**On a Constitutional Theory for China--From the General Program of the Chinese Communist Party to Political Theory**

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**I. Introduction**

In her marvelous analysis, a short note "On Larry Catà Backer's theory of the Chinese constitutional order," Flora Sapio performed "an intellectual exercise, therefore I will not set out to dismantle the theory of Party-State Constitutionalism, but sketch out a possible strategy to do so." (Ibid). Within that exercise was a powerful challenge to the genesis of s theory of Party-State constitutionalism:

A more viable move to challenge the theory of Chinese Party-State Constitutionalism has to start from somewhere else. The theory of Chinese Party-State Constitutionalism is not an autonomous theory, but the application of a taxonomy (the taxonomy of constitutionalism) to a specific political-institutional context. Those who have an interest in advocating for the superiority of one value system over the others –- and who do not realise how by merely conceiving this idea they have reacted exactly as the taxonomy predicts –- may want to attack the taxonomy itself. Proving that the taxonomy does not reach its goals is sufficient to take the ground from under the theory of Chinese Party-State Constitutionalism. (Sapio, "On Larry Catà Backer's theory of the Chinese constitutional order").

Professor Sapio correctly notes that the constitutionalism framework within which a Party-State theory is developed may contain a contradiction that may not be explained by the theory itself.

The Constitutionalism Framework has been designed as a meta-ideological device and while it has an extraordinary explanatory power at the meta-level, it is still possible to hypothesize a case this framework cannot account for. This hypothetical case would see the existence, within the Marxist-Leninist family, of two parties organized along Leninist lines, which share the same ideology and the same metric of substantive values. One would not expect either party to adhere to classical Marxism-Leninism, but the statute of each party should at least claim to profess a version of Marxism-Leninism that has been adapted to its historical and cultural context. Both parties would have to be the locus of supreme political power within their respective political community, delegate administrative power to their state apparatus and – these are fundamental conditions – claim the superiority of their own variant of Leftist ideology, trying to wield sovereign power over the same territory and the same people. (Sapio, "On Larry Catà Backer's theory of the Chinese constitutional order").

What Professor Sapio proposes, and quite brilliantly, is the contradiction inherent where one might convenience of a "one ideology-- two vanguard parties" system. It is, in a sense, the heart of the contradiction that must be explored within a more realistic situation--the one country two systems ideological framework within which China is now organized. This is the challenge is taken up here. I will undertake, without at first knowing the possible outcome, to work through the possibility of two parties-one ideology within the broader context of a one country two systems framework, as theory. In the process I will seek, freehand (that is without the burden of constructing a theoretical Frankenstein out of the bits and pieces of theory-insight I might take from others), to read through the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Constitution General Program, and from it to elaborate a substantive theory of Marxist-Leninism that might either prove the contradiction wrong, or proving its value, develop the underlying ideology in ways that might overcome its current contradictions. In the process, it may be possible to further elaborate the constitutional taxonomic framework I have been building, and a more refined and scientifically developed ideological ordering of the system now under (rapid) construction in China.

**A. Theoretical Foundations: The General Program in the Chinese Constitutional Complex.**

Since early in the history of the People's Republic of China, at a time just on the cusp of the Cultural Revolution, the problem of a theoretical foundations for the transformation of a revolutionary impulse guided by a 19th century theoretical vision into an institutional program true to that vision was acute. By the 1950s, the lessons of European Marxist-Leninism, in its Stalinist reformulations, had been absorbed, and with it a structure and language for the elaboration of a theory with some connection to the realities of the political architecture than being framed (and almost immediately after re-framed) in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that was not great, nor proletarian, nor cultural nor revolutionary.

Within that formative period and drawing on their Soviet elder brothers, as Arthur Steiner (writing in the late 1950s) reminded us, the great discursive tropes were forged within which the language of Chinese Marxism would be constrained and made to understand itself. The language, like the language of any elite (lawyers in common law countries; priests everywhere), was both compressed (laden with terms of art), and tethered to its own history (seek truth from facts). "Ideology" merged with and expressed theory; "politics" merged with and expressed practice. An "ideological line" expressed a theoretical perspective tied to a specific context. "Politics" was a way of expressing policy and the rule system through which it was implemented (and a reminder that the authority over politics remained not with the state but with the CCP)). The CCP's "line" was fashioned to serve as the operational device for instructing CCP cadres on the appropriate parameters of action within the sphere of their authority. It also served as the means by which such exercise of authority was to be measured . . . and constrained.

Yet this vocabulary, the system constructed from out of these organizing notions, has proven to be a thick barrier to Westerners, especially, and adherents of other political traditions, generally. The principal barrier, of course, is that the words do not translate well from one set of political theory to another. Ideology, political lines, party structure and organization, and politics have quite distinct meanings under non-Marxist-Leninist systems theory than they do elsewhere. And it is difficult to invest words with a common meaning in one theoretical system, with meanings largely inimical to that system's constructs in studying another. But not impossible. Perhaps in the American context, ideology can be understood as the theory of the American political order developed through the Declaration of Independence and related documents of the revolutionary period (through the Federalist Papers), and its politics elaborated in the early cases of the Marshall Court, particularly Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803) and McColluch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316 (1819). The American ideological line and its constraints was expressed through its founding documents, particularly its federal Constitution (and those founding documents central to constitutional modification), which served together as the structuring mechanism for politics, undertaken by factions united in their allegiance to the basic parameters of American ideology as expressed through its ideological line.

Thus CCP "ideology" is an expression of the theoretical foundations of the political order. The political order itself has, as its highest obligation, the burden of ensuring that its style of governance and its substantive policies conform to those theoretical foundations. That style of governance, the CCP's politics, then articulates substantive policy that is then implemented through the administrative structures of the state. The aggregate articulation of that obligation, as standard and measure of fidelity to the political order, is expressed in the party "line." The political and governmental constitution of the Chinese nation then seamlessly follows from this structure. The political order is exercised through the CCP. The CCP exercises the delegated power of sovereignty from the people, for whose benefit, in accordance with the governing ideology, it is fundamentally obligated to act. CCP membership is theoretically open to all people who embrace an allegiance to the CCP "ideology" and consent to the disciplining of that allegiance through the institutional mechanics of the CCP. At its limit, the CCP might merge into and include all adult citizens with capacity. The CCP "ideology" constrains all political choice within the nation. The specific choices made to express the concretization of the CCP's "ideology" together constitutes the CCP's line. The CCP line expresses the political choices made within the constraints of the constraining ideology, which creates the framework within which governance may be implemented. It acquires, in that sense, a constitutional character at the foundation of the political order of the nation. Both ideology and CCP line constitute the nation, and as written in the Constitution of the CCP, reflect the highest level of governance within the state. The CCP line, as reflected in its constitution, has direct effect on the people in whose name the line was developed. There is thus a direct connection, constitutionally affirmed, between the CCP and the people (and one that is still very much a work in progress). The constitution of the political order is then administered through, and implemented by, the government constituted for the administration of the state. That administrative order also articulates and is constrained by the CCP line. It is reflected in the state constitution. The state apparatus does not engage in politics, nor does it have responsibility for the nation's political line. Its role is far more constrained--to take the CCP line, within the further constraints of the state constitution, and implement it within the structures of government created therefor. That argument reflects the constitutional theory of Jiang Shigong and in my own prior work.

To encounter the theoretical foundations of the Chinese political order, therefore, it is necessary to look first to the ideology of that political order. The constitutional theory for China, and its constraining line--the framework within which Chinese politics, and the discretion of the CCP are constrained--the cage of politics (to paraphrase President Xi Jingpin's well known call to cage power within a cage of regulations)--is given, if it is given at all, from this ideology. That ideology is embedded within the General Program of the CCP. The cage of ideology restricts the political line of the CCP, and the state apparatus that administers that line. It is to the precise details of the cage of theory that we turn next. The objective is to discern whether the cage is illusory, or made of paper, or can robustly serve to bind the CCP to its purpose the way that the American ideological line has bound the factions of the American political party since the founding of that Republic.

Shan Gao provides a short discussion of the evolution of the general program within the formal structures of the CCP constitution in the short essay that follow. Links to the historical CCP constitutions then follow at the end of the essay:

This short essay illustrates the evolution of general program within the Communist Party of China’s Constitution. The focus is the organization and content of the general program in order to show how it evolved within the context of China and communist party as a more refined and more elaborated statement on the CPC’s institutional agenda, culture, guiding ideology and mission. This essay is organized in a chronological order, which separates the development of constitution into five stages: The primary stage (1921-1928). A pre-general program era, party constitution is simple and concise without a general program because young communist party of China has very limited operation in certain regions. The revolutionary stage (1945-1956). The adoption of general program in 1945 7th congress signified the maturity and sophistication of party’s revolution and the emergence of developing scientific theory to guide their institutional governance. The conflict stage (1966-1977). General program, as core part of constitution subordinated by the catastrophic culture revolution and de-structuralized in a new format to reflect the central power of China. The re- structuralization age (1982-1988) based on the 1956 constitution, the new General Program set the foundation for later update; The New Millennium/ socialist modernization stage 1992-2002. A more organized and coherent General program was presented; socialist system stage 2007-present. The proposal of socialist theory system with Chinese characteristics brought General Program into a new level.

The primary stage 1921-1928

From 1921 to 1928, the party constitution was at a primary stage. Through the 1st party congress in 1921, the young communist party of China only installed a very basic framework that requires years of constant amendments to enrich it primitive form of party structure, and yet to develop a theoretic framework for its institutional agenda. The first constitutive document of the Communist Party of China was adopted by 1st party congress in 1921. It was so simple with 15 articles to define the name, agenda and goal of the party that it was not even called constitution. The official name was “Program of Communist Party of China.” There were only physical copy of Russian and English version available to evidence its existence and one article of the program was missing from the document. By reviewing the Chinese translation of these two copies, the English and Russian language version was not consistent with each other.

Between 1922- 1928, the party started to use “constitution” as a foundational program to build its internal institutional framework. It usually cover these five areas: Membership: Qualifications and procedures of obtaining or transferring party membership, Organization: the authority and duties of central and local party committee; Voting: the voting rules for internal governance. Accountability: Punishments for violating internal governing rules that derived from constitutive document or authority of governing agent. Finance: Financial contributions by party members and maintenance responsibility by governing agent. The young communist party was weak at this stage, the constitution was simple and unsophisticated. It had no general program, no guiding theory. The party itself did not structured as a financially, institutionally and ideologically separate entity from Comintern. There were many irregularity within the legislation. The 1927 constitution was passed by politburo instead of congress. The 6th congress was held in Russia and make CPC became a branch of Comintern without independence.

