global production chains arranged around the new imperial centers, and the rules created to facilitate trade between these centers, that will likely mark the core transformations that the pandemic will leave in its wake.

The current world order is majorly based on liberalism and to some extent on realism approaches. What are the deficiencies of the said approaches revealed by coronavirus?

The answer to the first question changes the complexion of this second one. At its simplest, the answer must be that any event of severe stress—like pandemic—will likely reveal the weaknesses (as well as the strengths) of dominant systems that order political-economic-societal life within vertically arranged hierarchies in which some elements are privileged, and others survive as they can. But that answer applies equally to all systems, not just liberal democratic systems. And, indeed, the pandemic illustrates, for those who care to observe, the way that the stress it produces reveals both strength and weakness in all systems.

However, it is important to look more closely at the way that the stress of pandemic might reveal deficiencies in powerful or powerfully influential systems. By 2019, it had become a cliché among all political sectors and the intelligentsia that provided the foundations for their conclusions, that the post-1945 liberal demo-

cratic order and its manifestation in contemporary constitutional orders and the international framework of principles on which it was supposed to be based (or at least reflect) was either broken or in need of reform. Those at the margins of that discussion (Marxist-Leninist theorists, theocratic political-moral orders, so-called Third World and development oriented theorists) of course profited from that internal discussion. While many took that as a sign of the weakness of the system, for others, me included, it suggested an underlying strength. It suggested that the system was still quite “alive” in the sense that it was still the central element of the ordering of reality around which political-economic-societal systems could be ordered.

Enter the pandemic. An extraordinary entrance to be sure—in six months or so it has managed to sweep away much of the veiling behind which these discussions and battles for control of the “heart” of the system were taking place. And among those in the midst of the battling, it provided the signal—the sign—that they chose to interpret as permission to accelerate their move to seek control of the ordering norms of the system. It is in this sense that one might usefully understand the all too real view among virtually everyone about the deficiencies of the liberal democratic system as well as the way in which the pandemic provided the excuse necessary to reveal more publicly what was already well contested within the highest levels of the leadership of that system.

But it does not suggest the sort of fundamental deficiencies that might imperil the system. The opposite, I think, is true. In that light, the deficiencies must be understood within context. And that context can be divided into two parts. One context would examine the deficiencies of the liberal democratic order from the perspective and through the lens of the ordering principles of political-economic-moral systems fundamentally incompatible with

those of the liberal democratic order. For this perspective there can be nothing but deficiency precisely because the making of meaning with respect to the most fundamental objects of social ordering are impossible to reconcile. They simply cannot see the same thing in the same way. From this perspective it is true, as the question suggests, that the pandemic highlights all of the critical failings of the democratic order—the hijacking public policy by private institutions, the sovereignty eroding effect of markets on policy, the inefficiencies of public organs subject to multiple layers of consultation and fractures of authority, and the paralysis inherent in systems in which power is both sharply held and the success of its execution widely dispersed.

In contrast to this outsider perspective analysis, an insider perspective might



yield a different analysis. The insider perspective would examine the deficiencies of the liberal democratic order from one of two distinct analytical positions. The first would take as a given the soundness of the fundamental organizational principles of that order and focus instead on the deficiencies of its implementation. Those deficiencies might derive from system failures (e.g., the political institutions ought to be reformed to correctly reflect principle, or the law must be enforced in accordance with a correct application of principle, etc.). The second would focus on the need to reform or further develop (but not reject) the fundamental ordering principles themselves. In the context of pandemic these might center on the division of authority between different levels of government, to the division of authority within a political institution. In the United States this translated into furious debates about the way that American federalism impeded or advanced the fight against the pandemic. But they might also center on the substance of the principles themselves—and these may then create a discursive space around corruption (e.g., should the state provide support for business or to working people? How should medical resources be rationed? To what extent may the state or private actors mandate personal behavior among the masses? And the like).

In the international sphere, these deficiencies are marked by the borderlands between public and private sectors which are evident in the organization of global production. Thus, for example, the need to impose a responsibility on multinational enterprises for the effects of economic decisions taken in consequence of the pandemic that cause severe harm to local economies down their production chains. This has been particularly apparent in the context of the production of garments in which decisions taken by large Western multinational firms might severely affect the economic viability of states like Ban-

gladesh.

Taken from this perspective, the usual reporting about winners and losers is stripped of much actual significance. The pandemic has not produced a list of winners and losers along the conflict binaries that were popular before the pandemic: the state versus the private sector; bureaucracy and planning versus the market; liberal democracy versus Marxist-Leninism; China versus the United States, etc. Much more interesting is the way that the intelligentsia and the political classes they serve have sought to develop a discourse around the pandemic that its critical signification is the way that it will decide or change the contours of battles for global leadership. This is the sort of material one feeds mass opinion for the purpose of the propaganda wars that are an integral part of inter-systemic competition. They are important for the fury with which they are pursued, and their ability to sway common understanding. But they have very little to do with the actual movement of dominance under conditions in which no one system has emerged spotlessly triumphant. If the pandemic shows the world anything, it is that all systems under stress will have to change in light of their failures and will need to exploit those areas which showed each at their best. From that the battles for control of global narrative, of leadership, and the like, will continue even as the character of the combatants necessarily changes. But those changes, again to underline the opening perspective, has little to do with the virus itself—it has everything to do with the way that people invest these actions with meaning, and the extent to which such meaning is widely embraced. No magic here; and there is no organic progress toward triumph of one or another of the camps; it is all strategy, and work, and discipline, however those can be advanced within the rules of the respective “operating systems” of these actors.

If we accept that the post-coro-


na world order will be different from the existing one, will the changes be structural and fundamental ones? Which meanings will experience fundamental changes?

At last, we come to the most profound question, but also the one that may be easiest to answer—at least in general terms. The changes suggested above are both broad and fundamental. They will likely produce structural and fundamental changes. While it is far too early to provide much detail, the changes may be sketched in broad outline.

First, the fundamental relationship between the individual and governing institutions (the state in Marxist Leninist systems; the state and private institutions in liberal democratic orders; and the state and religious leadership institutions in theocratic systems) will change in profound and quite noticeable ways. While it is likely that the discourse of personal liberty and of individual autonomy will not change in the short term, the application of those principles will change. The broad outlines of those changes are already apparent. The first cluster of changes revolve around the power to monitor. Surveillance will become central to the organization of society and the understanding of privacy will change to suit the need. This does not mean that there will not be opposition, indeed there will be, but that it is likely that the opposition will have an effect only at the margins. In a sense this ought to come as a surprise to no one. All systems have embraced, some with enthusiasm, cultures of compliance and accountability for business and economic conduct. It is only a small step to transpose these now muscular cultural expectation around accountability to the individual. The framework around which accountability is driven is monitoring and reporting. It is grounded in data harvesting and in judgment manifested through data analytics. The rationale will be based on the protection of the

individual, first; and then on the protection of society from individuals whose conduct have (they always have) spillover effects. It will be difficult to resist this trajectory made more compelling in the shadow of pandemic. But surveillance will not mean merely the burden of being observed. As suggested above, it also implies the duty to account and to submit to systems of accountability. One sees this already in the systems developed in Israel and then Russia designed to track targeted individuals and then to warn others who might be exposed to them. It is seen in the way that Taiwan and South Korea have aligned their information systems for the purpose of surveillance with specific objectives (public health in this case) in mind. Even in the United States, the recent exposure of the way that large internet platforms (Google for example) to track people and to use that in the service of the police power in a crisis reveals the extent to which such surveillance is already normalized. Its rationalization remains at the earliest stages of development.

