军队，意识形态体制以及家族马克思主义：对李正哲《由古巴的政党军队关系和朝鲜“两条前线”说起》一文的评论

The Military, Ideological Frameworks and Familial Marxism: A Comment on Jung-chul Lee, “A Lesson from Cuba’s Party-Military Relations and a Tale of ‘Two Fronts Line’ in North Korea[[1]](#footnote-1)”

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25年来， 古巴经济研究协会Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE) 一直努力将其对古巴特定案例的分析嵌入到世界主流法律、经济、政治以及文化的讨论中。这样的努力常常会受到来自长期形成观念的抵制，这种观念认为古巴的情况是独特别具一格的，就如同把殖民主义、文化霸权、地理、种族和宗教放在一口上世纪冷战形成的大国中，并用发展中国家固有的意识形态折这柄大勺子搅拌均匀煮成的一大锅粥。这种别具一格的状态被认为是超越现实的欧美浪漫主义、加勒比异国情调、政治斗争中的诺斯替主义以及欧美之间意识形态斗争的共同产物。

当局外人对“世界中的古巴”这一奇异文化结构进行检视时，这种观点组建清晰起来。由韩国国家统一研究所Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU)[[2]](#footnote-2)发起的一系列论文中，明确提及了这种观点。这些文章们建议对古巴的论述最好是置身于世界经济，文化，政治的大潮，以及那些涉及几乎所有国家，无论是否参与全球化，社会进程的潮流之中来考察。在这个研究领域，大部分人都关注着社会转型背景下政治和经济的紧张对抗之中，（这其中西方的典型转型观点认为应当进行一种具有民主政治特性的市场经济转型），却少有人注意到制度变革给军民关系带来的影响。。有时这些制度变革是决定社会转型的进度和程度，以及方向。在这样的视角下，我们就可以发现埃及和土耳其，这两个传统的军事强国在过去十年的社会变革中走向了完全不同的两个方向。

除了专业研究机构，很少有人会考虑马克思列宁主义发展中国家的军民关系。韩国崇实大学Lee Jung-chul李正哲教授在他的论文《由古巴的政党军队关系和朝鲜“两条前线”说起》就设计了这个问题。李教授的论文有趣且直接。(Lee, supra, p. 1).他认为古巴的军队，革命武装力量（FAR）采纳了中国人民解放军（PLA）在邓小平领导下的模式。其本身的制度化，通过军工产业联盟（UIM），培养了一群由西方国家商学院训练的干部，这些干部运营着一个强大的企业，这个企业不仅满足军事以及民用需求，更是国外资本投资的主要受体。军队的管理被置于经济机构当中，而军队本事属于古巴共产党的领域。这种体制呈现了一种马克思列宁主义经济形式的发展，然而这种变型并没有被朝鲜所采纳，朝鲜所采用的是被称为“两条前线”的经济政策。在这种模式下，朝鲜共产党（KCP）和朝鲜军方分管不同的功能序列（朝鲜共产党主管经济发展，军方主管大规模毁灭武器（WMD））。双方共享生产空间及生产单位，朝鲜共产党通过党军双方共同遵循的政治准则来掌控军方。实际上，中国人民解放军和古巴革命武装力量的发展模式大体相同，只是古巴共产党缺乏对军队有效的控制，没有在党内和整个国家机器的各个层面保留和嵌入有效的管理人员。另外一方面，朝鲜共产党和军方干净利落地分割了国家经济，使生产力要么服务于国防武器生产有么服务于国家内需。在朝鲜的系统下，党与军方共同遵循一个世袭领袖制定的意识形态。由此，古巴所表现出来的发展方向实际是执政禁卫军马克思主义，而朝鲜的方向更倾向于君主马克思主义。我的评论直接针对于这篇论文。

李教授从问题的定位开始，他并没有把问题定性为马克思列宁主义，而是将其视为普遍的军民关系问题上。) Lee, supra, p. 2) 李教授从一个二元结构入手，强调民生与军事力量的分配在民主国家是一个外向型议题，而在马克思列宁主义国家是一个内向型议题。军民关系在民主国家中通过政治力量的不断协调而形成。在马克思列宁主义，这种协调发生在党和国家机器内部李教授李教授拒绝传统的分类学上有关军队实现集体目标（影响，勒索，取代，接管），而是采纳一种新的，半个世纪前提出的观点，用于区分西方国家以及所谓的“西方外围国家”的军民关系[[3]](#footnote-3)。

李教授会进一步区分马克思列宁主义国家以及其他“马列主义外围国家”。区别的要素主要集中在国家是否建立了一个列宁主义先驱党（我会在这里讨论）。两个方面值得我们更深一步考虑，首先是李教授的直觉认为列宁主义先驱党意识形态产生的效果是建立于苏联的模型之上的。其次，由此引出的是“在共产主义政权中，一个先驱党被假设是存在的，和军队的区别在于先驱党具有的组织和领导能力”(Lee, supra, p. 3). 由此产生的制度背景下，在现代马克思列宁主义周边国家中至少存在这两种体制结构。

这种观点是有见地的，根据苏维埃时期的重点著作分析[[4]](#footnote-4)，李教授(Lee, supra, p. 4)描述了一种苏维埃列宁主义党国结构。这些是根据一些旧的观念，包括（1）共产党的支配主导（在列宁主义民主集中制原则下进行分级组织并运行）（2）一个基于国家享有全部生产力所有权的中央计划经济（保留原始的非国有经济部门）。以及3）通过由共产党干部主导的国家机器进行运作（精英治理的双重性使矛盾仅发生于党组织内部）。在这种苏维埃列宁主义模式下，Lee标明了(Lee, supra, p. 4-5)基于Perlmutter and Leogrande发展的一种政党军队关系三方理想化类型：联盟，共生以及融合。在这种分类下，苏联是联盟模式的代表，中国是共生模式而古巴则是融合模式。