The party constitution did not adopt a general provision section, a section expresses the guiding principle of party’s organizational agenda, until the 7th party congress in 1945. There are a few possible explanations. First, the general provision epitomized the party’s political and institutional agenda, which is the manifestation of party’s revolution experience that requiring a matured theoretic framework to organize. Two elements are critical to the development of such framework: one is the time, and the other is a strong organization that survived from the external and internal challenges. Through two decades of fights, the party leaders, such as Mao and other cadres had obtained sufficient amount of valuable experience as the raw materials to develop a more refined and more objective understanding of Chinese people, China and revolution in China. With the supports of the party, Mao had wrote a series essays during these period of time that summarized the truth about party revolution. Core ideas of these essays, later find its expression in the constitution. Thus, it was just the right moment at 1945 when the party could put their more matured thinking into the general program. Another explanation for the late adoption of a general program section reflected a theory that the development of CPC is tied up with the core relationship between CPC and CPSU. The CPSU and Comintern had an established reputation of providing investment to the communist revolution in foreign land through financial assistant and institutional guidance. CPSU had a great and direct impact on CPC, which fashioned and shaped the path for the establishment party’s internal governance framework. Historically, the general program of communist revolution and the constitution was a separate document.[[1]](#footnote-1) It was until 1939 the 18th congress of CPSU that the party constitution embrace the general program within the text.[[2]](#footnote-2)

The revolutionary stage 1945-1956

The 1945 constitution was a well written constitutive document, it not only set up the basic structural framework that could logically organize information regarding the internal governance of the party, but also adopt a section of general program that coherently restate party’s agenda and revolutionary goal. As Liu Shaoqi commented in his report on the significant of this section:

The general program is the basic program that constituted the constitution, it sets the premise and general principal of the context. All party member must recognize it and act it in accordance with it…It summarizes the 24 years of revolution experience, which include the best of all, Mao Zedong theory. Through the simple words, it illustrates theories and agenda of communist party, the features, motivations and nature of Chinese revolution, and the necessary qualification for the revolution program.

The 1956 constitution General Program is a more refined amendment of 1945 General Program, it has a more organized writing that apply different paragraph to organize these sections in a coherent order: 1, the definition of CPC and its nature; the guiding ideology, 2 the restatement of historical achievements, 3 nature of current revolution and task. 4 The working ethics of the party.

Deng Xiaoping also explained when major changes occurred in Chinese society and party, it was necessary to have an updated constitution to address. According to Deng’s reports, three critical issues aroused due to the socialist transition. One is the mass line, another is democratic centralism. The third is collective leadership and personal cult. About the mass line, Deng specifically criticized there was a gowning tendency of bureaucratism within the party that deviated from the mass line, which party official ignoring reality and people’s needs by enforcing some personal agenda. In other words, to install the principle of mass line in order to reverse the damage of misconception and miscommunication between the masses and administrative bureaucrats. About the democratic centralism, Deng warned the issues of conflicts of leadership between local and lower administrative agent and central administrative agent. Deng concluded the issue originated from the improper and over centralism where the policy lost flexibility that local or lower agent have trouble to apply for local reality.

In order to properly address the issues of conflict of authority between the central and local, the risk of personal cult and bureaucratism due to the rising of cadres power during the process party leading all social organs for socialist transition, the general program installed the principle of “mass line” and “democratic centralism” in the text, although these concepts had not been clearly point out. For example, in the section emphasize the work ethnics of the party member, it provided that: “Serve the people wholeheartedly Close connection with the revolutionary people with understanding that the coherence between party and people’s interest, and consistency accountability to both party and people.” As for democratic centralism, it provided that: “Party is organized by the democratic centralism system. The strength of party’s execution comes from the unification of the will and act. Cooperation and coordination is required. Violator should not remained in the party.”

The conflict stage 1969-1977

1969 9th congress adopt a new party constitution. Due to the culture revolution, this is a complete overhaul of previous constitution, which was infested by left ideology. It further abandoned the previous well organized structure as sections such as the past task was purely centralized on class struggle. The guiding principle is Mao Zedong through, the restatement of historical achievement was merely a statement that lionize the greatness of Mao’s leadership. The general program abandoned the Mass Line and Democratic Centralism. The only important thing is proletariat dictatorship under class struggle with unquestionable allegiance toward Mao. Also, during the conflict stages, there were no substantial changes that truly altered the left nature of the text during those 3 General Program updates. The left tendency instilled into every sentence of the general program. The following comparison provided the best illustration:

On the definition of CPC:

1956: Communist party of china, is the advanced organized troops of Chinese working class in its highest form. His goal is to realize socialism and communism in China.

1969: CPC is a party of proletariat… Party is a vanguard formed by advanced elements of proletariat, leads proletariats to fight against class enemies.

1973: CPC is a party of proletariat, the vanguard of proletariat.

1977: CPC is a party of proletariat, it is the highest form of proletariat organization, which constituted by advanced element of proletariat. It lead proletariat and revolutionary masses to fight against class enemies.

On the guiding ideology of the party:

1956: CPC take Marxist-Leninist as its guidelines, party applies Marxism-Leninism into Chinese revolution practice and against any tendency of doctrinism or empiricism.

1969: CPC takes Marxist, Leninist, and Mao Zedong Thought as the theoretical base of guiding ideology. Mao Zedong Thought is the Marxist-Leninist at the times when imperialist marched to complete ruin and socialist marched to worldwide victory.

1973: CPC takes Marxist, Leninist, and Mao Zedong Thought as the theoretical base of guiding ideology.

1977: The guiding ideology and theoretic base of CPC is Marxist, Leninist, and Mao Zedong Thought. Party strongly against revisionism, dogmatism and empiricism. Party strongly support dialectical materialism and historical materialism, against idealism and metaphysics.

The list about the left conservatism of the general program during the conflict stage can goes forever. The bottom line is the General Program no longer wrote as the tools to summarize the party experience and lessons, to provide guiding principle for the operation of the party work. The central function of guidance and education was lost during this conflict stage.

The re- structuralization age 1982-1988

The 1988 constitution amendment did not touch the general program so the restructure or rehabilitation stage is centralized on the general program of 1982 constitution amendment. The 1982 Constitution was adopted after the well-known 3rd plenary session of 11th Congress. It was adopted during the time when Communist Party restored its social order and party order with a new orientation on the socialist economy construction. New theories and new principles had been proposed to reverse the damages of culture revolution. As the 12th CPC congress report entitled “A Whole New Chapter of Constructing Socialist Modernization” pointed out:

‘China has been through great historical transition: Through strenuous efforts we has liberated from the chains of dogmatism and personal cult to reestablish the guiding principle of Marxism: “seeking truth from facts.” We can redevelop Mao Zedong thought under new historical terms with a proper understanding of it. Through reestablishing social orders and laws, we ended the chaos and earned a great unification from everyone. Through the restoration of power and order to the party and state agents, we refocus on the economy construction to restructure social relations between workers, peasants and intellectuals.’

The 1982 General Program also reorganize its structure, which set the format for the future update. The current structure is:

1. The Definition of the Party

2. The Guiding ideology

3. The socialist theory and its application in China

4. The current revolution nature and task

5. The requirements for party working ethics

The 1982 General Program redefined CPC as the vanguard of the working class and loyal representation of the interests of all Chinese nationality. It is the core leadership of Chinese socialist business. The ultimate goal is to realize communism. Based on the 1956 General Program, the 1982 amendment refined the section of restatement on historical achievement. This section had been rewrote as ‘socialist theory and its application in China.’ this new entry normally has three part. The first part stated Marxism-Leninism as the scientific socialist theory that proved to be correct and will guide the world to replace capitalism with socialism. The second part redefined Mao Zedong thought as a collective wisdom of party that is an historical application of Marxism-Leninism into Chinese revolution practice. The third part is Chinese people led by the party won the new democracy revolution, established PRC and socialist system. In order to further reverse the left tendency issues. The 1982 General Program provided a comprehensive analysis on the nature of Chinese society, as it provided that Class struggle is no longer the main issue:

There is an impassible gap of economy and culture development that requiring our attention of socialist construction with Chinese characteristics. The main contradiction of Chinese society is people’s increasing material and cultural needs and under developed social production. Due to domestic and international forces, class struggle will remained for a long time with possibility of intensify, but not a main issue anymore.

The 1982 General program reestablished new party line: The basic line of the Communist Party of China in the primary stage of socialism is to lead the people of all ethnic groups in a concerted, self-reliant and pioneering effort to turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced modern socialist country by making economic development the central task while upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and the reform and opening up policy. On the issue of working ethics, the 1982 General Program proposed three requirements: the first: upholding the party’s core ideology and against left or right tendencies. Second: serve the people wholeheartedly. Third, party’s leadership is politics, ideology and organization.

New Millennium stage 1992-2002

The new millennium stage is also a stage of socialist modernization. Since 1982 Constitution amendment, the party had applied the new Open Up policy and Market economy with the Four Cardinal Principle, which provided valuable practice experience to develop socialist modernization. The 14th, 15th and 16th congress General Program had demonstrated party’s confidence of further developing a more refined, and elaborated party guidelines with a more matured, pragmatic, more scientific view. First, the 14th congress redefined China is currently under primary stage of socialism. Thus the agenda of the party should be economy construction. Class struggle will remained for a long time with possibility of intensify, but not a main issue anymore. In other words, class struggle is refrained and counterbalanced by the economy construction under the theory of socialism primary stage.

Second, the basic line of the party under socialist primary stage is to lead the people of all ethnic groups in a concerted, self-reliant and pioneering effort to turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced modern socialist country by making economic development the central task while upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and the reform and opening up policy. The 14, 15 and 16th congresses has similar discussions on how to carry out this basic line, which subcategorized into five areas:

1. Economy orientation: All works must serve for the core task of economy construction;

2. Ideology orientation: Upheld four cardinal principle and against Bourgeois liberalization;

3. Open Up policy: Open up is the inevitable path to liberalize and develop productivity, political reform must coordinate with the new economy system;

4. Socialist culture and ethics are equally important to the material prosperity. Education and propaganda is necessary to promote socialist culture and ethics;

5. Socialist democracy and legal governance.

The 1992 General Program provided four requirements on the party’s working ethics to restrain internal governance, which set the foundation of later refinement. These five requirements are:

1. Party’s basic line: There were two aspect; one is to unified thinking and act for party’s basic line, which is subject to future development, the other is to combat left and right erroneous tendencies, primarily left tendencies.

2. Personality of the Party: Emancipating the mind, seeking truth from facts, keeping up with the times, and being realistic and pragmatic.

3. Serving the people wholeheartedly. This means first, Party has no special interests of its own apart from the interests of the working class and the broadest masses of the people. Second, not allow any member to become divorced from the masses or place himself or herself above the people. Third, Party will persistently oppose corruption and step up efforts to improve its style of work and uphold integrity.

4. Upholding democratic centralism.

5. Leadership by the Party means mainly political, ideological and organizational leadership. The Party must meet the requirements of reform, opening up and socialist modernization, persist in scientific, democratic and law-based governance, and strengthen and improve its leadership.