Second, the scope of governmental authority will likely change. It is difficult, though to predict the direction of that change and it is likely to be highly contextual. Part will depend on the way in which a system disperses power between its public and private organs. But the character of that power will change as well. There will likely be an acceleration of the trend, already quite evident in most systems of moving away from the increasingly primitive view of government as actually managed by high (sometimes elected) officials in which the issues revolve around the exercise of sovereign executive, legislative and judicial power (however arranged) to a system that is centered on administration by managers. The bureaucratization of all aspects of life actually signals the movement of power from the political to the managerial elements of institutions. The pandemic revealed in all its majesty that the state and its principles are cap-



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tive to the administrator, to the technician, to the field expert, and to those who design and operate systems that connect policy to implementation. States that expose that connection tend to do well; states that seek to suppress this trajectory by muzzling or sidelining their technocrats often find themselves criticized and their efforts undermined.

Third, the nature of borders will change. As mentioned in more detail above, borders will indeed matter more for the control of people. At the same time, they will matter less for the organization of economic activity. At the same time, the nature of the porosity for economic activity will depend on the alignment of particular states within clusters of states organized around a vanguard state. The result, of course, is a fundamental reorganization of globalization. But this is unpalatable. So, expect that these changes will occur without much comment. Expect as well that those at the forefront of change will reject any notion that they are changing anything., And expect as well that eventually the principles of globalization will be re-interpreted to provide the discursive basis for legitimating the new global organization of economic activity.

Fourth, few people speak to international financial institutions and their role in the post COVID-19 world. That is a pity. Largely left behind, perhaps as a matter of policy, perhaps because their bureaucratic girth makes nimble movement difficult, it is possible that the role of IFIS will be changed. On the one hand, in the middle term public IFIs may become a useful tool for the implementation of normalized expectations for national shepherding of their populations to ensure maximum productivity (and thus maximum contribution, in the aggregate, to collective wealth). Loan conditionality, technical assistance and the like, the now ancient tools of IFI management of states can be used to those ends. But that requires consensus about what exactly is to be expected of states. That latter project will likely provide a window in the contests for global control of narrative among the US-China-EU with second order powers working furiously at the margins. Irrespective of the way that it is resolved, the application of the fundamental principles of animal husbandry through the language of rights will likely grow.

Fifth, the discourse of migration, as well as its management, are likely to change. One of the peculiar consequences of the pandemic, already much noted, has been the way that states, without much resistance, were able to reconstitute their borders for the protection of their populations. But borders are tools with a rich palette of uses—even if only directed against people. While it is unlikely that the discourse of migration will change much in the short term, it is possible that the management of migration—especially where it can be reconstituted as the movement of peoples (collective movement) rather than the product of individual circumstances—may begin to assume a different form, and one that is more restrictive. At the same time, this broader movement will be masked by wide variations among states, given their national challenges. More interesting will be the extent to which migration becomes a challenge more among states with vul-

nerable populations, than of migration between the periphery and the “metropolis.”

Sixth, the nature of the police power will likely change as well. It is likely that the future of power will be shaped as much by models based on data analytics, as it will be founded on the application of principles and human judgment. Machine learning and modelling has driven the response to COVID-19 irrespective of the political-economic or moral model to which the responding state adheres. The human factors has been disappearing from the development of approaches to protecting the human factor in societal organization. One speaks here to “at risk” populations, to the science of transmission, to predictive analytics. One speaks here to the use of analysis to align health, sustainability, economic and political consequences in ways that maximize the objectives of those applying the analytics. One sees, in the end, the emerge of automated management as the principal consequence and effect of the pandemic on the way in which the global order is conceived and managed. In the future it is as likely that contests for power will be between distinctive approaches to data analytics, and the effectiveness of the algorithms used to provide incentives and punishments than it will be about the underlying principles around which society—even global society—is ordered.

Professor Larry Backer researches globalization, especially as it relates to the emergence of ways of understanding constitutional and enterprise law. His most recent work touches on the regulation of multinational corporations, sovereign wealth funds, transnational constitutionalism, and the convergence of public and private law. He researches issues of governments as private actors in global markets, the development of law and social norm systems to regulate business and human rights.



Mehmet Ogutcu

Chairman of the
London Energy Club



What will be the effects of coronavirus on the current world order?

There has been no shortage of debates on the new world order, particularly during the 30 years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet we have not been able to create a viable new blueprint for the global governance in trade, finance, investment, geopolitics, and energy, boding well with all the dramatic changes and requirements.

One reason for this has been the reluctance of the US, portrayed as the “sole superpower,” to open space in the international arena for other emerging dynamic powers like China, India, Russia, Brazil, Indonesia, as well as regional heavyweights such as Turkey and Iran.

A glimmer of hope has emerged with the corona calamity given that we all recognize that the only way out is to revive the spirit of international co-operation and solidarity. Clearly, no nation alone can contain or survive such a dangerous contagion and its aftermath. It is for this reason that the US-China-EU trio, which controls the summitry of our world, must embark upon an urgent collaborative program, not only for themselves but for the entire globe. This may also help us lay the foundations of a long-overdue world order to take account of new realities on the ground and heal the wounds of our common planet.

Yet, it is still early, in my view, for this sacred desire to materialize any time soon no matter how much we want and the current circumstances force it on us simply because the leadership in Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and

Beijing is not ready to take such a vital step. They are more concerned about their declining fortunes and future aspirations of supremacy than rewriting the rules that have governed all life on this planet.

They do not want the fragile balance of power to be upset and give advantage to other aspirants that emerge powerfully in the global equation. It is a great pity and missed opportunity that will have devastating consequences.


The current world order is largely based on liberalism and to some extent on realism approaches. What are the deficiencies of the said approaches revealed by coronavirus?

We must admit that the corona pandemic, like the attacks of September 11, 2001, the financial crisis of 2008 and many great depressions before it, has brought about a tremendous shock that will not go away anytime soon.

We do not know how long it will linger on and whether there will be a second wave of another virus, as speculated, to further shock us.

Whilst we expect common, coordinated actions at the global level, the cracks amongst the traditional power centers, the US and Europe, are growing wide and internal solidarity is set to weaken. Russia is trying to create a strong position for itself in Eurasia, considered to be its "backyard," and even in the Middle East and East Mediterranean, and has built an effective "marriage of convenience" with China.

Can the Chinese leadership fill the gap left by the US? Does Beijing go beyond the regional superpower role and take on the global free investment and trade championship? Will it take the helm in climate change



and energy as well?

China is struggling to tackle its own structural economic problems, which were challenging to the lead even before the disaster struck Wuhan.

Whether the unchecked power of the Chinese government is the main reason the country has successfully slowed—and perhaps even stopped—domestic transmission of the virus is of course questionable. Will China emerge from the crisis a stronger global power?

True, this crisis has also laid bare gaps in American policy. Biodefense is a key component of national security; the US needs to put more technology to work tracking diseases before the next big outbreak, as China has successfully done.

The EU faces growing problems with its cohesion: Southerners and northerners are having a shouting match over the proposal for corona bonds, while Viktor Orbán's Hungary is turning even more authoritarian, supposedly in the name of combating the outbreak. If the EU disintegrates into a loose and weak grouping of powerful individual members, this may not be a big surprise.

I believe that free, transparent and efficient economic and political systems are needed to win the fight against the coronavirus and drive the recovery. The leadership gap is bigger than any other gap in the West.

Despite all odds, we must maintain our optimism and prepare ourselves to avoid an unexpected fait accompli.

Although the outbreak of the virus has put the realism and self-help approaches in the

center of the focus, it also has revealed deficiencies of the realism which is based on state security and looks at the security issue just militarily. The outbreak of the virus also showed that militaristic economies also are not able to maintain the security of nations and governments in the post-corona era. **What do you think of this?**

An increasingly interconnected world means that the global impact of what has historically been local disease outbreaks can have far-reaching political, social and economic consequences.