然后李教授将此分析模型适用于古巴的情况，(Lee, supra, pp. 5-6)，他们断定，古巴更像是执政禁卫军马克思主义而不是传统的苏联马克思主义列宁主义。古巴在某正程度上是独一无二的，因为当代的古巴共产党是建立在军事力量之上而后组建政府机构[[5]](#footnote-5)。政权合法性的基础以及国家，军队，民生机构的合法性的基础是建立在一场成功的革命起义而非列宁主义所强调的职业革命家高举党性党纪的旗帜。古巴的融合，源自于古巴共产党的原始本质以及军队的卓越合法性。然而这种融合表现的不太自然，当古巴共产党和国家机构官员仍然执着于宏观经济政策下的苏联意识形态模型，古巴军方已经开始在西方商学院训练干部并开始自主地通过军工产业联盟UIM--一种略小于其中国模式的企业--进行运作，UIM的运作收入可能会被分享，但也会再投资用于军方的人员和运作。其结果是军方拥有了一定的经济能力来提高了对军方的忠诚，进而提高对国家的忠诚。对此李教授对FAR和PLA以及相似的越南军方进行了区分，“虽然在中国和越南，军方对经济的参与一直受党的管制，但古巴并不受用这条规则。” (Lee, supra, p. 6)。[[6]](#footnote-6)因此，古巴并非传统意义上的马克思列宁主义国家这一观念最近越来越多地被提及。从功能的角度分析，古巴似乎和传统拉丁美洲国家的模式更加符合，大部分拉丁美洲国家认为军事或者军事官僚主义专制缺乏基础和统一思想[[7]](#footnote-7)。

从这个角度来看，它的见解，依然强大，但我怀疑可能还存在一些值得考虑的局限性。这些局限性与两个相异但相联的反驳有关。第一个是其分析框架似乎无法与中国马克思列宁主义在1970年开始的改革开放后发生的巨大变化有效地结合。第二个是这种意识形态在古巴依然重要，而且可能比在朝鲜还要重要，正是因为古巴军方的自主权可能会被认为是一场精英组织内部有关意识形态争执而产生的意识形态危机。

虽然从1980年来，古巴发生了很大的变化，但从意识形态的角度来看，古巴并没有产生很大的影响（见我的著作这里和这里）[[8]](#footnote-8)。而更重要的是，苏联的解体并没有带来太大的影响，反而是1978年后中国共产党领导下的当代马克思列宁主义党以及国家的模式为古巴带来很大冲击，这个重大发展对党内结构和共产党的运作都产生了实质的变化，(see, e.g., here)[[9]](#footnote-9)，但更重要的是， 它改变了党与国家、国家与经济政策的关系。邓小平的开放政策和内部民主化的中共的政策已经极大地改变宏观经济政策的本质（中央计划经济到集中管理）以及党所扮演的角色（转向制度化，群众路线的政治，民主化内部和法治）。没有改变的是党的层级组织，共产党（民主专政的原则）的领导作用，民主集中或者矛盾内部化。中国可能仍将维持党军共生制度，但这种共生模式已经大大变化，并且这种共生制度值得我们更加具体的研究，因为这正成为亚洲和非洲越来越有影响力的治理模型。

这些变化已经改变了党和国家关系的性质。1980年之后，中国共产党和PLA的共生关系发生了一系列的变化，其中之一建立在中国的马克思列宁主义路线采用了与苏联时期完全不同的发展轨迹，这对其他周边马克思列宁主义国家产生了间接的影响，古巴共产党本身以及其内部运作从根本上仍然依赖于苏联模式。但古巴共产党是一群1959年推翻前政权的军事精英建立的，他必须明确在建立之初，军队是必须服从于党的。而古巴的党军缺乏清晰的结合脉络，劳尔和菲德尔·卡斯特罗，将党和军方的控制保持在他们之间，所以的融合更多是个人或家庭的结合而不是制度上的结合。

这使得FAR和PCC的关系更接近朝鲜（将在下面讨论），而不是苏联，中国或者是越南模型。尽管先驱者家庭和historicos 支持他们在运作时有不同的选择，两种系统都修改了马克思列宁主义模式，以独特的方式将家庭和意识形态结构融合在一起，而通过家族控制模型来达到维持稳定的目的，朝鲜的模式似乎更好。

但是，这种观点表明，在古巴，意识形态不再重要，实际上可能并不是这样，而且我认为，任何这样的暗示可能会有问题[[10]](#footnote-10)。在革命时期，古巴领导人采取的立场是将意识形态隐含在革命运动中每一个环节[[11]](#footnote-11)。但意识形态仍然扮演着古巴治理结构中的重要作用，无论是在FAR或PCC（for my discussion, see, e.g., here[[12]](#footnote-12)）FAR与PCC的意识形态基础仍然很鲜明，在某种程度上，在FAR与PCC的精英中根深蒂固。问题本身并不在于意识形态是否存在，而是在于FAR与PCC对于意识形态的愿景并不一致。而意识形态的分析在朝鲜完全不同，实际上保持意识形态的统一处于国家稳定的核心。

更重要的是，在中国在发生识形态的大幅革新演变带来意识形态的灵活性暗示古巴可以另外一的角度来考虑FAR-PCC关系。李教授正确地注意了FAR和PLA在1980年后演变趋于一致。而且实际上军队的自主权使得这种影响变得可能。但是Fidel Castro从1970年开始是对中国马列主义的变革并不友好(for my discussion, see, e.g., here)[[13]](#footnote-13). 虽然Raul Castro 更加开放一些，但他的努力只被限制于FAR，并不是因为他不想，而是受到了来自PCC精英们不愿意改变传统苏联模式[[14]](#footnote-14)为基础的强烈抵抗。转型的模式建立于意识形态的模型之上，在古巴FAR与PCC在意识形态上的日益分化，使其不仅在讨论是否改革，而且在改革的方法上也存在分歧。