The later constitution amendments, including 15th, 16th, 17, and 18th congress all adopt the basic structure of this five requirements with minor changes. There were three critical theories had been installed since the 14th congress, which requiring our special attention:

First, institutional personality. The party reshape its institutional personality through the General program by claiming party should “Emancipating the mind, seeking truth from facts, keeping up with the times, and being realistic and pragmatic.” This means party understand the dangerous of seeing things through an ossified lens and decide to take a more constructive approach in constructing the system around it. Second, the theory of socialism at primary stage. According the context of General Program, the current revolution task is centralized by economy construction because there is an inevitable gap of underdeveloped productivity. Such gap is the main contradictions that party should pay great attention. Class struggle, a theory tarnished by culture revolution, had reconstructed under socialist primary stage. This means, class struggle has potential of reviving but less intense than the issue of economy development.

Third, the revival of mass line and democratic centralism. Each of the party line is actually a separate policy structure with coherent internal connection for their different applications. Mass Line consider the external relation between the party and people, which covers three aspects. 1) It is the theory address the issue of conflict of interest. It clearly warned party that “The Party has no special interests of its own apart from the interests of the working class and the broadest masses of the people.” No one should place personal interests above the masses of the people. 2), it is the guidelines on party’s working manner. Party’s works are premised on the people’s interest and people’s support. The formulation of the party policy has to be channeled through and by the people. The execution of party’s policy follow the same fashion so people could voluntarily carry out party’s mind. 3) The Mass Line entailed the function of anti-corruption because any corrupt behavior is an alienation from the mass. Masses are the victims of the corruption.

Democratic centralism is the theory dealing the internal conflicts between freedom and discipline, rights and duties. It serves as the internal governance principle. According to the General Program, Democratic centralism is a combination of centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized guidance. It is the fundamental organizational principle of the Party and is also the mass line applied in the Party's political activities. It has three aspects: 1) party member as an individual should be personally respected, so his or her rights could benefit the work of the party. 2) Party discipline should be respected, so individual’s rights would not violate the work of party.

The stage of Socialist system with Chinese characteristics 2007-

General Program had been vigorously developed in accordance with the advancement of China’s socialist development. The new millennium stage General Program had set a good foundation for the later development. The 17th Congress created a new entry in the General Program that stated: “success of Party’s work is the development and formulation of socialist theoretic system with Chinese characteristics.” This signified the emergence of Chinese socialist theoretic system to overarch the development of Chinese socialist business. It is a great leap in comparison with eight decades ago when party was a branch subordinate toward Comintern. The emergence of such system cannot occur without the institutional personality of pragmatism, without the restructure of socialist primary stage theory to accurately assess China’s reality and counter balance the left and right tendency, without the mass line and democratic centralism to avoid the conflict of interests between party member and masses.

There were many new updates from the 17th and 18th congress to response new changes of China. For example, the 17th Congress asserted

“Party lead people to develop socialist market economy, which encourage, support and shape the non-pubic economy sectors. Second, it rewrite the part of socialist democracy… party lead people to develop socialist democracy by upholding party’s leadership, people as the master of the state and rule the state in accordance with law… to construct socialist rule of law state… party lead people to develop advanced socialist culture.”

The 18th Congress embraced the Hu Jingtao’s Scientific Development Outlook as party’s guiding ideology, it further asserted “The Communist Party of China leads the people in promoting socialist ecological progress.”

As Liu Shaoqi asserted in his report in 1956, the General Program is a summary of past experience. The evolution of Party General Program is a concise overview of the past structural development of this section. It is important is a sense as the memo of stating the institutional agenda, personality, mission and culture. It provides some general and foundational guidelines on the internal governance. It reframe the behavior of the institution for a healthy development, but not limit their aspiration for great future. This has been proved by the new development of the party since 1982 and it has been practiced by the party currently.

**B. The Cage of Ideology: History of the General Program and the Constitution of the CCP**

We have come to understand the centrality of ideology to the ordering of the Chinese Constitutional system. And we have come to understand, as well, that the centrality of ideology is functionally similar to the animating ideology of other well-ordered and comprehensive political systems from out of which a self-referencing constitutional order may be established and disciplined in accordance with its normative logic. We have located the cage of ideology within the institutional structures of the CCP. CCP and ideology, sovereign political community and theory, are thus bound together to produce an ordering framework that binds all that constitutes the Chinese Republic in its current state of organization.

This cage of ideology structures and defines. It creates that border within which those premises which together constitute the basis of systemic coherence and self-reference can be identified, developed, policed and applied. From its premises the language of inter systemic communication can be developed, one in which words become terms of art and are diffused with deeper meaning that are built within the context of communication within the system. The cage of ideology is semiotically coherent, but only within its borders and among its practitioners and acolytes. It requires the acquisition of a specific language--in the American context this is well evidenced by the very peculiar language of U.S. constitutional discourse before the federal courts, a language that sometimes defies comprehension even among the great body of those in whose service the language is deployed. The cage of ideology provides a means of conceptual incarnation of an ordering system of substantive values and societal objectives.

Systemic reification is vital for the establishment of systemic autonomy from the collective personal desires, objectives and behaviors of the individuals who constitute the community operating within the system. A system, especially an ideological system, that does not exist beyond the control of any individual or group functions as commodity--a tool for leveraging personal power devoid of normative value beyond that useful for the personal welfare maximization of the individual or the group that owns it. Aristotle understood this dynamic well when he distinguished among the three ideological "cages" he described (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy) as autonomous ideological systems. He also noted that where such autonomy is lost, each system loses its legitimacy and thus perverted, becomes an illegitimate inversion of itself--monarchy becomes despotism, aristocracy becomes oligarchy, and democracy becomes mob rule. In the 20th century, democratic republicanism becomes fascism and Marxist-Leninist parties become totalitarian cult of personality dictatorships.

But the cage of ideology is essential as well for managing communication with other ideological systems. Here the insights of systems theory and autopoiesis are useful. An autonomous ideological system strives for internal coherence. It develops subsystems and subsidiary cages of regulation all derived from the premises that both constitute the system as distinct from others and that provide the normative framework for deriving subsidiary rules. That insight, of course, is the essential characteristic of the constitutions of all autonomous communities--from states, to religions, to enterprises. National laws are grounded in constitutional frameworks; religious rules are derived from the collected divine word and guidance; enterprise operating rules are framed through its organizing documents and so on. But that insight also produces another, internal coherence requires a substantial barrier between systems. Coherence is relational--it requires both distinguishing characteristics and a border that can be discerned and protected. Borders are not impermeable, but the nature of communication between systems is quite distinct from communication within systems. The current debate in the United States about judicial reliance on "foreign" sources provides a good example. The complications of "border control" are nicely illustrated by Ganesh Sitaraman in the American context. (Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 32:653-693). Systems communicate, in the language of systems theory, they engage in structural coupling, they intermesh, they form communicative networks, and the like. The way systems communicate, interact, and transpose these communications and knowledge transfers within their systems, however, can vary considerably. But no system exists focused solely inward. Robust systems are less fearful of extra-systemic communication than systems whose internal integrity is weaker. Strong systems internalize communication, transposing it into their own normative language; weak systems might be overwhelmed by communication that colonizes, and invasive communication that bursts systems.

In China, that cage has a formal structure that emerged only after a long process of development from the earliest organization of the CCP through its emergence in its current form only after the rejection of the cult of personality form of party-state organization that reached its greatest level of development during the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. The cage of ideology in China is the general program of the CCP--the formal elaboration of the theory of the organizational framework of the Chinese political-social-economic system. It represents the basic premises, the theory, under which the system of Chinese politics-society-economy is organized, from out of which rules may be created to implement and through which society develops. It provides premise, language, order and process, the essential qualities of autonomous systemicity. That cage has been placed within the document that itself constitutes the community of the holders of delegated political authority in this system--the CCP.

This cage embodies the formal structures of system theory, and its most legitimate source. It defines the character and borders of a system that is meant to be separate from and superior to the ambitions, desires and personal tastes of those who operate within it. The cage is strongest when individuals act on the basis of these organizing premises; it is at its weakest when individuals act to threaten the autonomy of the system and to use it to further their own or their factions' ends. A weak system cannot communicate either internally (to scientifically develop and implement its structures and objectives), nor can it communicate externally (since such communication with other systems is received as a threatening gesture with the potential to displace the structures of a system that has lost its autonomous integrity). It is for that reason, for example, that structurally weak systems--cult of personality Marxist-Leninist structures, fascist dictatorships or oligarchies, mob democracies--tend to try to strengthen the barriers between its "system” and foreign systems--each act of communication might expose the weakness of the system itself. On the other hand, robust autonomous systems are in constant interaction, communication, and transposition. Communication and transposition strengthens rather than threatens a robust Marxist-Leninist system, a democracy or an aristocracy. Detaching systems from the individuals who purport to manage them tends to be among the condition most threatening to the integrity, and thus to the strength of systems. Where such attachment has reached an advanced stage, then it is likely that the system, now decadent, will either fall and be replaced by another (a variation of this insight is well evidenced in Marxist determinism and the old Comintern; but also in the progressive ideology of the West that itself adheres to a determinism leading to the establishment of global democratic orders) or the system will be purged and reconstituted (in the language of Chinese ideology, scientifically developed driven by the foundational premise of seeking truth from facts).

**II. Fundamental Principles (¶¶ 1-9)**

**A. The CCP and Its Vanguard Role (¶ 1 General Program).**

We started with a macro analysis of the Chinese political universe. We have been considering the framework within which it is possible to read through the General Program of the CCP. We have come to understand the role of ideology and its connection to theory, and the role of politics and its connection to policy. We have come to understand the cage of ideology as the fundamental element in the structuring of the Chinese political system, including the establishment both of the CCP and the state apparatus of the nation. Lastly, we have begun to understand how that cage of ideology has been scientifically developed through the disciplinary development of the CCP's own normative structures that have now been assembled in the General Program of the CCP.

With this section we move from macro to micro analysis. The focus is the General Program itself--paragraph by paragraph, and word for word. All too often major ideological documents are more often cited than read, and even more often invoked than studied. The object here is the reverse. As the Chinese might suggest, through a careful reading of the entirety of the General Program, in all of its specifics, to find truth from facts. Only then might it be possible to understand the application of truth to facts within the context of Chinese ideology. It is this later point that must be kept firmly in mind as theory is elaborated. The exercise of finding truth from facts is only half the effort. It is then necessary to apply truth to facts to ensure that the connection between truth and facts does not remain merely a potential, an abstraction, or an aspiration, but instead provides the measure against action may be judged, and scientifically developed.

We start with the first paragraph of the General Program:

[1] The Communist Party of China is the vanguard both of the Chinese working class and of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. It is the core of leadership for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics and represents the development trend of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. The realization of communism is the highest ideal and ultimate goal of the Party.