The military cannot escape its devastating effects.

In an age of intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, long-range bombers and remotely controlled drones, the role of the military will also change.

Although we still have direct or proxy conventional wars being waged in different parts of the world, I believe that tomorrow's wars will no longer be fought by tanks, fighter jets, and missiles. The battlefields are trade, investment, technology, currency, energy, water, food, and values.

The biological viruses are no doubt part of this ruthless asymmetrical warfare without causing bloodshed and physical destruction. Recently, 10 drones were enough to wipe out almost half of the Saudi oil production and processing facilities.

Not surprisingly, the corona outbreak has given rise to conspiracy theories that the virus is man-made and it could possibly be a Chinese bioweapon, originally developed in a military medical research facility outside Shanghai. Likewise, the Chinese government spokesman blamed the US for developing this virus and spreading it in Wuhan in a hostile action to contain the "Middle Kingdom".

Thank God, both sides later declared a "ceasefire" in this exchange of accusations. However, even a mention of this possibility

The biological viruses are no doubt part of this ruthless asymmetrical warfare without causing bloodshed and physical destruction. Recently, 10 drones were enough to wipe out almost half of the Saudi oil production and processing facilities

demonstrates that the coronavirus could well be an effective biological weapon if any side really wanted to use it.

It has already locked us in homes, caused the cruise industry to sink, stocks to plummet, food supply chains to disrupt and global mobility to stop. You can hardly achieve these through a conventional military action alone.

Even while most of the attention has been focused on the virus' impact on health policy and the economy — and rightfully so — there are security implications resulting from the spread. We do not seem to have a Plan B for dealing with such outbreaks or the impacts on our military preparedness and operations. Even in NATO's most recent strategic concept, an official policy document to guide the Alliance to prepare for future threats, there is not even a single mention of the word "pandemic".

There are news reports that some military forces are trying to take advantage of the contagion crises in Iraq, Syria, and Libya by launching new attacks.

I believe that the coronavirus is a warning to us; unless we pull ourselves together for an effective, non-selfish global



response and move towards creating a novel order to achieve peace, prosperity and ecological balance, the worst-case scenarios may come true, unfortunately.

If we accept that the post-corona world order will be different from the existing one, will the changes be structural and fundamental ones? Which meanings will experience fundamental changes?

Let's remember that after World War II, the common understanding of why both world wars took place was nationalism and not providing room to major nations on the world stage.

If today more countries go the way of Trump's US, saying "every sheep hangs on its own leg" and "my country first," it is unlikely that in the post-corona era we will be evolving towards a new environmentally friendly, healthy, conflict-free, equitable global order in finance, energy, trade, geopolitical that we all aspire.

It is common knowledge that effective governance is not necessarily the strong suit of liberal democracies. Rather, the true merits of a liberal society are its freedom of the press and information, and its rule of law. This does not guarantee a timely response to a virus outbreak. Singapore tolerates far more freedom of information than China, and South Korea

is a liberal democracy. Their responses to the pandemic have been relatively successful so far, although their situations have not been as dire as in China's Hubei province.

The solution, therefore, is a hybrid regime that combines the voice of the people through popular elections with more decision-making power given to the "meritocrats". The emphasis of the Asian value of collectivism over individualism — a factor often attributed to the emergence of the "East Asia miracle" in the second half of last century — is also mentioned as one of the main reasons behind this region's success in fighting the pandemic better than the Western nations.

As a result of the current trends we follow, we may end up with the first stage of globalization coming to a halt. The second phase will not resemble what we have become accustomed to and may not be as free and liberal as the first. It can be an ugly and dangerous one.

In this age of rapidity and in light of the lessons learned from previous crises and conflicts, it is sad to say that a common effort cannot be launched swiftly and we have to wait further until our pains and hopelessness will grow everywhere. This will accompany, it goes without saying, serious social and political disturbances that will exasperate the situation.



Arshin Adib-Moghaddam

Chair of the Centre for Iranian Studies at the London Middle East Institute



What will be the effects of coronavirus on the current world order?

If anything, Covid-19 revealed that there is a lack of political rationality and a great amount of governmental inaptitude, which defies any talk of “orders” and “systems”. This terrible pandemic comes at a time when we have the worse governments in place. The only order that is visible is based on community bonds. The people, once again, are the ones who are carrying the burden, despite of the incompetence of their political leaders. But on a more abstract level, the pandemic will accelerate a process that had already started – The slow but definite demise of the United States as a global leader.

The current world order is majorly based on neoliberalism and to some extent on realism approaches. What are the deficiencies of the said approaches revealed by coronavirus?

The current international system is more complex than these theories appreciate. In fact, there is nothing “realistic” about much of the talk in government circles, but a lot of irrational “idealism”. So it depends on how we define these terms. What is central is a rational, science-based approach to life and existence on our planet. A global approach that accepts the inevitable interconnectivity of human life which this pandemic so painfully revealed. No theory can capture this inherent complexity of human existence. The failure of “realism” and “neo-liberalism” is exactly that. These are



ideas that claim, what they don't deliver: A functioning and just economy and good governance. We don't have either, in any of the contexts we are looking at.


Although Corona has drawn the attention of countries to the realist approach and the principle of “self-help”, on the other hand, it has led to the inefficiency of the realist approach to security, which is based on “state security” and prioritizes It defines “the security of the ruling elite” and sees the issue of security as purely military. On the other hand, the outbreak of the virus has shown that militaristic economies do not provide public security(human security), and that governments should pay more attention to “human security” in the post-Corona world, and that overlapping “state security” with “human security” is greater than ever. What do you think about this?

The pandemic revealed exactly what realist theories in International Relations are based on: state-centrism. It is simply stupid to assume that a pandemic that is by definition global can be battled without global coordination. What we need is better global governance, more multilateralism, a global laboratory with the best scientists that can find a vaccine against pandemics such as Covid-19. Instead, we have psycho-nationalism. This is the predicament of our age and

the challenge of our generation. If we fail, humanity will fail. I think it as dramatic as that.

If we accept that the post-corona world order will be different from the existing one, will the changes be structural and fundamental ones? Which meanings will experience fundamental changes?

A fundamentally new world order can only come about with a fundamentally different conception of governance and a redistribution of political power away from the state. On the communal level we need a federalism that devolves power to small communities to have their own hospitals, care homes, facilities. Defense and formal security can be nationally organised, governance needn't be. Beyond that federal micro-layer, and the national layer we need a strong global level of governance and multilateral cooperation that is respectful of national sovereignty of course. Power needs to be dispersed above and below the nation-state. Only then, can individuals decide for themselves, and only then can we really pool our resources to combat the pandemic, environmental degradation or any other existential threats that connects my fate to yours, and yours to everyone else on the planet. Imagine that!



Marwin Zonis

Professor of international political economy and leadership at the University of Chicago



What will be the effects of coronavirus on the existing world order?

The Coronavirus will be extraordinarily disruptive of the current world order. President Trump continues his ruthless assault on the world order by refusing to extend American leadership to other stricken countries. Simultaneously, China is making every effort to replace the U. as the world leader. Yet things will not go smoothly for China. Global supply chains are expanding beyond China to other countries, primarily in East Asia. Many countries that have accepted huge loans from China from its Belt and Road Initiative will find it impossible to remain current on those loans. China will be faced with the dilemma of allowing defaults or taking ownership over failed projects across Asia, Africa, and even Europe. Perhaps worst of all, countries primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa will experience threatening political unrest from their failed economies and massive numbers of virus deaths. The combination will drive flows of massive numbers of refugees seeking to enter countries in the developed world.

The existing world order is majorly based on liberalism and to some extent on realism approaches. What are the deficiencies of the liberalism and realism approaches revealed by the outbreak of coronavirus?