考虑到这一点，李教授对于PLA和朝鲜的比较显得更加相关，(Lee, supra, pp. 7-9)而且实际上，这个比较提醒了我们，相对于通常情况下西方国家（包括古巴本身）把古巴和越南放在一起进行比较来讨论制度变革，似乎古巴与朝鲜放在一同比较会更有价值。当然这些对比有时很难，不是技术原因，而是政治与意识形态的原因，首先，社会主义阵营的国家都倾向于把朝鲜视为一个异类，潜在的不合法的马克思列宁主义。其次，因为古巴“转型”的倡导者专注于让古巴向拉丁美洲或者越南模式转型，朝鲜提出了令人不喜的替代方式：保持不变。就像李教授提到的那样，这将是一个错误。然而相比其他地方，朝鲜的经历很可能被证明是更实用的用于了解古巴。因为朝鲜是唯一一个除古巴之外的外围性马列主义国家，且在地缘上受制于超级大国。政治与政策的选择也会因为其受制于周边邻国和敌国而变得偏执。这种未曾探讨过的关系值得我们更进一步了解。

李教授非常正确的提到(Lee, Supra, p. 7) 古巴与朝鲜都遭受了重大的危机。古巴的危机出现于苏联解体，被称为是特殊时期的绝望。朝鲜的危机出现的更早，1962年。历史在这里显得较为讽刺。在1962年12月。，朝鲜认为苏联对于资本主义国家过于软弱而决定采用一项政策保护政权不被外国颠覆。当赫鲁晓夫由对美国的强硬态度转变为妥协与和解的态度时，金正日绝望地感觉到发展朝鲜自己的自卫能力是不可避免的。(Lee, supra., p. 7). 其结果是朝鲜采取一系列措施，标志是思想上的统一和管理国家职能的分化。该措施被称为是“两个前线”。[[15]](#footnote-15)

感觉到被苏联抛弃的危险，朝鲜政权重组的系统同时包含了经济和军事。每一个生产设施中都安装了军火生产线，以保证军队资源，这显然扩大了军队，但同时政权也显然牢固将军队控制在党的领导下。(Lee, supra., p. 7). 这种控制建立在朝鲜共产党对统治思想牢固地控制，以及精英国民和军队对意识形态的忠诚期待之上。

这样的一种体制可以保持不变是由于党国制度沿着家族血脉被得到了认可。在2010年朝鲜共产党会议上，这种血统继承被朝鲜共产党大书特书。 (Lee, supra, p. 7) 朝鲜，如同古巴一样形成了一个以家庭成员为中心，忠诚的精英成员紧密维系的马列主义革命国家。在朝鲜，这种世袭特性被融入了朝鲜马克思主义。在古巴，家族世袭的重要性是一种既成事实上的，而非法律上的。而在这两者，对家庭的忠诚成了思想的忠诚的一部分，有时甚至作为基础的意识形态基础变化，以适应领导家族的野心。事实上，在朝鲜，1960年的两条前线理论在2010年重新复兴，作为对新的世袭领导人忠诚的核心原则。(Lee, supra) 这也成为了朝鲜核打击能力政策的核心基础，朝鲜逐渐变化为君主马克思主义，而同时古巴采取了禁卫军马克思主义。两者都没有采取中国的改革开放作为国家政策。尽管古巴FAR的自主权允许于某些部门引进中国的意识形态立场， 但效果极其有限[[16]](#footnote-16)。

但是李教授提出了更多的说法。“两条前线”的路线下是官僚政治的能动运动。。。者象征着政策优先性争论的结束以及公开宣称政党军队间行政上的竞争。(Ibid., p. 8). 有意思的是在古巴FAR与PCC之间也存在着相同的意识形态的分歧。在朝鲜与古巴，精英阶级都选择划分权限，但选择有所不同，朝鲜共产党按意识形态来决定级别（围绕在世袭领袖周围）并按照功能来划分经济活动。而古巴人按照对外政策来确定级别，按照部门来划分经济活动。

为什么会有这样不同的划分方式？李教授提到：

为了取代由军方控制的特定产业以及其中的生产线，朝鲜政府建立一个合作制度，由军方共享国家整个运行系统中一条或两条生产线，使其充当国家整个生产系统中个一个子系统，这个制度促成了朝鲜的“两条前线”制度。

因此对于古巴，李教授认定FAR拥有在PCC之外的制度自主权，但在朝鲜，尽管军方有用一定功能上的自主权，军方仍然在党的管理和指导下。这个关键的区别在于，古巴的宏观经济政策关注于劳动分工以及其他治理政策目标的选择。朝鲜采取的是部门协调，古巴采取的是部门分配，而中国采取的则是经济管理主义。

因此，李教授提供了一个较有见地的比较分析。探讨了两个相联系的处于社会主义以及外围的兄弟国家，及他们的意识形态。两个国家选择以不同的方式来应对相似的政策挑战，古巴选择机构自治和意识形态演化。朝鲜选择了职能自主和严格思想纪律。在这种精辟的分析之后的一些问题依然存在。人们不禁要问，例如意识形态在制定和解释，或者是管理，古巴和朝鲜之间扮演角色的差异。或许有人会好奇在马列主义国家，军队的理想定位是什么，这个可能需要更多的关注中国和越南。两者都是值得进一步考虑的问题。我会说，古巴军方制度上的自主权是源自于两种对抗力量的意识形态分歧；即中国模式的变体对抗古巴共产党精英种的守旧的斯大林主义。 这个自主权之所以能够存在是因为先有军队，再有政党，而这种自主权仅仅也只是提供了一个分歧的空间。这个分歧之所以没有被严厉地抑制是因为PCC和FAR的领导者们的家庭纽带关系。[[17]](#footnote-17)这其实呼应了韩国现在的状态（也许有人应该会注意到最近朝鲜新领导人的实施的政策）正是君主马克思主义的正式确立使基于创始人合法确认的职能自主变得可能。