[1] 中国共产党是中国工人阶级的先锋队，同时是中国人民和中华民族的先锋队，是中国特色社会主义事业的领导核心，代表中国先进生产力的发展要求，代表中国先进文化的前进方向，代表中国最广大人民的根本利益。党的最高理想和最终目标是实现共产主义。

We start with the object of theory, the CCP. The politics of the nation is not vested in the people undifferentiated. Nor is it vested in a person, nor yet again vested in a factional aggregation of individuals. The CCP is not constituted as an oligarchy, nor as a nobility, nor as an aggregation of individuals greedy to retain for their organization the reins of power, nor yet again as a throne on which to project a leader. The CCP, by its own theory, is constituted as a vanguard. It is meant to facilitate, to prepare the way, to instruct, to nurture. It is meant to do that not for its own benefit--the CCP is not constituted to serve itself or its own narrow interests, as faction or as political class or as a group apart. It is, instead, founded to serve as an instrument, a vanguard, to lead from one ideological state top another and on behalf of others.

The CCP is constituted as a vanguard not for itself. Rather the General Program explains that the vanguard role can be understood as of three distinct types, each of greater generality. It is first a vanguard of the Chinese working class. But it is also and simultaneously the vanguard of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. We must consider how the working class may be distinguished from the Chinese people, and the Chinese people from the Chinese nation. Clearly, these three overlap, but in a way that echoes what we will come to understand as the three pillar structure of Sange Daibiao (the three representations). That echo identifies vanguardism in its three distinct characters. First, vanguardism has a political character. That character is shaped by a focus on the working class, the original core of political ideology (to which more will be said in the context of the following paragraphs). Second, vanguardism has an institutional character. That character is shaped by the CCP's obligation to provide ideological leadership to the apparatus of state and thus to meet its obligations to the Chinese people irrespective of class. Third, vanguardism has a cultural character. That character is shaped by the obligation to enhance Chinese culture, one that is made up of the aggregation of the cultures of its many peoples and ethnicities and which together form the Chinese nation as something unique and worthy of protection.

It is also clear that CCP's vanguard role of the Chinese working class comes first and for obvious historical reasons. Though, as ideology, history may inform, it must not control its scientific development. To reverse this relationship suggests that ideology may not be scientifically developed but must instead remain a prisoner to its own history. Such a basic approach to ideology would create a fundamental contradiction between the vanguard role of the CCP and the pull of history. One leads forward toward a goal, the other shackles to preserve a modern iteration of the past. We will see later how, or whether this contradiction may be overcome. The CCP, then, may act only as a vanguard, and it may undertake its vanguard role only for the working class, the people and the nation. It may not act for its own benefit.

What is the character of a vanguard role? It is the obligation of leadership. But this is leadership not for its own sake, but bent to a normative purpose (beyond self-preservation for its own sake). But the CCP is not to exercise leadership alone--distinct and distant from the working class, people and nation. The leadership of the CCP is understood as a core of leadership. To serve as the core of leadership is to understand the dangers of cults of institutional personality; it is to caution that the object of the vanguard is normative, not institutional, and that leadership is meant, even at the level of institution, to be a collective exercise. The CCP serves as the core of leadership. There must be others, including institutional others, to lead, and who participate in leadership. But core also suggests a dominant and guiding position. The CCP's leadership is guiding and dominant. To be the core means to direct. But to direct, guide and dominate does not mean to dictate as if nothing but the core exists. Such a position would contradict the fundamental three part collective character of the vanguard obligations of the CCP. The enterprise is collective and consultative--in the way, perhaps that democratic centralism, is properly deployed.

To what end is the CCP to play a vanguard role? The rest of the first paragraph suggests the fundamental purposes to which the obligations of a vanguard role must be directed. The normative objectives of vanguardism, the goals to which the CCP must direct its core leadership role, is for the cause of socialism (perhaps with overtones of social democracy) with Chinese characteristics. While the specifics of this normative objective are developed in the paragraphs that follow, it becomes clear, even at this initial point, that the normative obligations of the CCP are fundamentally collective in character. And the "Chinese" characteristics must necessarily relate as well to the objects of vanguard obligation--the Chinese working classes, the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. Thus, the vanguard element fundamental to the obligation of the CCP acquires both a normative character and one that folds back into its representational role.

The focus on the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics is augmented by a set of related representational objectives--objectives that drive home the connection between normative socialism and the vanguard political, institutional and cultural responsibilities annexed to the CCP's vanguard role. The cause of socialism thus framed also represents the development trend of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. Note the double parallels that align--the nature of the CCP's vanguard obligations (working classes Chinese people, Chinese nation), and the nature of the substantive obligations around the cause of socialism (development of productive forces, advanced culture, and fundamental interests of the Chinese people).

To what is vanguardism ultimately directed; what is the ultimate end of the vanguard role of the CCP to which its leadership role must be bent? It is bent to the realization of communism. Yet note that this ultimate objective is understood in two senses. Communism represents both an ideal--something far and aspiration--and final or last goal, the point at which the vanguard role of the CCP itself is fulfilled and the CCP itself merges with the people and the nation.

**B. The CCP's Guidebook (¶ 2 General Program).**

With the last section, I considered the first paragraph of the General Program of the CCP. That paragraph focused on the core premises that shape the character and role of the CCP and the obligations that flow form that role. The General Program, indeed, starts with the formulation of the polity from out of which national sovereignty is to be exercised. That polity is shaped and its power divided by the theoretical construction of the notion and need for a vanguard as the holder of popular sovereignty. That foundation is grounded in the embrace of an instrumental role for the people and nation, which itself serves as the constraints within which sovereignty itself may be exercised, either directly or through representative groups or bodies. It answers a set of related questions in that respect. First, what is a vanguard? The vanguard are those elements of political citizenship to which the obligation to lead the state and society to a particularized set of goals is vested. Second, which organization must serve in that vanguard role? In this case that is the CCP. Third, for whose benefit is the CCP serving as a vanguard? That is itself understood in three aspects--political, institutional and cultural. Fourth, to what objectives is the vanguard directed? It is directed toward a socialism that reflects the character of the political, institutional and cultural contexts of the Chinese nation. The ultimate goal, and the ideal, is the realization of communism. Yet the core objectives are themselves left undefined.

With this section I consider the first effort to delineate the fundamental theoretical sources that are available to the CCP in its work in its vanguard role. That is, if the core obligations of the vanguard is toward socialism with Chinese characteristics and the ultimate realization of communism, then it becomes important to construct those referents which ought to guide the vanguard in its objectives obligations. To that end paragraph 2 of the General Program provides a foundational structure.

[2] The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents and the Scientific Outlook on Development as its guide to action.

[2] 中国共产党以马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想作为自己的行动指南。

In effect, paragraph 2 provides the guidebook for the vanguard in determining both the meaning and the implementation of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the realization of communism. The Guidebook includes the founding theories of Marxism and Leninism, two fundamentally European ideologies, at least in origin and historical context. Yet it also includes a number of theoretical developments from out of the Marxism and Leninism base. These include the "thought" of Mao Zedong, the "theory" of Deng Xiaoping, and the "important thought" of Sange Daibiao, and the scientific outlook on development.

What has the CCP taken as its guidebook? The normative substructure on which the vanguard role of the CCP is developed is quite specific. It is notable both for what it includes and what it omits. Most importantly it does not suggest what specific texts of Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, Sange Daibiao and scientific development form the corpus of the ideological basis (and theoretical constraints) of the CCP's vanguard role. This is quite disconcerting to Westerners, who are now quite used to the specification of specific texts as the legitimate expression and memorialized universe of the legitimate sources of fundamental norms. Legal and political cosmologies are rooted in the texts of constitutions and other foundational writings; religious cosmologies are rooted in divine text and definitive glosses. These are readily identified and unassailable. They are the unquestioned basis on which theoretical reality and operationalization constraints must be based. No such definitive list of text form of unassailable core premises whose expression is implemented in the CCP's vanguard role. The consequences is a form of flexibility in core premises that might mirror the flexibility of traditional U.K. constitutionalism--something suggested recently by Chinese academics such as Jiang Shigong. The second paragraph points to the galaxy of authoritative unassailable theory, but not to the texts from which these theories are drawn. What are the texts of Marxism or of Leninism, for example, from which the CCP must draw? Does Leninism include in its unassailable texts Stalin's glosses on Leninism? Exegesis without a definitive list of texts may be less of a problem when the vanguard is coherent and there is a long term consensus of at least the core of the texts from which core theory is to be drawn. But in the context of a vanguard party state, this flexibility may prove troublesome. The trouble comes because cages, and especially cages of ideology, might not be tangible enough if it is not constructed of materials that can withstand strong pressure. This is a subtext that will follow a reading of the rest of the General Program.

What is the character of this guidebook? Beyond ambiguity about the text of its core theory, the guidebook also notable for what it specifies and what it leaves open. The guidebook does not suggest, at least in this iteration, three important elements. The first is that the Guidebook does not specify how core theory is to be read. Second it does not suggest how core theory is to be applied. And third it does not specify whether or to what extent additional sources of core theory may be used or must be avoided.

With respect to the first, the problem of hermeneutics looms large. This is not a problem specific to Chinese theory, but here it appears as a problem of hermeneutics with Chinese characteristics. If there is no consensus on the way in which to approach text, and there is no consensus on the text that is authoritative, then the flexibility built into the normative cage becomes large indeed. And to the extent it becomes a doorway rather than a constraint, this shifts authority away from text and elsewhere. If that "elsewhere" are the institutions of the CCP, or senior leadership, then there is a danger that the collective principles of the vanguardism may be imperiled. If it is shifted in a way that itself does not provide a cage for interpretation, then it might well obliterate the value of any core theory. At its limit, an unfettered authority to interpret, combined with an unfettered authority to apply, reduces the thing interpreted to an empty vessel--to a fetish that might be invoked but to which there need not be any fidelity. And for a vanguard party that might be the most profound error of all. If that is the case, then the character of the guidebook must be derived from out of a principle inherent in its establishment--that principle of fidelity, of loyalty, suggests that the vanguard party retains its authority as a vanguard party only to the extent and for so long as it remains loyal to the normative principles of the core theory. This principle of fidelity to the core theory described in the Guidebook is the core of the normative obligation of a vanguard party. We will see if this is enough to sustain the cage of theory, or if, instead theory has been caged by its servants.

This principle of fidelity, then, ought to mark the boundaries of the second two issues. Application becomes more authoritative as it comes closer to the normative core, and less authoritative when it strays. Indeed, Leninism is crucial as a normative foundation of the application of the substantive core theories of the guidebook. But the error of sloganeering is always a danger in this context. A facile connection between core and intended action might also run the risk of reduction to fetish, to a formula invocation justifying every action. That, of course, marred much of the operationalization of European Marxism. It is a danger elsewhere. And not just in Marxist-Leninist systems. The third issue is a product of the ambiguity of text, but also relates to the first two issues. In the absence of authoritative text, there is a hierarchy of text that may be persuasive but less authoritative, or unpersuasive, or inimical to the functioning of a vanguard party. There is a sense, currently, of the need to create such hierarchy of authoritativeness of texts that might be used to gloss the core theories specified as constituting in the guidebook. For example, recent calls for avoiding Western ideas, especially political ideas, tend to fall in this category. But such calls suggest a lack of education in the foundations of the General Program itself. To avoid knowledge (of facts) is to betray the core premise of finding truth from facts. There is a distinction between unassailable premises, authoritativeness of text, and persuasiveness grounded in the facts of the experiences of others. While the guidebook suggests the core of the normative premises that constitute the basis for systemic fidelity, it does not suggest a fear of other facts and knowledge that might be used for the CCP's vanguard work.