There are times in which markets fail. The coronavirus has certainly produced one of those times. It is very hard to imagine that post-virus, the liberal order will

remain unaffected. Huge government interventions in the economies of the country after country are unsustainably large. They will certainly be drastically reduced over time. But it is also likely that the interventions of governments in their economies will be considerably greater than pre-virus.

The outbreak of the virus also showed that militaristic economies also are not able to maintain the security of nations and governments in post-corona era. What do you think of this?

Any country which believes its security can be assured solely through military means is surely delusional. But then again, I do not know of a single country that believes this. But we certainly will see a change in the United States. Since the al Qaeda attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, the US has focused on threats to its well-being from terrorism. That is likely to change to a great extent to preparations to deal with future global pandemics. There will surely be more pandemics, especially if the world fails to police Chinese food markets to eliminate animals from whom new viruses will pass to humans in the future.

If we accept that the post-corona world order will be different from the existing one, do you think that the changes will be fundamental ones?

If world leaders are not brain dead — which many appear to be — there will be fundamental changes. But so many countries have leaders in complete denial (Bolsonaro in Brazil, for example) or have public bureaucracies so incompetent (Nigeria, for example) or are mired in such corruption (Iraq, for example) that it is highly unlikely they will be able to come to terms with the new reality.





Osman Faruk Logoglu

a senior member of
Turkey's CHP and
veteran politician

Dr. Logoglu believes the outbreak of the coronavirus will result in great changes throughout the world.


He said, "The one statement about the post-corona world which is categorically true is that it is going to be substantially different from the world as we know it today. What is not certain is whether it will be a better world or one that is worse. The pandemic will have deep and lasting consequences on global politics, the economy, lifestyles, and education to name a select few areas. The trend toward national self-isolation will continue, spelling the end of the benefits of globalization and increasing the potential for inter-state competition and thereby the risk of conflicts. The global balance of power is likely to shift away from the US and Europe toward China and Asia. Capitalism will experience a surge with big capital holders buying out failing companies across the globe, leading to further concentration of capital in fewer hands. Income distribution inequalities will get worse, with the developing and underdeveloped countries suffering the most. With the continuing impact of climate change, economic devastation in these countries may lead to massive migration across borders."

Logoglu added, "In terms of impact on our daily life, work from home, rather than in the office, may become the new normal. The same may be the case in the field of education. Business and international meetings will be conducted increasingly via video conferences. Tourism will experience a global downturn.

COVID-19

CORONA VIRUS

The message of coronavirus to humankind is clear: "I am deadly. But I can be defeated. To do that, you must act together and cooperate. Stop bickering. Stop fighting each other. Stop hurting each other, whether by sanctions or by other means." So far, humankind has not gotten this message. Hence, we must all brace ourselves for more difficult and trying days ahead."





Nicholas Onuf

one of the founders
of constructivism in
International Relations

What will be the effects of coronavirus on the current world order?

This is a very difficult question for a theorist to answer since theories seek to explain in general terms, and the pandemic is not a generalizable phenomenon for the purposes of international relations theory. As a theorist, I think it is most useful to view the pandemic as a potential catalyst for a significant change in the current world situation. In this respect, the influenza pandemic of 1918 (in which my own grandfather died at the age of 32) was not a catalytic event in itself, because it came at the end of an already disruptive world war. The current pandemic comes at a time when the world's political economy is in serious trouble. Financial institutions are over-extended, disparities in wealth are widening, technological innovation is waning, infrastructure is decaying at an alarming rate in the advanced economies, and climate change is relentless. The 2020 pandemic will inevitably cause a deep, global depression possibly lasting several years. Whether a full recovery is even possible remains to be seen. I suspect that the pandemic catalyst will trigger down-growth, at best leading to a Japan-style deflationary stagnation in the wealthier economies. Elsewhere, rapid, uncontrolled down-growth will prompt social unrest within states and beggar-thy-neighbor politics among them. I have publicly warned of this eventuality for many decades, and I often wondered if I would live long enough to see it happen.

The current world order is majorly based on liberalism and to some extent on realism approaches. What are the deficiencies of the said

approaches revealed by coronavirus?

Political realism is broadly materialist, but it is predicated on a few assumptions about human nature, and not a 'nature' that makes a mockery of our self-regard. Realists have nothing to say about a crisis, not of our making—even if health specialists would argue that it is very much a crisis of our making. Neoliberals smugly believe that the world capitalist economy has brought unprecedented prosperity and relative peace to the world as a whole, but they consistently underestimate the fragility of the current world situation; they will have nothing helpful to say when the world economy fails to recover 'on its own.' Leftists and postmodern theorists will content themselves by saying 'we told you this would happen.'

Although the Outbreak of the virus has put the realism and self-help approaches in the center of the focus, it also has revealed deficiencies of the realism which is based on state security and looks at the security issue just militarily. Outbreak of the virus also showed that militaristic economies also are not able to maintain the security of nations and governments in the post-corona era. What do you think of this?

The problem is not just 'militaristic economies.' The modern state in whatever form has shown itself too easily overwhelmed by this crisis in human security. Arguably China is one of the most militarized states in the world and one of the most successful in managing the crisis. The same goes for South Korea. The US has been a disaster in this respect and for many reasons, including an ineffectual president and a constitution that empowers local authorities in matters of human security. It seems to me that real issue is the rise of functionally-oriented



administrative regimes at every level, from the World Health Organization to city health departments, and the absence of effective coordinative mechanisms within and between levels.

If we accept that the post-corona world order will be different from the existing one, will the changes be structural and fundamental ones? Which meanings will experience fundamental changes?

Despite the uneven, laggard response of public health authorities at every level to the pandemic, I do not expect a significant change in what I would call modernist socio-political arrangements. Publics everywhere will depend more and more on functionally defined administrative regimes for their welfare as the modern world undergoes uneven immiseration in the decades ahead. When and where functionalist elites fail to provide for minimal public needs, social unrest will increase, as I pointed out in my response to the first question. With ever fewer resources to draw on, administrative capacity will diminish, state leaders will dither, and crises in human security can only increase in number and scale.



Paul R. Pillar

Pillar is an academic and 28-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), serving from 1977 to 2005

He is now a non-resident senior fellow at Georgetown University's Center for Security Studies, as well as a nonresident senior fellow in the Brookings Institution's Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence.

What will be effects of coronavirus on the current world order?

A crisis as intense and far-reaching as the current episode with the coronavirus inevitably invites commentary on what will be the wider effects of the crisis, including on the world order. There has already been a surge of such commentary. Much of that commentary reflects the understandable impulse of pundits and commentators to say something profound about the biggest news story of the day, as much as what it says about the coronavirus pandemic itself. Thus it is safe to assume that the actual effects of the pandemic on the world order will be less than what much of the commentary might lead one to believe. Crises do, however, tend to amplify and sometimes speed up processes that already were in train before the crisis began. I expect that we will see such amplification in the current case. The way that the United States and China have each responded to the pandemic will, for example, tend to hasten the decline in U.S. world leadership and the increase in China's role.

Current world order is majorly based on neoliberalism and to some extent on realism approaches. What are the deficiencies of the said

approaches revealed by coronavirus?

These "isms" each consist of a descriptive element (how the world actually operates) and a prescriptive element (how statesmen, to be effective, ought to deal with the rest of the world). The current public health crisis has underscored how this distinction applies to the applicability of neoliberalism and realism. Many national responses to the pandemic would appear to support realist explanations of how governments actually operate, with more focus on the individual nation-state than on an international order. Meanwhile, the fact that a contagious virus does not respect international boundaries argues for a prescriptive approach that thinks at least as much in international as in national terms. However, a disciplined use of realism, properly defined, would recognize that even if one is focused narrowly on the interests of one's own nation and rejects many of the hypotheses of neoliberals, protecting those national interests in a time of a global pandemic requires policies that recognize how much the pandemic is an international problem requiring international cooperation.