苏联遗留的问题在古巴和朝鲜关键的部门和人员形成了严重影响，在某种程度上让两国向僵尸马克思主义发展，当实质性的关注都聚集在古巴与越南和中国的比较时，李教授有建设性的文章提出了更深层次比较的价值[[18]](#footnote-18)。对于朝鲜来说，有一个话题常常被我们忽视，这个僵尸马克思主义国家唤起一个死去已久的外壳，力量的来源是做一个边缘马列国家，朝鲜害怕在面对强大的敌人时无处寻求保护。这种担心促使他推进军队的发展，可是发展的方式及其不同，这些不同一定程度上建立在这些国家不同的建立历史上。在古巴，军队在马列主义广泛传播之前就具有一定的制度及思想自主权。而在朝鲜，军方的功能自主受制于严苛的思想纪律。对于两个国家来说，冲突都生自于家族覆盖了做为国家建立基础的马列主义。家庭控制限制冲突的后果，并保留稳定性：在古巴通过卡斯特罗的兄弟关系，在朝鲜通过建立家族王朝来控制国家和军队。这种由家族覆盖组织的意识形态保留着至关重要的功能，使得这两个国家不同于中国或是越南，但从长远的角度来看，这个稳定的体制将难以维持。

For the last 25 years, the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE) has sought to embed analysis of the special case of Cuban within the main stream of discussion of law, economics, politics, and culture. That process has sometimes found resistance in the long cultivated notion that the Cuban situation was sui generis, a porridge composed of equal parts colonialism, cultural hegemony, geography, race and religion, cooked in a pot created by the Cold War of the last century and stirred by the fairly large ladle that is the product of an ideology of developing states. Yet that sui generis is more a product of the romanticism of Europe and North America than any reality, combining large dollops of Caribbean exoticism, Gnosticism in political conflicts, and the exportation of ideological battles between the European and North American left and right. This becomes clearer when strangers to this odd cultural construction of “Cuba in the World” begin to examine the situation of Cuba. This is quite apparent in the excellent papers sponsored by the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU).2 These papers suggest a better picture of Cuba within larger streams of economic, cultural, political and social evolution that are touching, in distinct ways, virtually every country of this planet within (or without) the strong currents of globalization. While much of the interest in this area tends to center on the contests between politics and economics in the context of what most in the West view as a necessary transition to something else (usually democratic in character and market based operation), few consider the issue from the institutional character of change that focuses on civil military relations. For developing states, these institutions relations are sometimes critical for determining the pace and scope of transition, as well as its direction. Consider in this respect recent changes in Egypt and Turkey, two states with traditionally strong militaries that have moved in very different directions in the last 10 years. Even less often considered, except by specialist institutions, are civil military relations in Marxist Leninist developing states. It is this issue that is taken up by Jung-chul Lee of Soogsil University in Korea in the excellent paper, “A Lesson from Cuba’s Party-Military Relations and a Tale of ‘Two Fronts Line’ in North Korea.” Professor Lee’s argument is intriguing and straightforward (Lee, supra, p. 1). Professor Lee argues that the Cuban military, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) has embraced the model of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since the start of the Deng Xiaoming leadership. Its institutionalization, through the Union of Military Industries (UIM) has 1 Presented at the 25th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, July 31, 2015 2 Available https://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/. KINU’s mission and history may be accessed at https://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/about/about\_02\_01.jsp. The Military, Ideological Frameworks and Familial Marxism: A Comment on Jung-chul Lee, “A Lesson from Cuba’s PartyMilitary Relations and a Tale of ‘Two Fronts Line’ in North Korea”1 ASCE Proceedings and Papers, 25:-- (forthcoming 2015) Larry Catá Backer 2 created a cadre of western business school trained cadres that now operate a powerful conglomerate that meets both military and civilian needs and serves as a site for foreign inbound investment. Military governance is anchored in economic institutions and the military is autonomous of the Cuban Communist Party (CCP). This presents a singular variation on a form of evolving Marxist Leninist economic organization. It is one that has been rejected by the North Koreans, who have adopted a “Two Fronts Line” Policy. In this model, the military and Korean Communist Party (KCP) have divided control on functional lines (KCP economic development and Korean military on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capacity). Both KCP and military share production spaces as coordinate units of production and the KCP controls the military, through control of the joint political principles under which both operate. Effectively the PLA and FAR have been developed loosely in parallel but the CCP has does not have effective control of the FAR that remains and embedded actor within and outside the structures of the CCP and the state apparatus. On the other hand, the military and the KCP have effectively divided the economy, diverting productive forces either to national defense and weapons policies or to domestic needs through a system in which both military and KCP adhere to the same ideological lines under a hereditary leadership. Cuba appears headed toward a form of Praetorian Marxism and Korea toward Monarchical Marxism. My comments are directed to that paper. Professor Lee starts by situating the issue, not as a Marxist Leninist problem, but as a variant of the much more common problem of civil-military relations )Lee, supra, p. 2). Professor Lee starts with a basic binary—allocations of civil-military power are externalized in democratic states but are internalized in Marxist Leninist states. Civilmilitary relations are renegotiated within political space in democratic states. In Marxist Leninist states, this renegotiation occurs within the structures of Party and state apparatus. He rejects the traditional typologies of ways in which military institutions realize corporate goals (influencing, blackmailing, displacing, and taking over) and embraces the view, now half a century old, that differentiates civil-military relations between those in western states and those in what are sometimes called “peripheral” states.3 But Professor Lee would further distinguish between Marxist Leninist and other “peripheral” states. The distinguishing factor centers on the extent to which a state has established a Leninist “vanguard” party (I discuss this here). Two points are worth considering in more detail. The first is Professor’s Lee’s intuition that the effect of Leninist vanguard party ideology on civil-military relations (or better Party-military relations) is grounded on the Soviet model. The second, springing from the first, is that in “communist regimes, a vanguard party was presumed to exist, distinguished from the military in terms of organizational and instructional capacities.” (Lee, supra, p. 3). That produces an institutional context in which there are at least two institutional structures of modernization in Marxist Leninist peripheral regimes. 3 Citing Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New States (U Chi Press, 1964). The Military, Ideological Frameworks and Familial Marxism: A Comment on Jung-chul Lee, “A Lesson from Cuba’s PartyMilitary Relations and a Tale of ‘Two Fronts Line’ in North Korea”1 ASCE Proceedings and Papers, 25:-- (forthcoming 2015) Larry Catá Backer 3 The perspective is insightful. Grounding the analysis on Soviet era key work,4 Professor Lee (Lee, supra, p. 4) describes a model of Soviet Leninist Party-State structures. These are grounded in the older notion of a (1) hegemonic communist party (hierarchically organized and operating under Leninist principles of democratic centralism); a centrally planned economy based on state ownership of all productive forces (with a vestigial nonstate sector); and (3) operationalization through a state apparatus that is dominated by communist party cadres (dual role elites shunts conflict into Party structures). Within this Soviet Leninist model, Lee notes (Lee, supra, p. 4-5) Perlmutter and Leogrande’s development of a three-part idealized typology of party-military relations—coalitional, symbiotic and fused categories. Within these categorical types, the Soviets serve as a model of the coalitional type, China of the symbiotic type and Cuba of the fused type. Professor Lee then applies this analytical model to the Cuban case (Lee, supra, pp. 5-6). They posit that Cuba is more an example of Praetorian Marxism rather than traditional Soviet Marxist Leninism. Cuba is somewhat distinctive because the modern version of the PCC was established by the leaders of the military apparatus that produced the current government. 5 The foundations of legitimacy—and of the state, military and civil apparatus—is grounded on revolutionary victory rather than on Leninist notions of a victory of professional revolutionaries steeped in party discipline. The fusion, then, arises from the nature of the origins of the PCC and the superior legitimacy of the military. Yet that fusion appears strained. While the PCC and state apparatus officials remained wedded to Soviet ideological models of macro economic policy, the FAR began training its cadres in western business schools and began operating autonomously through the UIM, a conglomerate that resembles on a smaller scale, its Chinese model. Income from the operations of the UIM might be shared, but it also was reinvested in FAR personnel, and operations. As a consequence FAR had the economic ability to enhance loyalty to FAR first, and the state apparatus within that larger loyalty. This, Professor Lee, distinguishes FAR from PAL and its Vietnamese counterpart. “While the military participation in the economy of China and Vietnam have always been regulated and controlled by the party apparatus, the Cuban case does not abide by this rule.” (Lee, supra, p. 6).6 As a consequence, the notion appears more current now that Cuba may no longer be understood as a traditional Marxist Leninist State. Rather analyzed from a functional perspective, it appears to fall more in line with traditional models common to 4 See, e.g., Amos Perlmutter and W.M. Leogrande, “Civil Military Relations in Communist Political Systems,” American Political Science Review 76:778-789 (1982). 