To what extent may the vanguard ignore the guidebook? One may not avoid, ignore or reject foundational texts in the West and retain a crucial marker of legitimacy. The General Program suggests a similar, but not identical approach. The vanguard party is committed to using the core theory as a guide. That requirement is not subject to exception. But to use core theory as a guide is only to suggest that these serve as a starting point, and perhaps as well, as a constraint, on the action to which the vanguard party is bound to take. The CCP may not ignore the core theory specified in paragraph 2 but it is not bound to reduce its action to the contextual specifics of those texts. And, of course, as guides, they might themselves develop, even as the vanguard moves, through application of the core theory, to the attainment of socialism and the eventual realization of communism. Both vanguard and theory, then, are to some extent, moving targets, with only a principle of fidelity to hold them together.

May the guidebook be amended? The preceding, then suggests that the guiding core theory might itself then be amended and further developed. The use of the guide to action, what I have been calling the guidebook, exists in a reciprocal relation to the obligations of the vanguard party. That reciprocity is based on another and critical premise that is contained within but unstated in the second paragraph: the core theory that constitutes the unassailable theoretical basis for the elaboration of the vanguard role of the CCP and its relation to the political, institutional, and cultural is not static and unchangeable. Within the premise--seeking truth from facts--is the insight that the elaboration of core theory, its glosses, and its application in the context of the specific conditions of a place (China in this case) is itself also in a state of development in two respects. First, core theory is itself unfinished. Second, the application of core theory's insights may require development when applied to the specific national and historical contexts for which it is drawn. This the guidebook provides the basis for formulating the form of application by the vanguard party, but that application itself is meant to contribute to the further development of the core theories, grounded in the insights drawn from the facts of context, history and application. Ideology, then, may be a cage, the bars of which may sometimes be elastic, but which is itself the carriage of a vehicle that is moving toward communism on a platform of fidelity to the core premises of its own logic.

**C. Marxism-Leninism With Chinese Characteristics (¶ 3 General Program).**

The first two paragraphs of the General Program set out the outer framework of two critical aspects of Chinese constitutional theory. The first paragraph is focused on the centrality of the vanguard to Chinese constitutional theory. The vanguard sits at the center of Chinese constitutional and political theory. To understand the structures of Chinese constitutional and political theory one must understand the vanguard. The vanguard role is not assigned to an individual or to a person. It is assigned to the political collective best situated to undertake the obligations of the vanguard. The political collective best situated is one that meets two criteria. First it must be politically, institutionally and culturally representative of (1) the most advanced elements of the polity, (2) the people, and (3) the nation made up of the collective that is the Chinese nation. Second, it must be faithful to the objectives for which a vanguard is constituted. That objective is the establishment of socialism leading ultimately to the construction of communism in China. Within this framework, the CCP has assumed the role of vanguard party. That burdens the CCP with a leadership role. But faithful to the spirit of collectivity at the theory of Chinese political and constitutional theory,

The second paragraph then focuses on the normative basis that constrains the actions of the vanguard party in fulfilling its obligations to the polity, state and nation. To that end, the General Program establishes the normative structure of Chinese political and constitutional theory. That theory arises from five (5) very specific theories: Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents and the Scientific Outlook on Development. But the relationship between the vanguard and grounding theory is not hierarchical. The vanguard takes as its guide these theories, but it is not bound to a particular historical understanding of those theories or of their applications in other times and places. Indeed, the theories identified are not specified, or moored, within specific texts. Nor are they moored within specific interpretive tropes. Yet these theories provide, none the less, a well-developed and powerful set of constraints to action. The vanguard retains legitimacy, its actions are authentic, only when its actions can be understood as derived from the guide of these five theories. At the same time the vanguard is obligated to engage with these constraining theories. The engagement with its normative base is interactive. Seeking truth from facts requires an application and reapplication of interpretation in light of the realities, the facts, emerging from both implementation and interpretation as it produces facts on the ground. Here, then, we have the first iteration of the meaning of Chinese characteristics in theory. And, indeed, the dynamic relationship between foundation and vanguard is illustrated by paragraph 2 itself--the five theories identified illustrate the growth of foundational Chinese theory from its historical foundations in European Marxism and Leninism, through its initial iteration in Mao Zedong Thought, to the addition of foundational norms from the leadership periods of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jingtao.

It is important, then, to understand that, unlike religious text, or European Marxist-Leninist theory, the text of Chinese communist theory is not yet complete, but continues to be written as China advances along the road of socialist modernization. It is the dynamic principle of elaborating the path to objective, then, that also marks Chinese political and constitutional theory as distinctive. Just as Chinese economic theory is grounded in a dynamic framework of socialist modernization—so too Chinese political and constitutional theory is marked by a path toward a fully developed communist political and constitutional theory. The dynamic elaboration of economic theory (through socialist modernization within the specific context of China) then informs the dynamic elaboration of political and constitutional theory (through the elaboration of the General Program and its application through the political work of the vanguard party).

The five theories identified in paragraph 2 are the elaborated in paragraphs 3-7. Each, in turn, illustrates the development of foundational Chinese theory from its historical foundations in European Marxism and Leninism to the addition of foundational norms from Mao Zedong through the leadership periods of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jingtao. Each addition represents the “crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China” at each successive stage on the road toward communism. And the path itself makes clear that the process of successive crystallization is far from complete.

The foundations of Chinese political and constitutional theory is built on European and received wisdom--the classical philosophy of Marxism-Leninism.

[3] Marxism-Leninism brings to light the laws governing the development of the history of human society. Its basic tenets are correct and have tremendous vitality. The highest ideal of communism pursued by the Chinese Communists can be realized only when the socialist society is fully developed and highly advanced. The development and improvement of the socialist system is a long historical process. So long as the Chinese Communists uphold the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism and follow the road suited to China's specific conditions and chosen by the Chinese people of their own accord, the socialist cause in China will be crowned with final victory.

[3] 马克思列宁主义揭示了人类社会历史发展的规律，它的基本原理是正确的，具有强大的生命力。中国共产党人追求的共产主义最高理想，只有在社会主义社会充分发 展和高度发达的基础上才能实现。社会主义制度的发展和完善是一个长期的历史过程。坚持马克思列宁主义的基本原理，走中国人民自愿选择的适合中国国情的道 路，中国的社会主义事业必将取得最终的胜利。

The principal object of paragraph 3 is to resolve the ambiguities of paragraph 2, at least to some extent. Its focus is the first of the ideological foundations of Chinese political and constitutional theory, and the guiding norms of the vanguard --Marxism-Leninism. It is interesting that the two, sometimes quite distinct theories are conjoined in the General Program. Marxism and Leninism are not the same thing, and it is less than useful to speak to them as a unity. Marxism supplies the normative foundations of a theory of communism; Leninism provides the theoretical foundations of the political theory necessary to move forward the normative project of Marxism. Both theories are normative--Marxism focusing on a philosophy of the human community and Leninism on an institutional theory of politics necessary to move the project of communism forward.

For the Chinese vanguard, however, the focus is quite specific--Marxism-Leninism is at its most useful for its structures of historical determinism ("brings to light the laws governing the development of the history of human society"). It provides the normative objective for which Leninism provides the transport. It also provides the normative structures on which Leninism is itself founded--from the notion of the vanguard itself, to the theory of class struggle from out of which socialist modernization could be authentically fashioned. But Marxism and Leninism are not understood purely as important for its historical determinism. They both remain vital, though in a manner that remains unspecified . . . except in one important respect: "the highest ideal of communism pursued by the Chinese Communists can be realized only when the socialist society is fully developed and highly advanced." Here the key to socialist modernization--and a reinforcement of the declarations of paragraph 1, that communism is the goal, socialism is the way, and that the way may be both long and winding.

Marxism then stands like bookends at the beginning and end of China's march to communism. The normative premises of Marxism provide the boundaries of the political universe that must be traveled by the vanguard as it guides (like Marxism guides the vanguard) the state, people and nation to its objective, a communist society ("The development and improvement of the socialist system is a long historical process" [社会主义制度的发展和完善是一个长期的历史过程.]).

Leninism stands in a more peculiar place. It is conjoined with Marxism and is a technique that invests the vanguard with its institutional character, but it is a means rather than an ends. Yet it does offer a crucial principle for the Chinese political and constitutional theory-state--the principle of collectivity. The bridge between Marxist historicity and communism grounded in Marxist normative aspiration is built on Leninist foundations but one that is turned toward the context and historical realities of China as it progresses through socialism to communist society ("So long as the Chinese Communists uphold the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism and follow the road suited to China's specific conditions and chosen by the Chinese people of their own accord, the socialist cause in China will be crowned with final victory." [坚持马克思列宁主义的基本原理，走中国人民自愿选择的适合中国国情的道 路，中国的社会主义事业必将取得最终的胜利]).This last ties Marxism, through Leninism to the legitimacy of the vanguard grounded in fidelity to the objectives for which the advanced elements of the Chinese nations banded together into the leading element of the Chinese polity. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 now come together in a self-referencing circuit within which policy must be developed and applied.

**D. Mao Zedong Thought (¶ 4 General Program).**

The vanguard sits at the center of Chinese constitutional and political theory. Its legitimacy is grounded on two fundamental premises. The first is that the vanguard party must be representative. The second is that in its representative capacity the vanguard must be committed to the socialist path to the ultimate development of a communist society in China.

The second paragraph then elaborates what it means to embrace the socialist path and develop a communist society. To that end, the General Program establishes the normative structure of Chinese political and constitutional theory. That theory arises from five (5) very specific theories: Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents and the Scientific Outlook on Development. It also established the context within which these theories are to be understood and applied. These substantive principles constrain the vanguard party and define the socialist path to communism. But they do not themselves constrain the development of the theory that molds the vanguard’s role. The socialist path is itself a work in progress to which each generation in following the principles of the past applied to contemporary realities can then develop the theory required to take society to the next stage, until communism is reached.

Paragraph 2, then, can be understood as describing the theory already developed and pointing the way to the further development of the path toward a communist society. The text of Chinese communist theory is not yet complete, but continues to be written as China advances along the road of socialist modernization. It is the dynamic principle of elaborating the path to objective, then, that also marks Chinese political and constitutional theory as distinctive. The five theories identified in paragraph 2 are the elaborated in paragraphs 3-7. Each, in turn, represents the “crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China” at each successive stage on the road toward communism. And the path itself makes clear that the process of successive crystallization is far from complete.