Although Corona has drawn the attention of countries to the realist approach and the principle of "self-help", on the other hand, it has led to the inefficiency of the realist approach to security, which is based on "state security" and prioritizes It defines "the security of the ruling elite" and sees the issue of security as purely military. On the other hand, the outbreak of the virus has shown that militaristic economies do not provide public security(human security), and that governments should pay more attention to "human security" in the post-Corona world, and that overlapping "state security"



with "human security" is greater than ever. What do you think about this?

We should not have needed the coronavirus pandemic to realize that security should not be defined just in military terms. Nothing is more inherent to the security of one's people than their health (and having the medical and economic resources to ensure that health). Perhaps the current pandemic will persuade some more people of that truth, but the tendency to think of national security in military terms is very strong, partly because "national security" elements of governments tend to involve military matters.

If we accept that the post-corona world order will be different from the existing one, will the changes be structural and fundamental ones? Which meanings will be experience fundamental changes?

As I mentioned, I think whatever changes come about will be less fundamental than an amplification of changes already taking place. It will be interesting, however, to see whether attitudes change at all about the needed role of government in responding to something like an infectious disease. How will, for example, American conservatives, who generally proclaim an anti-government ideology, perceive the conservative prime minister of the United Kingdom as he praises the National Health Service--a thoroughly socialized system of medical care--for saving his own life and for being the key to saving his country from the coronavirus?



Professor Charles Taliaferro

a member of St
Olaf's Department of
Philosophy since 1985



What will be effects of coronavirus on the current world order?

It is too early to know, but one likely outcome is that national isolationism and the social segregation of peoples based on race or wealth will be more difficult. There is evidence that the coronavirus is, like most calamities, more gravely impacting the poor and dispossessed, but there is also evidence in much of the world, that the powerful and elite are vulnerable and some highly placed powerful persons have become ill, including the Prime Minister of Great Britain which was once the most powerful empire in the world. The message that is being broadcast to the United States population is that we are all in this together. If I fail to take care of myself, I can be a danger to others. It is my deepest hope that we, the people on this planet, will be less individualistic, more aware that our lives are interlinked. Perhaps more and more of us will come to realize that without a serious, national and international commitment to stable, cooperative public, global health we cannot function well. I don't think that commitment will be effective unless disparities of health care are addressed. A whit privileged billionaire In New York City may shelter in his elite apartment, but his isolation will have to be permanent unless the poor, the homeless and under-employed are cared for.

Current world order is majorly based on neo-liberalism and to some extent on realism approaches. What are the deficiencies of the said



approaches revealed by coronavirus?

The current form of realism that has guided the Trump administration is under great stress, but will probably prevail unless Trump is not re-elected. Just as Trump will negotiate with known terrorist groups like the Taliban if he believes it is in America's interest, he might be provoked into some moderate international cooperation if he thinks America will be best served that way. But in terms of neoliberalism globally, my hope is that we might see a more communitarian practice, a realization that each for each of us, our well being depends upon each other.

Although Corona has drawn the attention of coun-

tries to the realist approach and the principle of "self-help", on the other hand, it has led to the inefficiency of the realist approach to security, which is based on "state security" and prioritizes It defines "the security of the ruling elite" and sees the issue of security as purely military. On the other hand, the outbreak of the virus has shown that militaristic economies do not provide public security(human security), and that governments should pay more attention to "human security" in the post-Corona world, and that overlapping "state security" with "human security" is greater than ever. What do you think about this?

That is exactly what I believe or what I hope for. History shows us that the response to pandemics vary radically. As a philosophy professor, it is painful to realize that in the lifetime of Socrates, the plague in Athens led



N

to social chaos, the breakdown of collaboration, and, according to the historian Thucydides, the disintegration of language, when terms like “loyalty” and “courage” might be used to describe what we would call betrayal and cowardice. On the other hand, after the plague subsided in 14th century Europe, with possibly as high as 80 million dead, what we call the Renaissance blossomed.

D


If we accept that the post-corona world order will be different from the existing one, will the changes be structural and fundamental ones? Which meanings will be experience fundamental changes?

I think that most of us who will prioritize what you call human security will need for those changes to be structural and fundamental.

E

Just before this interview, I learned that a friend, the husband of an artist in New York City died of the virus in a hospital room alone. He was a wealthy art dealer. Before long, each of us will know someone who knows someone who tests positive. It is my hope that the elite and powerful will learn that short of isolation on their own island, the world must change if we are to have a stable global life in which there can be enduring human flourishing.

MIC



Richard Anderson Falk


is an American professor emeritus of international law at Princeton University



What will be effects of coronavirus on the current world order?

At this point, in the middle of the pandemic, any response is highly speculative. When speculating it seems helpful to distinguish between what we regard as probable and desirable effects of a kind that would be beneficial for humanity.

With respect to probable effects, I aware of two broad sets of influential perspectives emerging, some of which admittedly somewhat confuse what is likely to happen with what we wish would happen. As near as I can tell from listening to the American post-pandemic discourse, the private and public sector leaders are now preoccupied with taking steps to restore the pre-pandemic dynamics without substantial modifications beyond the recognition that governments should invest more resources in preparing national health systems for a recurrence of the COVID-19 outbreak or from another contagious disease. It is important to appreciate that previously in this century there were several lethal epidemics (SARS, Ebola, avian flu), although this COVID-19 experience has a far greater human and societal impact for two main reasons: first, the WHO has officially declared it to be a ‘pandemic,’ which automatically focuses attention on the severity of the challenge; and secondly, the crisis has seriously afflicted countries in the West, which heightens world media and public attention further, and ensures more effort to assess the experience from a world order perspective. This latter observation is



particularly true for the United States, and possibly China, as both have become 'global states,' that is, States with an array of major political, economic, and social engagements beyond their national boundaries.

What restoring pre-pandemic world order is not entirely clear, and is somewhat contested, as to what were its essential features. Most obviously, it would mean facilitating the rapid revival of transnational trade and capital flows, a renewed effort to overcome rising economic tensions before the onset of the pandemic. Such a preferred model of a restored world overlooks the ultra-nationalist trends in major States that involved a retreat from neoliberal globalization, and was reinforced by negative reactions by many Western countries to refugees from combat zones and migrants seeking a better standard of living. The lockdowns during the health crisis also provided pretexts for relying on surveillance technologies, and generally led to greater social tolerance for authoritarian policies and practices, governance habits that could easily persist after the pandemic phase of the disease has ended.

These obstacles to reviving the 'old normal' will also be challenged by the widespread belief that many of the jobs lost during the pandemic will not become available to workers in a post-pandemic atmosphere as economies will take advantage of automation due to developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics. Particularly in capitalist countries, past economic crises have been occasions for a streamlining of the labor force on the basis of more rigorous standards of capital efficiency. In so doing, profits margins are regained, even increased, while jobs are being lost and high unemployment haunts the recovery process. There is little reason to doubt that this pattern will be repeated in the present circumstances, which included such drastic socio-economic dislocations.

A more prescriptive effort to restore the old world order based on stability and economic growth places emphasis on recreating the conditions that produced what is embraced as past success. Henry Kissinger, writing in the conservative Wall Street Journal, recommended an imitation of the strategies relied upon after the end of World War II, especially assertive American global leadership, a mobilization of resources to restore market vitality in the countries of the West most adversely affected by the pandemic, and a strengthened health system as integral to future national, global, and regional security. This kind of assessment blends the probable with the desirable, but it also swims against the pre-pandemic tide of ultra-nationalism that placed stress on transactional bargains rather than cooperative problem-solving that acknowledged global interests as a main component of national interests, given the realities

of digital globalization, or the complexities of interconnectedness. Insofar as directed at Washington, any serious prospect of strong American global leadership depends on replacing Trump with someone more responsive to the global scale challenges facing humanity.