5 Ernesto Che Guevara, Notes for the Study of the Ideology of the Cuban Revolution (Verde Olivo (8 Oct. 1960) Transcription/Markup: A .N./Brian Baggins. Online Version: Ernesto Che Guevara Internet Archive (marxists.org) 2002. Available https://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1960/10/08.htm 6 Citing to D. Amuchasteguí, “Cuba’s Armed Forces: Power and Reforms,” ACSE Papers and Proceedings 24:456-473 (2014). The Military, Ideological Frameworks and Familial Marxism: A Comment on Jung-chul Lee, “A Lesson from Cuba’s PartyMilitary Relations and a Tale of ‘Two Fronts Line’ in North Korea”1 ASCE Proceedings and Papers, 25:-- (forthcoming 2015) Larry Catá Backer 4 Latin America, most of which suggest military or military-bureaucratic authoritarianism devoid of foundational and unifying ideology. 7 This perspective, and its insights, remains powerful, but I suspect might also present some limitations worth considering. The limitations are bound up in two distinct but interrelated challenges. The first is that the analytical framework does not appear to incorporate the effects of the quite robust changes in Chinese Marxist Leninism since the period of opening up started in the 1970s. The second, is that ideology continues to matter in Cuba, and perhaps more than in Korea, precisely because FAR autonomy might be understood as a crisis of ideology within an elite structure in which its ideological bases are now challenged from within. Much, indeed, has changed since the 1980s, though from an ideological perspective with substantially less effect in Cuba (see my work here and here).8 Most important is not so much the withering away of the Soviet Union, but rather the rise of modern Marxist Leninist state and Party models under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party since 1978. That development has had substantial changes on both the internal development of the structures and operation of the communist party (see, e.g., here)9 but more importantly on the nature of the relationship of the communist party with the state, and of the state with economic policy. Deng Xiaoping’s policy of opening up and the CCP’s policy of internal democratization has substantially changed the nature of macro economic policy (shifting from central planning to centralized management) and of the role of the party (shifting towards institutionalization, mass line politics, internal democratization, and rule of law). What has not changed are the hierarchical organization of the party, the leadership role of the communist party (principles of democratic dictatorship), the centrality of democratic centralism or the internalization of conflict within the communist party. China may still remain symbiotic but that nature of that symbiosis has changed substantially. And that symbiosis is worth considering in substantially more detail as it becomes a more influential model for governance in Asia and Africa. 7 Citing to Yvon Grenier, Cultural Policy, Participation and the Gatekeeper State in Cuba,” ASCE Papers and Proceedings 24:456-473 (2014); Daniel I. Pedreira, “Cuba’s Prospects for a Military Oligarchy,” ASCE Papers and Proceedings 23:243-247 (2013); Vegard Bye, 2012, The Politics of Cuban Transformation-What Space for Authoritarian Withdrawal?,”ASCE Papers and Proceedings 22:22-43 (2012); and Michael Aranda, “The Evolution of the Cuban Military: A Comparative Look at the FAR with the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model of South America,” ASCE Papers and Proceedings 20:200-208 (2010). 8 Larry Catá Backer, The Cuban Communist Party: Current Status and Future Reform ASCE Proceedings 24:72-88 (2014). Available http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/v24-backer.pdf. 9 See, e.g., Backer, Larry Catá and Wang, Keren, 'What is China's Dream?' Hu Angang Imagines China in 2020 as the First Internationally Embedded Superpower (February 23, 2013). Consortium for Peace & Ethics Working Paper No. 2013-2. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2223279 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2223279 The Military, Ideological Frameworks and Familial Marxism: A Comment on Jung-chul Lee, “A Lesson from Cuba’s PartyMilitary Relations and a Tale of ‘Two Fronts Line’ in North Korea”1 ASCE Proceedings and Papers, 25:-- (forthcoming 2015) Larry Catá Backer 5 These changes have changed the nature of Party-state relations. The development of a post 1980s variant on symbiotic relations among CCP and PLA, one grounded in ideological shifts as Chinese Marxist Leninism evolves along lines quite different from the trajectory of development in the Soviet era, has collateral effects on other, more peripherally situated Marxist Leninist states. Cuba remains fundamentally tied to a Soviet model for its internal operation and that of its communist party. But the communist party was a creation of the military elites that overthrew the prior regime in 1959, and it has to been clear that from its inception that the military was subordinated to party. The lack of clarity stems, in part, not just from an institutional perspective but a family one. The brothers, Raúl and Fidel Castro, have between them retained control of both the PCC and FAR apparatus. Thus the fusion is personal rather than institutional. That brings the FAR-PCC relations closer to those of North Korea (to be discussed below) rather than either to the Soviet, Chinese or Vietnamese model. Though “vanguard” families and the “historicos” that support them have made somewhat different choices in operationalization, both systems present modifications of Marxist Leninist organization that meld family and ideological structures in unique ways. And it may be that for purposes of sustaining stability along family control models, the North Koreans might be the better organizational choice. But this view suggests that in the case of Cuba, ideology no longer matters. Indeed, the opposite might be true, and I might suggest that any such implication may be problematic.10 At the time of the Revolution, Cuban leaders took the position that ideology was implicit in the very revolutionary movement.11 Ideology still plays an important role within the structures of Cuban governance, either within FAR or the PCC (for my discussion, see, e.g., here).12 The ideological basis of both FAR and PCC remains vibrant, to some extent, and deeply held among FAR and PCC elites. The problem here is not ideology but that the ideological visions of FAR and PCC may no longer be aligned. That ideological analysis suggests a significant variation from the situation in North Korea where, indeed, the need to maintain ideological unity falls at the heart of the stability of the state. 10 For my discussion, see, e.g., Backer, Larry Catá, The Cuban Communist Party at the Center of Political and Economic Reform: Current Status and Future Reform (March 30, 2015). Available http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2473351. 11 It was noted: This is a unique revolution which some people maintain contradicts one of the most orthodox premises of the revolutionary movement, expressed by Lenin: "Without a revolutionary theory there is no revolutionary movement." It would be suitable to say that revolutionary theory, as the expression of a social truth, surpasses any declaration of it; that is to say, even if the theory is not known, the revolution can succeed if historical reality is interpreted correctly and if the forces involved are utilised correctly. Ernesto Che Guevara, Notes for the Study of the Ideology of the Cuban Revolution, supra. 12 See, Backer, The Cuban Communist Party at the Center of Political and Economic Reform, supra. The Military, Ideological Frameworks and Familial Marxism: A Comment on Jung-chul Lee, “A Lesson from Cuba’s PartyMilitary Relations and a Tale of ‘Two Fronts Line’ in North Korea”1 ASCE Proceedings and Papers, 25:-- (forthcoming 2015) Larry Catá Backer 6 More importantly, ideological flexibility made possible by the substantial innovation in ideology evolving in China might suggest the basis of another view of Cuban FAR-PCC relations. Professor Lee is quite correct to note the growing convergence of FAR-PLA relations from the 1980s. And indeed, the autonomy of the military made that influence possible. But Fidel Castro and the PCC establishment has not been a friend to Chinese development of Marxist Leninism from the 1970s (for my discussion, see, e.g., here).13 Raúl Castro has been more open. But his efforts have been limited to the FAR not because he wants it that way but because of the resistance of PCC elites to changing the fundamental basis of ideology away from traditional Soviet models.14 What shifting typological models grounded in deeply important ideological models suggests in Cuba is an increasing divergence between FAR and PCC expressed through the language of ideology but positioning FAR and PCC on quite different sides of debates about future reform and also about the way in which each approaches reform within their jurisdictions. With this in mind, Professor Lee’s comparison of the PLA with the North Korean situation becomes more relevant (Lee, supra, pp. 7-9). And indeed, that comparison reminds us that the usual Western (and Cuban) comparisons of Cuba with Vietnam for purposes of thinking through Cuban transitions may be less valuable than the comparisons of the Cuban and Korean models. Those comparisons, of course, are hard to make, not for technical, but for political and ideological reasons. First, Korea tends to be viewed as an outlier and potentially and illegitimate expression of Marxist Leninism even within the socialist camp. Second, because “transition” advocates have focused on moving Cuba toward Latin American and Vietnamese models, Korea presents an unpalatable alternative, one best left untouched. That, as Professor Lee suggests, would be a mistake. Yet, the experiences of the North Koreans might well prove to be more useful to understand Cuba than any other place. It is the only other state that conjoins the character of the state as peripheral but one geographically contingent to giant powerful states, with a Marxist Leninist political foundation, whose politics and policy choices are also tinged with paranoia grounded in their vulnerability to neighbors and enemies. This underexplored relationship deserves wider study. Professor Lee notes, quite correctly (Lee, Supra, p. 7) that both Cuba and North Korea went through profoundly important Soviet “crises.” Cuba’s of course, occurred at the time of the fall of the Soviet Union and was characterized by the desperation of the socalled special period. North Korea’s occurred much earlier, in 1962. There is irony here. In December 1962, in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, the North Koreans 13 See Larry Catá Backer, Fidel Castro on Deng Xiaoping and Erich Honecker--Understanding the Foundations of Cuban Political and Economic Policy, Law at the End of the Day (Aug. 19, 2012). Available http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/fidel-castro-on-deng-xiaoping-anderich.html. 14 Discussed in Backer, Larry Catá, The Cooperative as Proletarian Corporation: Property Rights between Corporation, Cooperatives and Globalization in Cuba (August 3, 2012). Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 33, 2013; Penn State Law Research Paper No. 16- 2012; Consortium for Peace and Ethics Working Paper No. 2012-8-1. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2115135 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2115135. The Military, Ideological Frameworks and Familial Marxism: A Comment on Jung-chul Lee, “A Lesson from Cuba’s PartyMilitary Relations and a Tale of ‘Two Fronts Line’ in North Korea”1 ASCE Proceedings and Papers, 25:-- (forthcoming 2015) Larry Catá Backer 7 determined that the Soviet Union had gone “soft” on the capitalist states and determined to embrace a policy that would protect the regime against foreign subversion. “During this time it is told that Kim Il-sung desperately sensed the inevitability to develop selfdefense capabilities when Khrushchev approached U.S. hardline approach in compromising and conciliatory manner.” (Lee, supra., p. 7). The result was adoption of a system that was characterized by ideological unity and functional differentiation in managing the state. The system was referenced as a “Two Fronts line”.15 Perceiving the threat of being abandoned by the Soviet Union, North Korean regime established a compartmentalized system that embraces the economy and the military simultaneously. Production lines for arms supplies were installed in every production facility assuring the resources for the military. This appeared to expand the military role on the one hand, but the regime of course has firmly brought the military under the party’s control. . . (Lee, supra., p. 7). That control was grounded in a very tight control of the ruling ideology by the Korean Community Party and the expectation of ideolocal loyalty by all members of the elite— civil and military. That framework remained intact when the defacto organization of the Party-State along family lines was recognized. At a Korean Communist Party meeting in 2010, the hereditary character of the Korean Communist state was proclaimed (Lee, supra, p. 7). Korea, like Cuba, then was organized as a revolutionary Marxist Leninist state but operated through a tight network of elite members held together by family ties and loyalty. In Korea that was blended into Korean Marxist ideology. In Cuba the importance of the family remains de facto and not de jure. Yet in both, loyalty to family became part of ideological loyalty, even as ideological foundations were shifted to suit the ambitions of leading family members. Indeed, in Korea that became apparent when the Two Fronts Line of the 1960s was revived in 2010 as a core tenet of loyalty to the new hereditary leader (Lee, supra). It remains a core foundation of Korean policy on nuclear capability. Korea has moved toward a monarchical Marxism even as Cuba embraced Praetorian Marxism; neither embraced China’s opening up as state policy, though FAR’s autonomy in Cuba permitted the introduction of Chinese ideological positions within some sectors of Cuban macro-economic planning, though with limited effect.16 15 On the importance of party line in Chinese Marxism, some of which may be relevant here, see, e.g., Backer, Larry Catá, The Rule of Law, the Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (the 'Three Represents'), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism. Journal of Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=929636. 16 Discussed in Backer, Larry Catá, Cuban Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: Cuban Marxism, Private Economic Collectives and Free Market Globalism. Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=652563. The Military, Ideological Frameworks and Familial Marxism: A Comment on Jung-chul Lee, “A Lesson from Cuba’s PartyMilitary Relations and a Tale of ‘Two Fronts Line’ in North Korea”1 ASCE Proceedings and Papers, 25:-- (forthcoming 2015) Larry Catá Backer 8 But Professor Lee suggests more. Within “the ‘Two fronts’ lie the dynamics of bureaucratic politics. . . . [and] signals the end of the policy priority debates and the declaration to coordinate party-military bureaucratic rivalry.” (Ibid., p. 8). Interestingly, there is a resonance here with the ideological rifts between the Cuban FAR and PCC. In both cases elites chose to partition authority, but the choices were different. The Korean communists closed ranks on ideology (around the hereditary leader) and divided economic activity on functional grounds. The Cubans closed ranks on foreign policy but divided economic activity (and ideological basis for policy) by sector. How does that different approach play out? Professor Lee notes: Instead of the military dominating specific industries and the production line within them, the [Korean] regime has created a cooperative structure for the military to share one or two lines in the state run system to function as a subsystem of the whole production line of the state. This accounts for the furtherance of the ‘Two Fronts’ line by the North Korean Regime. (Lee, supra., p. 8) Thus in Cuba, Professor Lee posits an institutional autonomy of FAR from the PCC, while in North Korea the military continues under the guidance of the party though the military enjoys some functional autonomy. The key difference with Cuba, then, amounts to a macro-economic choice in the division of economic labor and its allocation for policy objectives. The result in Korea is sectoral coordination; in Cuba sectoral allocation; in China, economic managerialism. Thus, Professor Lee provides an insightful comparative analysis of two quite related national and ideological “brothers” in the context of ideology at the periphery and among Marxist Leninist states. But each has chosen to respond to similar policy challenges in distinct ways. Cuba chose institutional autonomy and a measure of ideological variation. Korea chose functional autonomy around a strict ideological discipline. In the wake of this insightful analysis some questions remain. One wonders, for example about the role of ideology in framing and explaining, perhaps managing, the differences between Cuba and Korea. One might as well wonder about the ideal role of military in Marxist Leninist states, but that requires substantially more attention to Vietnam and China. Both are issues worth further consideration. I might argue that in Cuba institutional autonomy follows from ideological divergence between a Chinese model oriented military and the old hard line Stalinism of PCC elites. This might have been made possible because the military came before and remained distinct from the party apparatus, but that autonomy merely provided a space for divergence. And that divergence was not suppressed harshly precisely because of the familial relations between the heads of the PCC and FAR. That echoes the Korean situation (though one ought to note the recent execution by the new leader in Korea).17 Yet it is precisely the formal establishment of a Marxist monarchy that 17 See, e.g., Entire family of Kim Jong-un’s uncle executed in N. Korea – reports, Russia Times, 26 Jan. 2014. Available http://www.rt.com/news/korean-leader-family-slayed-213/. The Military, Ideological Frameworks and Familial Marxism: A Comment on Jung-chul Lee, “A Lesson from Cuba’s PartyMilitary Relations and a Tale of ‘Two Fronts Line’ in North Korea”1 ASCE Proceedings and Papers, 25:-- (forthcoming 2015) Larry Catá Backer 9 made possible the formal establishment of functional autonomy grounded in the legitimacy of the founder’s actions. The dead hand of the Soviet Union retains a powerful chokehold on key actors and institutions in both Cuba and North Korea, producing in both tendencies to zombie Marxism at least among certain elements of their respective “históricos.” 18 While substantial attention in Cuba comparative studies has focused on Vietnam and China, Professor Lee’s insightful essay quite usefully suggests the value of deep comparison with North Korea, a subject far too often neglected. This zombie Marxism evokes the image of a dead husk animated by something that is no longer alive, the power of which is a function of the fear of their respective regimes that, as peripheral Marxist Leninist states, they have no place to turn for protection against mortal enemies. In both, that fear has propelled their respective militaries to prominence but in quite distinct ways, the product to some extent of the different histories of the establishment of these states. In Cuba the military has become institutionally and ideologically autonomous within the broad parameters of nationalist Marxism. In North Korea the military has achieved functional autonomy moderated by a severe ideological discipline. In both cases conflict is moderated by a familial overlay to the Marxist Leninist ideology on which each state it organized. Family control limits the consequences of conflict and preserves stability—in Cuba through the fraternal relations of the Castro brothers, in North Korea through the establishment of dynastic control of the Leninist state and military apparatus. That family overlay on organizing ideology remains crucial features of both states and distinguishes both from states like China and Vietnam. But this is a stability whose institutionalization will be difficult to maintain over the long run.