We have seen how classical Marxism-Leninism marks the first stage of the path of socialism and serves as the foundation for Chinese political and constitutional theory. Classical Marxist-Leninism points the way on the path, for which its ends can only be framed in a general sense. If the foundations of Chinese political and constitutional theory is built on European and received wisdom--the classical philosophy of Marxism-Leninism—the foundations of classical Chinese political and constitutional theory is built on Mai Zedong Thought.

With paragraph 4, then, we come to the first of the set of the first four stages of an elaboration of a contextually relevant Chinese path toward a communist theory of politics and constitution.

[4] The Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, created Mao Zedong Thought by integrating the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Mao Zedong Thought is Marxism-Leninism applied and developed in China; it consists of a body of theoretical principles concerning the revolution and construction in China and a summary of experience therein, both of which have been proved correct by practice; and it represents the crystallized, collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China. Under the guidance of Mao Zedong Thought, the Communist Party of China led the people of all ethnic groups in the country in their prolonged revolutionary struggle against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, winning victory in the new-democratic revolution and founding the People's Republic of China, a people's democratic dictatorship. After the founding of the People's Republic, it led them in carrying out socialist transformation successfully, completing the transition from New Democracy to socialism, establishing the basic system of socialism and developing socialism economically, politically and culturally.

[4] 以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人，把马克思列宁主义的基本原理同中国革命的具体实践结合起来，创立了毛泽东思想。毛泽东思想是马克思列宁主义在 中国的运用和发展，是被实践证明了的关于中国革命和建设的正确的理论原则和经验总结，是中国共产党集体智慧的结晶。在毛泽东思想指引下，中国共产党领导全 国各族人民，经过长期的反对帝国主义、封建主义、官僚资本主义的革命斗争，取得了新民主主义革命的胜利，建立了人民民主专政的中华人民共和国；建国以后， 顺利地进行了社会主义改造，完成了从新民主主义到社会主义的过渡，确立了社会主义基本制度，发展了社会主义的经济、政治和文化。

Mao Zedong Thought is perhaps most import for its role as bridge. Mao Zedong Thought provides a necessary bridge between European theory and its transposition within the Chinese context (“by integrating the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution”). It also provides a bridge from the revolutionary struggle of the 1930s-40s and the establishment of the People’s Republic (“led the people of all ethnic groups in the country in their prolonged revolutionary struggle . . . winning victory in the new-democratic revolution and founding the People's Republic of China, a people's democratic dictatorship”). Lastly Mao Zedong Thought provides a bridge between the roles of the CCP from revolutionary party to party in power (“it led them in carrying out socialist transformation successfully, completing the transition from New Democracy to socialism”).

The bridge theme is crucial for understanding the place of Mao Zedong Thought within evolving and maturing Chinese political and constitutional theory. It both helps bring Marxism-Leninism forward from out of Europe into Asia, and places that forward evolution within the historical constraints of its time. That contextualization, in turn, cabins the class struggle elements of earlier iterations of Chinese political theory. The critical bridge here is the New Democracy (新民主主义) ideas now perhaps best articulated in the design of the flag of the People’s Republic (with the largest star the CCP, and the smaller stars the class elements whose initial coalition would make possible a transition from feudalism to (actually better—toward) socialism). By structuring New Democracy as a transition stage, the bridge element of Mao Zedong Thought is further deepened. It is transitional precisely because its establishment merely marks the beginning point of the path toward socialism, a path that must be left for further development. And indeed, the emphasis of transition is underlined in the last phrase (完成了从新民主主义到社会主义的过渡) that speaks to transition to what comes next, what comes after Mao Zedong Thought, though built on its “body of theoretical principles concerning the revolution and construction in China”.

More interesting still, however, are the signals within this paragraph of the overarching Leninist interpretive structures within which Mao Zedong Thought must be understood, and thus understood, incorporated within Chinese political and constitutional theory. First, the General Program is quite clear that it was the CCP that created Mao Zedong Thought. Mao Zedong, of course, played an important role—as “chief representative”. But it is clear that Mao Zedong Thought is autonomous of the person of Mao Zedong, and that it “represents the crystallized, collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China.” The collectivity principle at the core of Leninism is here expressed as a constraint on the conflating of theory with cults of personality. That insight is then tied to the second signal—the paramount importance of representation within the internal development of theory. We are to understand that the CCP represents the vanguard forces of society, state and nation; the leaders of the CCP represent the CCP as a collective leadership. Representation here is deployed in its Leninist form—ideology as the crystallized collective wisdom of the CCP. Third, Mao Zedong Thought, a “body of theoretical principles,” represents an example of a successful application of the grounding principle of truth from facts, especially useful in bringing China to the post-revolutionary stage of its development. It represents the lessons and wisdom of a formative stage of development, but not wisdom projected forward for the ages. It is foundational, the way Marxism-Leninism, is foundational, but capable of understanding only within the historical context from out of which it arose. It remains an essential step toward “establishing the basic system of socialism and developing socialism economically, politically and culturally” for “carrying out “socialist transformation successfully.” But it is not the statement of a mature and established communist society the mature political and constitutional ideology product toward which Mao Zedong Thought points, but which it does not in itself constitute.

If the crystallization of the collective wisdom of the CCP does not end with the body of general theoretical principles of Mao Zedong Thought, then it is necessary to study the evolution of the wisdom of the CCP under the leadership of those collective leaders that succeeded the leadership that produced and applied Mao Zedong Thought. The CCP Constitution’s General Program then describes those important later stages of crystallization of wisdom in Paragraphs 5-7 to which we turn next.

**E. Deng Xiaoping Theory (¶ 5 General Program).**

We have been reviewing the initial paragraphs of the CCP Constitution's General Program. The first two paragraphs of the General Program set out the outer framework of two critical aspects of Chinese constitutional theory. The five theories identified in paragraph 2 are the elaborated in paragraphs 3-7. Each, in turn, represents the “crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China” at each successive stage on the road toward communism. And the path itself makes clear that the process of successive crystallization is far from complete. Paragraph 3 elaborated on the place of classical Marxism-Leninism as the first stage of the path of socialism and serves as the foundation for Chinese political and constitutional theory. If the foundations of Chinese political and constitutional theory is built on European and received wisdom--the classical philosophy of Marxism-Leninism—the foundations of classical Chinese political and constitutional theory is built on Mai Zedong Thought.

Paragraph 5 introduces the next stage in the development of Chinese constitutional and political Theory--Deng Xiaoping Theory. If Mao Zedong Thought provided a bridge from revolutionary to governing vanguard party, Deng Xiaoping theory provides the principles through which socialist modernization can be realized.

[5] After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Central Committee, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Deng Xiaoping as their chief representative, analyzed their experience, both positive and negative, gained since the founding of the People's Republic, emancipated their minds, sought truth from facts, shifted the focus of the work of the whole Party onto economic development and carried out reform and opening to the outside world, ushering in a new era of development in the cause of socialism, gradually formulating the line, principles and policies concerning the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics and expounding the basic questions concerning the building, consolidation and development of socialism in China, and thus creating Deng Xiaoping Theory. Deng Xiaoping Theory is the outcome of the integration of the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of contemporary China and the features of the times, a continuation and development of Mao Zedong Thought under new historical conditions; it represents a new stage of development of Marxism in China, it is Marxism of contemporary China and it is the crystallized, collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China. It is guiding the socialist modernization of China from victory to victory.

[5] 十一届三中全会以来，以邓小平同志为主要代表的中国共产党人，总结建国以来正反两方面的经验，解放思想，实事求是，实现全党工作中心向经济建设的转移，实行改革开放，开辟了社会主义事业发展的新时期，逐步形成了建设中国特色社会主义的路线、方针、政策，阐明了在中国建设社会主义、巩固和发展社会主义 的基本问题，创立了邓小平理论。邓小平理论是马克思列宁主义的基本原理同当代中国实践和时代特征相结合的产物，是毛泽东思想在新的历史条件下的继承和发 展，是马克思主义在中国发展的新阶段，是当代中国的马克思主义，是中国共产党集体智慧的结晶，引导着我国社会主义现代化事业不断前进。

Paragraph 5 strengthens the Leninist connection between the refinement and evolution of theory and its necessary origins in the collective efforts of the CCP. There is a parallel repetition here between paragraphs 4 and 5. In the former it was Mao Zedong that served as the chief representative of Chinese communists. In paragraph 5, Deng Xiaoping serves in that role. But the resulting theory that bears the name of the chief representative is understood as the reflection of the collective wisdom of the CCP rather than of the genius of one man. But representation is multilayered here. The communists are not represented merely by one leader. Instead, they are represented through an elaborated representational institutional architecture that marks the maturation of the organization of the party in power. And like Mao Zedong Thought "it is the crystallized, collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China."

But Deng Xiaoping Theory also represents a substantial change in direction from Mao Zedong Thought, one made necessary by the changing context in which theory must be applied ("shifted the focus of the work of the whole Party onto economic development and carried out reform and opening to the outside world"). This evolution of the CCP line profoundly important, to be sure, and well known. But perhaps equally important, and less well appreciated in the West, are the legitimating mechanics of collective decision making on which these changes in Party line are based. The necessary mechanics includes a historical analysis ("analyzed their experience, both positive and negative, gained since the founding of the People's Republic"), freed from the passions of cliques or personality cults ("emancipated their minds, sought truth from facts").

Indeed, the notion of emancipating minds is here identified as the core mechanics for the appropriate approach to ideological development and application within CCP constitutional theory. Emancipating the mind underlines the central importance of the rejection of rigidity in either ideology or in the approach to ideology to the reality within which the political work of the CCP must be undertaken. In "Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth From Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future," Dec. 12, 1978, Deng Xiaoping noted:

When everything has to be done by the book, when thinking turns rigid and blind faith is the fashion, it is impossible for a party or a nation to make progress. Its life will cease and that party or nation will perish. Comrade Mao Zedong said this time and again during the rectification movements. Only if we emancipate our minds, seek truth from facts, proceed from reality in everything and integrate theory with practice, can we carry out our socialist modernization programme smoothly, and only then can our Party further develop Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.

Indeed, emancipating the mind can be understood as a short hand for avoiding the errors of text worship and fact blindness in the development of theory. It suggests that no text is sacred, that no textual reading is eternal and that such rigidity effectively eviscerates text by shifting emphasis from issues of theory to issues of faction.

When people's minds aren't yet emancipated and their thinking remains rigid, curious phenomena emerge.

Once people's thinking becomes rigid, they will increasingly act according to fixed notions. To cite some examples, strengthening Party leadership is interpreted as the Party's monopolizing and interfering in everything. Exercising centralized leadership is interpreted as erasing distinctions between the Party and the government, so that the former replaces the latter. And maintaining unified leadership by the Central Committee is interpreted as ``doing everything according to unified standards''. We are opposed to ``home-grown policies'' that violate the fundamental principles of those laid down by the Central Committee, but there are also ``home-grown policies'' that are truly grounded in reality and supported by the masses. Yet such correct policies are still often denounced for their ``not conforming to the unified standards''.