From my perspective, a desirable post-pandemic approach would definitely seek 'a new normal' that gave primary attention to meeting the pre-pandemic challenges of global inequality, climate change, extreme poverty, policy concerns that were not being adequately addressed by the procedures of state-centric world order, especially given the various failures of global leadership by the United States and the excesses of post-Cold War capitalism. Such a reorientation of international political behavior would also require the repudiation of militarist geopolitics and the abandonment of coercive diplomacy (including sanctions), and their replacement by respect for international law and the authority of the United Nations, and a better balance in foreign policy between the sovereign rights of States and the global responsibility of the UN System to secure compliance with individual and collective rights, as well as encouraging ecological stewardship and climate justice. Such a visionary approach will strike many observers as utopian, but from another perspective such advocacy can be regarded as embodying a necessary ethical, security, and ecological response framework to the realities and threats of the contemporary world.

Current world order is mostly based on neoliberalism and to some extent on political realist policymaking. What are the deficiencies of these approaches as revealed by coronavirus?

I would add a structural element to your way of summarizing current world order. It is the statist character of world order that has evolved over time from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia that ended the Religious Wars in Europe, and gave rise to the primacy of



the territorial sovereign state as the main building block of world order. This state-centric world order, originally a European regional arrangement, became gradually universalized as the dialectic between colonialism and anti-colonialism in the non-Western world unfolded, culminating in a consensus among governments that only States were eligible to become fully accredited participants in formal international politics. This criterion regulating status and participation in international political life also explains limiting membership in the United Nations to entities that qualify as States under international law. Colonialism imposed statist networks in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa with little attention to the antecedent experience of empire and colonial rule, thereby overlooking the reality of ethnic and traditional contours of human community for the affected peoples. This has led these regions to endure continuous strife in the post-colonial world that can only

be avoided by imposing authoritarian rule that achieves order by repressing resisting elements in the society.

A further aspect of this kind of Westphalian world order is the role of geopolitics, which here refers to the discretionary behavior of leading States that refuse to accept restraints on their freedom of maneuver externally, and reject any kind of accountability with regard to abuse internal to their own country. The legalization of such rogue behavior is exhibited in the UN Charter by vesting a right of veto in the five permanent members of the Security Council, the only decision-making body within the UN System. In effect, the UN Charter rather shockingly acknowledges the uncontrollability of the five political actors that most endanger international peace and security. Turkey has for a decade been challenging this kind of hegemonic arrangement by calling for global reform, adopting the slogan 'the world is greater than five' to highlight its campaign to diminish the influence of geopolitics within the workings of the UN System.

As your question suggests, neoliberalism and political realism have played influential roles in giving shape to international life, but in both cases, at considerable cost from the perspective of human wellbeing and ecological stability. As earlier indicated, neoliberalism privileges the efficiency of capital over the wellbeing of people, accentuating ecological harm on one side, and extremes of inequality on the other side. The effect of this ideological shaping of behavior is to accentuate poverty, alienation, class conflict, while inclining governance at the level of the State toward autocratic leadership. Political realism is imbued with the idea that national interests, narrowly and selfishly conceived as excluding




both global concerns and deference to international ethical and legal norms. Such realists insist that such a calculation of national interests is the only reliable basis for the formation of foreign policy. In this sense, realism has become unrealistic. In our times we need to develop strong mechanisms of global problem-solving to meet such challenges as global warming, migration pressures, declining biodiversity, ecocide, and genocide. Political realism remains anchored in seventeenth century conditions where autonomous territorial communities didn't need any external framework of restraint. Under twenty-first century conditions such realism has become dangerously out of touch with the severe and accumulating existential threats of the twenty-first century.

Although Corona has drawn the attention of countries to the realist approach and the principle of "self-help", on the other hand, it has led to the inefficiency of the realist approach to security, which is based on "state security" and prioritizes It defines "the security of the ruling elite" and sees the issue of security as purely military. On the other hand, the outbreak of the virus has shown that militaristic economies do not provide public security(human security), and that governments should pay more attention to "human security" in the post-Coronavirus world, which confirms that the overlapping of "state security" and "human se-

curity" is greater than ever. What do you think about this?

I would again call attention to my distinction between probable and desirable outcomes once the crisis atmosphere subsides. There is no doubt in my mind that a human security approach to 'security' would be a desirable way to incorporate the lessons of the COVID-19 ordeal. Yet I believe this to be a highly improbable outcome beyond a narrow focus on strengthening national preparedness for facing future epidemiological challenges, and possibly endowing the WHO with an early warning responsibility. Even this focus is less a matter of upholding human security than it is a realization that governmental legitimacy depends on keeping the economy functioning, and this depends on minimizing the impact of disabling health challenges, which unlike climate change have an immediate concrete life-threatening potential impact on every person on the planet as to make the threat unpostponable or deniable at least after the bodies begin to pile up.

Nevertheless, it is more important than ever for public intellectuals to insist upon a human security framework both to challenge the war system, including its enormous unproductive diversion of energies and resources, and to endow a human rights culture with political potency so as to ensure that state/society relations develop ethical standards implemented by the rule of law. We live at a time when what seems necessary also seems out of reach, which suggests that we should reach further, and admit that struggle for a better future is worthwhile because good surprises, as well as bad ones (for instance, the pandemic) can happen. In a sense, to



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meet the threats confronting the world we need to realize that our basic condition is uncertainty about the future not a fatalistic sense of doom.

If we accept that the post-Corona world order will be different from the existing one, will the changes be structural and fundamental ones? Which new meanings will be experienced as fundamental changes?

I think it is impossible to identify at this point what will be the post-Corona effects on global structures and fundamental characteristics. I believe that there is unlikely to be any profound effects without prior seismic-scale challenges to the established order in major countries of the world. Neither the U.S. nor China, the former asserting itself via reliance on military capabilities and the forcible penetration of foreign political spaces and the latter expanding its influence by way of positive economic inducements, seem inclined to alter world order in ways that are structural and fundamental, but this perception might be mistaken. The U.S. seems somewhat open to a movement from below for drastic change gaining power, and shifting the policy focus of government to a human security agenda.

The Sanders campaign for the Democratic Party presidential nomination arguably came close to gaining enough influence to mount such an effort, and it has pledged to continue pursuing these goals by further augmenting its influence as a social and political movement. China has become a formidable global state by relying on 'soft power,' expansion of trade, economic growth, foreign economic assistance, and non-coercive diplomatic activism at the UN and elsewhere. Hard power geopolitics heavily depends on military capabilities for leverage and as a policy instrument, while soft power avoids to the extent possible, without rejecting on principle, political violence, conserving its resources for more productive applications, including global cooperation and human security. At the same time, with respect to internal politics, the U.S. 'soft' authoritarianism is more amenable to reformist changes and more adaptable to certain aspects of human security than is China 'hard' authoritarianism. From this perspective, the main energy for human security in the West is likely to come, if at all, from movements of people whereas in China and other deeply rooted authoritarian systems such an energy for change would almost certainly have to come from governing elites.


What will be effects of coronavirus on the current world order?

Hard to tell at this point, but the most likely outcome will be to decrease globalization and international cooperation and heighten nationalism, making it even harder to deal with other world-wide problems like climate change. But there is at least a chance that leaders and the general public will conclude that one reason for the devastation caused by the virus was that states did not cooperate enough and that the relevant international institutions were too weak.

Current world order is majorly based on neo-liberalism and to some extent on realism approaches. What are the deficiencies of the said approaches revealed by coronavirus?