1. Presented at the 25th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, July 31, 2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Available https://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/. KINU’s mission and history may be accessed at https://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/about/about\_02\_01.jsp. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Citing Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New States (U Chi Press, 1964). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See, e.g., Amos Perlmutter and W.M. Leogrande, “Civil Military Relations in Communist Political Systems,” American Political Science Review 76:778-789 (1982). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Ernesto Che Guevara, Notes for the Study of the Ideology of the Cuban Revolution (Verde Olivo (8 Oct. 1960) Transcription/Markup: A .N./Brian Baggins. Online Version: Ernesto Che Guevara Internet Archive (marxists.org) 2002. Available https://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1960/10/08.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Citing to D. Amuchasteguí, “Cuba’s Armed Forces: Power and Reforms,” ACSE Papers and Proceedings 24:456-473 (2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Citing to Yvon Grenier, Cultural Policy, Participation and the Gatekeeper State in Cuba,” ASCE Papers and Proceedings 24:456-473 (2014); Daniel I. Pedreira, “Cuba’s Prospects for a Military Oligarchy,” ASCE Papers and Proceedings 23:243-247 (2013); Vegard Bye, 2012, The Politics of Cuban Transformation-What Space for Authoritarian Withdrawal?,”ASCE Papers and Proceedings 22:22-43 (2012); and Michael Aranda, “The Evolution of the Cuban Military: A Comparative Look at the FAR with the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model of South America,” ASCE Papers and Proceedings 20:200-208 (2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Larry Catá Backer, The Cuban Communist Party: Current Status and Future Reform ASCE Proceedings 24:72-88 (2014). Available http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/v24-backer.pdf. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See, e.g., Backer, Larry Catá and Wang, Keren, 'What is China's Dream?' Hu Angang Imagines China in 2020 as the First Internationally Embedded Superpower (February 23, 2013). Consortium for Peace & Ethics Working Paper No. 2013-2. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2223279 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2223279 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. For my discussion, see, e.g., Backer, Larry Catá, The Cuban Communist Party at the Center of Political and Economic Reform: Current Status and Future Reform (March 30, 2015). Available http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2473351. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. 1 It was noted: This is a unique revolution which some people maintain contradicts one of the most orthodox premises of the revolutionary movement, expressed by Lenin: "Without a revolutionary theory there is no revolutionary movement." It would be suitable to say that revolutionary theory, as the expression of a social truth, surpasses any declaration of it; that is to say, even if the theory is not known, the revolution can succeed if historical reality is interpreted correctly and if the forces involved are utilised correctly.