People whose thinking has become rigid tend to veer with the wind. They are not guided by Party spirit and Party principles, but go along with whatever has the backing of the authorities and adjust their words and actions according to whichever way the wind is blowing. They think that they will thus avoid mistakes. In fact, however, veering with the wind is in itself a grave mistake, a contravention of the Party spirit which all Communists should cherish. It is true that people who think independently and dare to speak out and act can't avoid making mistakes, but their mistakes are out in the open and are therefore more easily rectified.

Once people's thinking becomes rigid, book worship, divorced from reality, becomes a grave malady. Those who suffer from it dare not say a word or take a step that isn't mentioned in books, documents or the speeches of leaders: everything has to be copied. Thus responsibility to the higher authorities is set in opposition to responsibility to the people.

Our drive for the four modernizations will get nowhere unless rigid thinking is broken down and the minds of cadres and of the masses are completely emancipated. "Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth From Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future,"

The notion of emancipation of mind is tied to that of seeking truth from facts, and both are central to the crystallization of the core principle of Chinese constitutional and political theory--that the substantive elements of core constitutional theory are both grounded in historical foundations and driven by the primary objectives of the vanguard party, the establishment of a communist society. From this core operational principle, all theory, and all decisions that are translated as the CCP's line must be understood and constrained by the context in which they are made and the historical conditions from out of which they develop. That also suggests a strong dynamic element. The CCP to remain true to its basic goals must change with the times, and adjust its line to meet new conditions constrained only by the lessons of the past, and the layering of core principle that represents the constant building up of an objectives based constitutional theory. All theory and each application of the CCP line must be viewed scientifically and in historical perspective as "a stage in the course of China's socialist development” ("Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth From Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future," supra). Together this forms the core of the procedural element of Deng Xiaoping theory.

These critical principles form the essential core of Deng Xiaoping Theory. And the application of that theory to a scientific study of the conditions of China toward the end of the 1970s in historical perspective produced the great shift in the focus of the CCP "ushering in a new era of development in the cause of socialism, gradually formulating the line, principles and policies concerning the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics and expounding the basic questions concerning the building, consolidation and development of socialism in China." This shift which forms the core substantive element of Deng Xiaoping theory. The substantive core element consists of a renewed focus on economic development, opening up and reform. The object is to complete the movement from New Democracy to socialism by elaborating and applying the principles of socialist modernization. This shift is understood as a natural development grounded in existing theory, now further developed in light of changing conditions (outcome of the integration of the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of contemporary China and the features of the times, a continuation and development of Mao Zedong Thought under new historical conditions" ). This stage is the "Marxism of contemporary China."

Dong Xiaoping Theory, then, can be understood as the interweaving of three distinct elements: orientational, procedural, and substantive.

The orientational element touches on the basic approach to the CCP's work as a vanguard Leninist organization responsible to and representative of the people. It confirms the dynamic element of theory and its connection to the context in which it is to be applied and form out of which it is to be developed ("building, consolidation and development of socialism"). Deng Xiaoping Theory is about motion and change; it is a warning against ossification and rigidity---the bureaucratism that is fatal to Leninist organization and of special concern in the specific context of China ("it is essential to overcome the evils of bureaucracy. Our present economic management is marked by overstaffing, organizational overlapping, complicated procedures and extremely low efficiency. Everything is often drowned in empty political talk."("Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth From Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future," supra)). But it is as well about fidelity--fidelity to the core objective of the theory, and Party--the building of a communist society. Everything else may be subject to change and must be understood as mutable and changeable. The ultimate goal may not. This is the pole star to which all theory, practice and organization must be oriented. And thus the interlinking of this paragraph to the fundamentals of paragraph 1 of the General Program.

The procedural element touches on the CCP's working style. It confirms a focus on self-criticism, on the integration of fact and theory sensitive to changes in historical conditions "and the features of the times." The key elements of the CCP's working style are quite specifically described: "analyzed their experience, both positive and negative, gained since the founding of the People's Republic, emancipated their minds, sought truth from facts." Those three elements--(1) analysis of experiences stripped of political, factional or ideological blinders; (2) emancipation of the mind; and (3) seeking truth from facts. These process elements, this consolidation of the specifics of the CCP's working style also evidence that style in action, drawing from the accumulated wisdom of foundational theory and practice, refined and applied to current circumstance. That formula, then, does not itself ossify working style to a specific set of mechanics, of forms of action, but is itself quite adaptable to changes in historical conditions. The CCP's working style is itself an expression of that working style's adaptability and dynamism.

The substantive element touches on the CCP's fundamental responsibility to the people, state and nation. If the CCP's working style rejects ossification, rigidity in theory, and bureaucratism, then that process must produce changes to reflect correctly changing historical circumstances. And changing historical circumstances are absolutely necessary as a sign that the CCP has adopted the right path. This is a core application of the central insight of Paragraph 1of the General Program It is in this light that the shift from rigidity, textualism, and the errors of cults of personality and unconstrained discretion in the service of party and not people can be understood. "Economic development and carried out reform and opening to the outside world" are the concrete expression of the refocusing of CCP direction towards "building of socialism with Chinese characteristics and expounding the basic questions concerning the building, consolidation and development of socialism in China" from out of the structures of traditional class struggle that marked the revolutionary period. The great insight in this paragraph, though, is not in the identification of economic development and opening up, but in the notion that economic development and opening up, that socialist modernization itself, is a dynamic process that will continue to require adjustment to changing circumstances through a combination of dynamic theory building and principled but flexible representational and institutional leadership. That building of socialism with Chinese characteristics will be grounded on what is now understood as socialist modernization, to which the General Program will turn in succeeding paragraphs, and to which we will return in due course.

**F. Important Thought of Three Represents (¶ 6 General Program).**

Paragraph 6 introduces the succeeding layer of development of Chinese constitutional and political theory--the Important thought of Three Represents (Sange Daibiao).

[6] After the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Party Central Committee and in the practice of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Jiang Zemin as their chief representative, acquired a deeper understanding of what socialism is, how to build it and what kind of party to build and how to build it, accumulated new valuable experience in running the Party and state and formed the important thought of Three Represents. The important thought of Three Represents is a continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory; it reflects new requirements for the work of the Party and state arising from the developments and changes in China and other parts of the world today; it serves as a powerful theoretical weapon for strengthening and improving Party building and for promoting self-improvement and development of socialism in China; and it is the crystallized, collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China. It is a guiding ideology that the Party must uphold for a long time to come. Persistent implementation of the Three Represents is the foundation for building the Party, the cornerstone for its governance and the source of its strength.

[6] 十三届四中全会以来，以江泽民同志为主要代表的中国共产党人，在建设中国特色社会主义的实践中，加深了对什么是社会主义、怎样建设社会主义和建设什么 样的党、怎样建设党的认识，积累了治党治国新的宝贵经验，形成了“三个代表”重要思想。“三个代表”重要思想是对马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论 的继承和发展，反映了当代世界和中国的发展变化对党和国家工作的新要求，是加强和改进党的建设、推进我国社会主义自我完善和发展的强大理论武器，是中国共 产党集体智慧的结晶，是党必须长期坚持的指导思想。始终做到“三个代表”，是我们党的立党之本、执政之基、力量之源。

With Sange Daibiao (三个代表 of the important thought of the three represents) the CCP begins a more intimate interrogation of the character of its vanguard role as it emerged onto a new historical stage made possible by the success of socialist modernization and opening up.

With the external success of the CCP's line, the CCP moved from fundamental change to a refinement of basic theory, but refinement in significant respects of the relationship of the vanguard party in its leadership role. More importantly, Sange Daibiao marks a turn inward toward the more active development of the institutional structures of the vanguard party itself. With the Sange Daibiao one encounters both continuity and change. The continuity is plainly built into the process of its development. Sange Daibiao is an exercise in Leninist collectivism which remains true to democratic centralism -- this time under the leadership of Jiang Zemin -- as refined represents the collective wisdom of the CCP. But its greatest contribution is tied to the issue of representation itself. Sange Daibiao declares the scope of the representative character of the CCP (1) to advanced social productive forces, (2) advanced culture, and (3) the interests of the overwhelming majority of the people. Here representation works in multiple respects between the party the state and nation, and within the party architecture itself. Lastly it represents another step away from the class struggle elements of the revolutionary party and points to a distinct direction in the architecture of socialist modernization.

It is tempting to dismiss Sange Daibiao as an exercise in obscurity and relevant only within the interior dialogues of the CCP. Yet a careful reading of the text itself within the framework of the General Program reveals not just its simplicity but also its scope and potentially transformative breadth.

An important conclusion can be reached from reviewing our Party's history over the past 70-odd years; that is, the reason our Party enjoys the people's support is that throughout the historical periods of revolution, construction and reform, it has always represented the development trend of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. With the formulation of the correct line, principles and policies, the Party has untiringly worked for the fundamental interests of the country and the people. Under the new conditions of historic significance, how our Party can better translate the Three Represents into action constitutes a major issue that all Party members, especially senior officials, must ponder deeply. (News of the Communist Party of China, Three Represents).

First, Sange Daibiao must be understood within the long sweep of development of Leninism specific to the Chinese context. That is a Leninism which becomes increasingly sensitive to the vanguard party's paramount obligation to people, state and nation. That obligation can be understood as an obligation to represent and to serve. Fidelity to both ensures the legitimacy of the CCP in Leninist terms. Representation is at the heart of Mao Zedong thought and Deng Xiaoping theory. Sange Daibiao is meant to provide further depth to that representational obligation. But it does do within the context of a change in the historical context, a change made possible by the success of the application of Deng Xiaoping theory to move forward the process of socialist modernization. That new or changed historical context required a further modification to the understanding of the concepts of class struggle central to the revolutionary period and advanced by the shift in emphasis to socialist struggle to advance modernization in the post-revolutionary period

Second, Sange Daibiao represents the fruits of self-reflection and analysis. It is meant to represent an application of seeking truth from facts to the evolution of theory and stock taking for the CCP. It represents the product of knowledge generated form the "practice of building socialism with Chinese characteristics." This knowledge was meant to be applied to a specific end-- to acquire "a deeper understanding of what socialism is, how to build it and what kind of party to build and how to build it, accumulated new valuable experience in running the Party and state."

Third, Sange Daibiao must be understood in its dynamic aspect. It speaks to the obligations of the CCP in the future--on the future construction and operation of the CCP and the future focus of its legitimacy enhancing activity. The future role of the CCP is representative in a much more focused way. Seeking truth from facts is a sterile exercise unless its insights are put to use. And Sange Daibiao is meant reflect "new requirements for the work of the Party and state arising from the developments and changes in China and other parts of the world today; it serves as a powerful theoretical weapon for strengthening and improving Party building and for promoting self-improvement and development of socialism in China." The dynamic element is essential to avoid the possibility falling back into the error of bureaucratism through the failure to adhere to a CCP working style that in its essence is centered on emancipation of the mind (General Program ¶ 5).