Realism properly understood implies that while states put their own interests first, they also are intelligent and consider the one-run impact of what they are doing. It further assumes that central authorities control local ones. The former assumption did not hold true for the US; the latter did not describe China. So I think the problem was not with the wisdom of Realist prescriptions but with the ways states deviated from what Realism called for.

Although Corona has drawn the attention of countries to the realist approach and the principle of "self-help", on the other hand, it has led to the inefficiency of the realist approach to security, which is based on "state security" and prioritizes It defines "the security of the ruling




elite” and sees the issue of security as purely military. On the other hand, the outbreak of the virus has shown that militaristic economies do not provide public security(human security), and that governments should pay more attention to “human security” in the post-Corona world, and that overlapping “state security” with “human security” is greater than ever. What do you think about this?

While it is true that realism focuses on military threats, it does not exclude other types. It is interesting that in the US one of the agencies that was most alert to the danger of pandemics and the need to prepare was the Department of Defense. The trouble is that until it hit this kind of danger seemed hypothetical and abstract, and humans and their governments tend to give problems of this little concerted attention despite the fact that frequent reports and table-top exercises showed how unprepared we were.

If we accept that the post-corona world order will be different from the existing one, will the changes be structural and fundamental ones? Which meanings will be experience fundamental changes?

As noted above, hard to tell. The “Spanish” flu of 1918-19 was devastating, but had little impact on the subsequent world order.



Robert Edwards Hunter

Ambassador to NATO during the Clinton Administration




Robert Edwards Hunter is an American government employee and foreign policy expert, who served as United States Ambassador to NATO during the Clinton Administration.

What will be effects of coronavirus on the current world order?

Too early to tell. Part of it will depend on whether the US political class learns the lessons of having let our “positive” leadership slide in the last few years. “Competitors for power:” will try to pick up where they left out. That will include the Middle East (of course, there has been little “pause” in these competitions, now.) I do expect significant reorientation of supply chains, perhaps efforts (at least in the US) to reduce dependence on China. But remember that interests of finance and the private sector will be the same. (China and Russia will hope to profit in terms of relative positions regarding other countries and the overall “system.”)

Although Corona has drawn the attention of countries to the realist approach and the principle of “self-help”, on the other hand, it has led to the inefficiency of the realist approach to security, which is based on “state security” and prioritizes It defines “the security of the ruling elite” and sees the issue of security as purely military. On the other hand, the outbreak of the virus has shown that militaristic economies do not provide public security(human security), and that governments should pay more



attention to “human security” in the post-Cretan world, and that overlapping “state security” with “human security” is greater than ever. (A good lesson here for the Iranian clerical leadership and the IRGC, along with leaderships in other countries.) What do you think about this?

Again, too general. But I have always thought, at least for us, “state security” and “human security” have to go together.

If we accept that the post-corona world order will be different from the existing one, will the changes be structural and fundamental ones? Which meanings will be experience fundamental changes?

Not clear it will be different (significantly). Too early to tell. Existing “competitions and struggles” are likely to remain more or less the same. Middle East politics unlikely to change. Of course, if the Iranian leadership, Saudi leadership, and Israeli leadership all understand that they jointly have been pursuing a “mutually self-destructive game,” much could change. But I don’t expect it.



Mahmood Monshipouri

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Following is the note of Professor Monshipouri about the Post-Coronavirus World Order.

At the earlier stages of the struggle against the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, governments across the globe are still in a reaction mode and politicians are making decisions as they go. Experts are rushing to express different views and contemplate the ramifications of the spread of this infectious disease. Meanwhile, the world faces lethal cost of containing and eventually controlling this virus in terms of economic decay and public health crisis of a magnitude unforeseen in the past.

More specifically, however, poverty-stricken countries and those still engulfed in a civil wars, including refugees, migrant workers, and asylum seekers, will wind up getting the short ends of the stick. Most predictions point to the epic event of our time surpassing the great depression of the 1030s, with deadly consequences, including the rise of extremism, mass suffering, socioeconomic inequality, economic collapse, and possibly social unrests. It is not clear when the world exits from national lockdowns and “stay at home” strategy. If there is an agreement among experts, it is that going back to normal is impossible in the short term, as parts of the world await a long recovery. What would the world be like in the post-coronavirus pandemic era?

Some experts, such as Stephen M. Walt, argue that populist politicians will exploit this pandemic as yet another opportunity to blame refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers for the outbreak. Clearly, they push for closing borders and adopting anti-globalization measures in the name of nationalism and economic protectionism. Others

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
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
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argue that the pandemic will strengthen the state and bolster nationalism. Different governments will adopt emergency measures to curb the crisis and many will be reluctant to give up these newfound powers when the crisis is over. The coronavirus, Walt continues, will also expedite the “shift in power and influence from west to east” (Foreign Policy, March 20, 2020). The result will be a world that is bereft of social justice, shared prosperity, environmental sustainability, and basic freedoms. Consequently, US competence will be disputed, and its global influence likely to sharply decline.

Similarly, Richard N. Haass, the author of *A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order* (2017) argues that the post-coronavirus world will not be dramatically different from the one that came before it. “COVID-19,” Haass continues, “will not so much change the basic direction of world history as accelerate it.” The world that emerges from this crisis, Haass insists, will be familiar: “Waning American leadership, faltering global cooperation, great power discord”—features that have come to accurately describe the US declining leadership role in the world (Foreign Affairs, April 7, 2020). Well before this virus overwhelmed the globe, Haass asserts, there had already been a drastic drop in the appeal of the US model. The pandemic is certain to heighten friction between the United States and China, while also reinforcing the democratic recession that has characterized the world since the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Now more than ever, the possibility of a new Cold War between the United States and China looms large. There will be greater support for a larger government role in society, particularly in the form of curbing movement of populations or providing economic aid. Under such circumstances, civil liberties and political freedoms will be significantly restricted.

Still others argue that abandoning democratic norms will come with a hefty price, underscoring the need to assess the performance of authoritarian regimes in terms of alleviating poverty, protecting rights, and tackling socioeconomic and racial disparities. The need for global coordination becomes so urgent that it would



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require cooperation at all levels—international, national, and local. Each country has much to learn from the experiences of the rest. An ardent defender of liberal internationalism, G. John Ikenberry posits that in the future, while we may see the increasing great power rivalry in a divided and violent world, nation-states are likely to cooperate to achieve security and prosperity for all. It is plausible that in the long term, Ikenberry writes, “democracies will come out of their shells to find a new type of pragmatic internationalism (quoted in *The Guardian*, March 28, 2020). While most liberal democrats acknowledge that this global pandemic could widen the divisions between countries and possibly fuel anti-migrant sentiments, there is a good chance it will buttress international cooperation, support for the international organization such as UN, and a willingness to seek negotiations rather than military and economic clash.

Meanwhile, in the absence of global leadership and cooperation, traumatic effects of coronavirus will leave unresolved the possibility of the return of the liberal order narrative, making a critical assessment of the pandemic’s disruptive consequences all the more urgent. US Senator Bernie Sanders, along with several other democrats, have asked the Trump administration to lift sanctions on Iran in light of the fact that the country is facing a humanitarian disaster in its campaign against coronavirus. There are evidence that the sanctions have reduced Iran’s capacity to curb the outbreak. Absent global cooperation and sustainable/coordinated efforts, the future waves of this virus will be even more threatening.

COVID-19



John Dunn

focuses on applying a historical perspective to modern political theory

What are the most important reasons for welcoming rightists and nationalists in Europe and America?