Ernesto Che Guevara, Notes for the Study of the Ideology of the Cuban Revolution, supra. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. See, Backer, The Cuban Communist Party at the Center of Political and Economic Reform, supra [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See Larry Catá Backer, Fidel Castro on Deng Xiaoping and Erich Honecker--Understanding the Foundations of Cuban Political and Economic Policy, Law at the End of the Day (Aug. 19, 2012). Available http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/fidel-castro-on-deng-xiaoping-anderich.html. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Discussed in Backer, Larry Catá, The Cooperative as Proletarian Corporation: Property Rights between Corporation, Cooperatives and Globalization in Cuba (August 3, 2012). Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 33, 2013; Penn State Law Research Paper No. 16- 2012; Consortium for Peace and Ethics Working Paper No. 2012-8-1. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2115135 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2115135. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. On the importance of party line in Chinese Marxism, some of which may be relevant here, see, e.g., Backer, Larry Catá, The Rule of Law, the Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (the 'Three Represents'), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism. Journal of Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=929636. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Discussed in Backer, Larry Catá, Cuban Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: Cuban Marxism, Private Economic Collectives and Free Market Globalism. Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=652563. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. See, e.g., Entire family of Kim Jong-un’s uncle executed in N. Korea – reports, Russia Times, 26 Jan. 2014. Available http://www.rt.com/news/korean-leader-family-slayed-213/. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. 8 A reference to the historical or fist generation leaders of the revolution, especially in Cuba. See, e.g., Cuba’s ‘Communist codgers’ unlikely to establish Market-Leninism, Democracy Digest (April 21, 2011) (“The Communist regime desperately needs a fresh generation of leaders, President Raúl Castro told this week’s opening session of the ruling party’s congress, promising “to make Cuba’s sclerotic communist system more open and efficient, and [promote] younger, reform-minded apparatchiks.”. . . “What it means is any generational change and the implementation of reforms will be guided by the ‘historicos’ — or perhaps better put, constrained by the history of the Cuban revolution and the memories and goals of its founders,” said Christopher Sabatini, editor of Americas Quarterly.”) Available http://www.demdigest.net/cubascommunist-codgers-unlikely-to-establish-market-leninism/. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)