The basis for increased rightist and nationalist support in Europe and America is mainly that the way their economies have developed over the last forty years has done a lot to harm and pretty little perceptibly to benefit a large part of the countries concerned. This is real. Unfortunately it has also become confounded with the fact that quite large numbers of people from other countries have entered them to work. This has made the countries richer as a whole, and increased the resources which governments can spend on the welfare of the population as a whole, but this is not recognized and has definitely not been felt in the parts of the countries which are no better off now (or even worse off) than they were forty years ago.

One of the most important issues related to the developments in the Middle East was the announcement of the US withdrawal from the region. But in practice this has not happened. How do you think the US is pulling its troops out of the region?

The American government is not a single coherent actor, let alone a rational one. Trump's concerns are more or less confined to his chances of being re-elected, but the CIA, the Pentagon and even the State Department have wider and more lasting preoccupations and the United States has many other interests still in West Asia. I don't expect all

American forces to have left it in the near future.

One of the major problems facing the US now and in the future is China. Various Western security documents, including a statement from the Munich Security Conference with China, have been cited as a threat. How will America be able to contain China? Will the containment policy work?

The Trump administration is trying to make the American economy less dependent on China and to protect American technological innovation against Chinese competition. It is also trying to contain the expansion of Chinese political and military power across East Asia. Containment is not working well at present and may well just fail, but China also has its difficulties (and not just because of the virus, which may harm the US just as much or even more). Taiwan is a key battle front, and a source of vulnerability in different ways for both China and the US. Hong Kong to a lesser degree such for China alone.

The leaderships of both countries at present are far more reckless than their predecessors were for several decades.

The outbreak of the Corona virus points out that there are threats that are more easily resolved through the cooperation of countries.

Will the international community learn from the damage caused by the spread of the virus, and will we see increased international cooperation to address global threats?

I devoutly hope that a lot of countries will recognize the benefits of cooperating closely on an international scale because of the damage done by the virus. There are going to be plenty more viruses. It takes courage, leadership and intelligence to govern on the basis of that recognition. Many countries at any time, unfortunately, don't have the luck to have that.

What will be the economic impact of the Corona virus on the world economy? How will this affect the upcoming US presidential election?

The virus will certainly do a lot of damage to the world economy. It already has done plenty and the damage at present is still growing rapidly. To limit it effectively governments will need to cooperate bravely, intelligently and quite protractedly. So far unfortunately they're completely failing to.

I very much hope it will mean that Trump loses the election, but until there is a clear and plausible Democratic opponent and that opponent remains such up to election day, Trump's incompetent and sleazy idiocy can't be trusted to lose him the election. He will have to lose it TO someone else.



Urban Rusnák

Secretary-General of
the Energy Charter
Secretariat



Secretary-General of the Energy Charter Secretariat. He worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovak Republic and was the Leader of the Project for Slovakia's External Energy Security.

What will be the effects of coronavirus on the current world order?

The current pandemic is already changing the world as we use to know it. I see it mostly as an accelerator and an enforcer of tendencies which have been present since last decade – the rise of nativism, the twilight of international institutions, strengthening of intercultural conflicts, widening of the income gap, and search for safe heaven by individuals and societies.

The current world order is majorly based on liberalism and to some extent on realism approaches. What are the deficiencies of the said approaches revealed by coronavirus?

The underlying base for the current system of the international relation is the UN Charter and other basic UN documents, which indeed promotes universal values. Liberal and realistic approaches are not in the contradiction per se. What we see now is that the fight for the COVID19 legacy in international relations already started. The access to the information in due time and quality based on the available scientific evidence is still the most essential instrument in the battle against the coronavirus propagation. Handling the economic and social consequences will be with us for many years and will become a new normal.


Although the outbreak of the virus has put

the realism and self-help approaches in the center of the focus, it also has revealed deficiencies of the realism which is based on state security and looks at the security issue just militarily. The outbreak of the virus also showed that militaristic economies also are not able to maintain the security of nations and governments in the post- corona era. What do you think of this?

The current pandemic is showing that there is no one size fit all solution to handle it. While there is a mounting body of evidence that some basic non-medical recommendations and actions (like maintaining basic hygiene, wearing the face masks and limiting social interaction of people) significantly reduces the speed of spreading the illness they do not provide with lasting solutions. Certainly, military hardware is of little use to combat the pandemic, and containing a large number of personnel in closed areas like ships or military bases is more a recipe for problems than a part of a solution. Certainly, as the COVID19 is a global threat that will last long, you cannot beat it with self-help isolated efforts. Now the race for vaccines from multiple research teams and producers together with internationally coordinated vaccination effort is our best bet for the future.

If we accept that the post-corona world order will be different from the existing one, will the changes be structural and fundamental ones? Which meanings will experience fundamental changes?

I wish the post corona world order will address the underlying causes of global tensions and challenges. Inequalities in a broad sense of this word should be addressed, as should be the challenge of climate change. I believe that we should keep in mind that the economy and the military power are very important indeed, however the people's health and wellbeing is a way more complex issue. COVID19 outbreak showed the fragility of our world as we knew it until last December, regardless of the prevailing economic, religion, or social structure. It is a wakeup call for Humanity, to change our behavior and form a more cooperative and respectful one.





Kazuto Suzuki

is Professor of international politics at Public Policy School of Hokkaido University and he also served as an expert in the Panel of Experts for the Iranian Sanction Committee under the United Nations Security Council from 2013 to July 2015

How will the coronavirus outbreak affect the existing world order?

First of all, this pandemic has revealed that the Western states (Europe and the US) were not prepared for such pandemic while Asian countries were fairly capable of coping such pandemic. This would lead to the second point that this pandemic can be summarized as the decline of the West and the rise of the East in the world order. China, which was the origin of the pandemic, was the first to re-open the country with strong production capability. Now, China provides masks and other medical equipment to other countries including the United States. On the other hand, the United States under President Trump was not able to cope with the situation and more than 30,000 lives were lost. His approach puts his election strategy in front of the health and lives of people in America. There are conflicts about the federal governments and state governors. This pandemic does not allow room for a populist approach in which the leaders and people neglect the importance of science, experts, and facts.

What are the deficiencies of the liberalism and realism approaches that the existing world order has been made on them?

The global pandemic requires international coordination because the virus does not respect borders. But at the same time, the only way to deal with this virus is to implement social distancing since there is no therapeutic drug or vaccine. In order to change people's behavior, national governments have to step in and impose severe rules. So realism, or state-centric approach, would be inevitable.



This realism, however, puts every state in competition for masks, goggles or ventilators. The market liberalism puts states in competition and the stronger and wealthier wins. I think those are the deficiencies.

The Outbreak of the virus also showed that militaristic economies also are not able to maintain the security of nations and governments in post-corona era. What do you think of this?

Although national governments have to put a lot of resources onto the fight against the pandemic, still military posture remains in a minimum change. I think there will be a lot of stress on welfare programs or national infrastructure investments, but military spending will remain at the current level. Even it is

possible that governments may increase military spending and elevate tension in order to stir up nationalism (which may be different but similar trajectory of the 1930s).

If we accept that the post-corona world order will be different from the existing one, do you think that the changes to it will be fundamental ones?

Post-corona world order will be the one of transitioning order. I think it will be the beginning of the decline of US hegemony, for sure, and the rise of China will be accelerated. But I think it will not be a new hegemonic order by China. China may be a superpower beyond the United States, but its soft power, or power to attract other countries to follow the Chinese lifestyle or Chinese model of governance.

The coronavirus outbreak and how governments have been able to deal with it have brought into discussion the effectiveness of political systems on the one hand, and on the other hand, the transition from the current order to the post-coronavirus order.

Most thinkers emphasize this key point that as a result of the outbreak, we are facing an order in the future the likes of which we did not see before the outbreak. But the important questions to ask are, what is the order of the world system that is on the verge of collapse after the pandemic, and what are the characteristics of the new order?

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