Fourth, those new requirements bring the CCP back to a necessary engagement with the Leninist obligation of representation within new historical conditions in China. Representation, in this sense, is an aspect of collectivity at the heart of mechanics of the operation of a vanguard party. The CCP's working style must incorporate representation in the broadest sense in order to develop its collective working style. That is, Leninist collectivity requires collective representation as a fundamental organizational principle of the CCP. Representation serves to check the tendency toward a self-serving working style and a reminder that theory and practice must not be developed in opposition to the people and especially to the fundamental obligation of the CCP to move the nation toward the fulfillment of socialist modernization. Representation is the practical application of that insight, constraining ("the cornerstone for its governance and the source of its strength") in a way that may be measured and assessed.

To whom does the CCP owe a duty of representation? Representing the development trend of China's advanced productive forces imposes on the CCP the obligation for ensuring the orderly advancement of socialist modernization. It suggests that the CCP's leadership is exercised only in a fiduciary, a representational, capacity--not for itself but for the benefit of those for whom socialist modernization is advanced. Eventually, Sange Daibiao will suggest the contours of the CCP's leadership role in the operation and function of Chinese state owned industries, in the encouragement of investment within China and in the framework within which China engages the productive forces of the world. More importantly, and not yet fully realized, is the insight that the CCP itself must be understood as a key element of the advanced productive forces whose work must be integrated into the collective efforts of socialist modernization--not above or autonomous of modernization, but deeply embedded within it. Representing advanced culture requires not merely the disciplining of the customs and traditions of the people, but more importantly, ensuring that the CCP itself, and its cadres, practice the highest forms of socialist culture. The CCP cannot represent unless it itself fulfills its vanguard role of practicing what it represents. Representing the people suggests that the CCP is a reminder of the fundamental character of a Leninist vanguard party.

What does it mean to represent? It means to embed the CCP within socialist modernization, rather than above or beyond it. As an integral part of socialist modernization, the CCP's productive forces must be developed in a way that is deeply integrated within the logic of socialist modernization, with a fidelity to Leninist principles, and in a way that serves as a model for the advancement of non CCP productive forces in the economy, society and culture. The CCP represents by leading in a way that people, society, and economic activity may take as a model, and which moves society closer to attainment of a communist society.

How does this bring Deng Xiaoping theory forward? It provides a Leninist basis for "strengthening and improving Party building and for promoting self-improvement and development of socialism in China" through advancing notions of collective action. That advancement points collective action in the direction of the people through the concept of representation.

**G. Scientific Outlook on Development (¶ 7 General Program).**

Paragraph 7 introduces the last of the current layers of theoretical development of Chinese political and constitutional theory--the scientific outlook on development.

[7] Since the Party's Sixteenth National Congress, the Chinese Communists with Comrade Hu Jintao as their chief representative, following the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents, have gained a deep understanding of major questions such as what kind of development China should achieve under new conditions and how it should achieve it to meet new requirements for development and answered these questions, and thus developed the Scientific Outlook on Development that puts people first and calls for comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development. The Scientific Outlook on Development is a scientific theory that is both in keeping with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents and is in step with the times. It fully embodies the Marxist worldview on and methodology for development and represents the latest achievement in adapting Marxism to China's conditions. It is the crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China and a guiding ideology that must be upheld and applied in developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.

[7] 我国正处于并将长期处于社会主义初级阶段。这是在经济文化落后的中国建设社会主义现代化不可逾越的历史阶段，需要上百年的时间。我国的社会主义建设，必须 从我国的国情出发，走中国特色社会主义道路。在现阶段，我国社会的主要矛盾是人民日益增长的物质文化需要同落后的社会生产之间的矛盾。由于国内的因素和国 际的影响，阶级斗争还在一定范围内长期存在，在某种条件下还有可能激化，但已经不是主要矛盾。我国社会主义建设的根本任务，是进一步解放生产力，发展生产 力，逐步实现社会主义现代化，并且为此而改革生产关系和上层建筑中不适应生产力发展的方面和环节。必须坚持和完善公有制为主体、多种所有制经济共同发展的 基本经济制度，坚持和完善按劳分配为主体、多种分配方式并存的分配制度，鼓励一部分地区和一部分人先富起来，逐步消灭贫穷，达到共同富裕，在生产发展和社 会财富增长的基础上不断满足人民日益增长的物质文化需要。发展是我们党执政兴国的第一要务。各项工作都要把有利于发展社会主义社会的生产力，有利于增强社 会主义国家的综合国力，有利于提高人民的生活水平，作为总的出发点和检验标准。跨入新世纪，我国进入全面建设小康社会、加快推进社会主义现代化的新的发展 阶段。在新世纪新阶段，经济和社会发展的战略目标是，巩固和发展已经初步达到的小康水平，到建党一百年时，建成惠及十几亿人口的更高水平的小康社会；到建 国一百年时，人均国内生产总值达到中等发达国家水平，基本实现现代化。

The scientific outlook on development reflects a return to a focus on economic development, but one that is now tied in more interesting ways to the development of the CCP's political work and its working style. It applies a now familiar collective mechanics, grounded in an analysis of past operations and applied through the filter of foundational principles. This mechanics adds a layer to theory, one that "puts people first and calls for comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development." It serves as a gloss on the economic development aspects of socialist modernization. It is a gloss that reinforces the representational elements of the CCP's relation to the people, and the obligational nature of that representation. Representation, in other words, imposes an obligation on the CCP, as a Leninist vanguard, to organize its activities to advance the interests of the people (rather than its own). Such advancement in the sphere of economic development now is supplemented by the insights of sustainability to development planning that is comprehensive (and not piecemeal), integrated and coherent (rather than fractured and anarchic).

The scientific outlook on development was meant to respond to the changes within China in the face of the success of the economic development policies put into operation during the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. And it was meant to solve the new practical problem that economic development had produced--environmental degradation, wealth gaps, and an inefficient development and consumption of productive forces. These specific problems required the creation of a normative approach to macro-economic planning that is consistent with basic political theory but which might more efficiently work towards socialist modernization. Or, perhaps better understood, to better structure socialist modernization in its economic aspects as China transitions to a moderately well off society. The object is to structure the trajectories of development--that is to choose the path that ought to be taken to achieve socialist modernization, one that might remain true to the fundamental principles.

**H. Cage of Principle-Cage of Policy (¶ 8 General Program)**

Paragraph 8 serves to sum up the initial paragraphs and as a bridge to the elaboration of the basic CCP line and working style in the paragraphs that follow. It is directed specifically to cadres and provides an easy conceptual framework within which they can understand their role in socialist modernization.

[8] The fundamental reason behind all of China's achievements and progress since the reform and opening up policy was introduced is, in the final analysis, that the Party has blazed a path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, formulated the system of theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and established the socialist system with Chinese characteristics. All Party members must cherish the path, the theories and the socialist system that the Party has explored and created after going through all the hardships; and they must keep to them all the time and continue to develop them. They must hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and strive to fulfill the three historic tasks of advancing the modernization drive, achieving national reunification, and safeguarding world peace and promoting common development.

[8] 改革开放以来我们取得一切成绩和进步的根本原因，归结起来就是：开辟了中国特色社会主义道路，形成了中国特色社会主义理论体系。全 党同志要倍加珍惜、长期坚持和不断发展党历经艰辛开创的这条道路和这个理论体系，高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜，为实现推进现代化建设、完成祖国统一、维 护世界和平与促进共同发展这三大历史任务而奋斗。

Paragraph 8 provides a summary, and a bridge to the historical and substantive provisions that follow. These will build on the basic theory foundations of Paragraphs 1-8 to flesh out the CCP's line. In effect, one can read Paragraphs 1-8 as setting out first principles--the cage of principles within which the CCP may develop programs to guide it in its leadership role. The remainder of the General Program then builds on those principles the specifics of the CCP's governing principles--the cage of policy that is the CCP line. These governing principles are necessarily constrained by the foundational principles of ¶¶ 1-8, just as the CCP's leadership role and policy are constrained by the governing principles specified in the remainder of the General Principles. Together, both serves as the normative framework that disciplines the CCP ensuring that it follows the socialist path toward its goal--not for the greater glory of the CCP or its leaders, but for the attainment of a communist society for its people. That discipline, and this cage of principle, provide the singular basis for the legitimacy of the CCP in its role within the Chinese system of democratic dictatorship. And this is, in essence, "the socialist system with Chinese characteristics" which references the entirety of the constraining principles through which the CCP may exercise leadership. That, at any rate, is the theory elaborated in this bridge paragraph.

The proof of legitimacy is success. But success, is in part, related to discipline; and discipline is a function of the development and of adherence to the theory on which success is founded. The are some points worth noting in this respect that are made clear from Paragraph 8. First, the starting point for measuring of success, the start of the post-revolutionary period in the development of China, the starting point for measuring success is the period "since the reform and opening up policy was introduced." Second, CCP's leadership in developing theory, structuring its Party line on that foundation and then implementing the line are to be tested against measurable economic, social and cultural progress, the facts from which the truth of the legitimacy of the CCP's leadership is derived. This will be an important principle for gauging legitimacy of theory and action. Third, this cage of principles provides the framework for guiding the actions and behaviors of CCP cadres--whatever their rank. Fourth, this obligation of cadres must reflect both the disciplinary element of historical determinism in the evolution of theory but also its dynamic character ("they must keep to them all the time and continue to develop them"). The cage of principles is informed by the CCP's working style. The cage is not meant to imprison--the errors of rigidity and bureaucratism--but to focus and constrain excess--cults of personality in the service of the three "historic tasks" of the CCP--socialist modernization, national reunification and the participation of China on the world stage.

Each of these fundamental tasks--derived from the core principles--are taken up next.

**I. Socialist Modernization and Class Struggle (¶ 9 General Program).**

With Paragraph 9 the General Program moves from theory to action infused by theory. It considers the first of the three fundamental tasks of the CCP derived from its theory, which is the first operational element of the CCP line:

[9] China is in the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a long time to come. This is a historical stage which cannot be skipped in socialist modernization in China which is backward economically and culturally. It will last for over a hundred years. In socialist construction the Party must proceed from China's specific conditions and take the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. At the present stage, the principal contradiction in Chinese society is one between the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the people and the low level of production. Owing to both domestic circumstances and foreign influences, class struggle will continue to exist within a certain scope for a long time and may possibly grow acute under certain conditions, but it is no longer the principal contradiction. In building socialism, the basic task is to further release and develop the productive forces and achieve socialist modernization step by step by carrying out reform in those aspects and links of the production relations and the superstructure that do not conform to the development of the productive forces. The Party must uphold and improve the basic economic system, with public ownership playing a dominant role and different economic sectors developing side by side, as well as the system of distribution under which distribution according to work is dominant and a variety of modes of distribution coexist, encourage some areas and some people to become rich first, gradually eliminate poverty, achieve common prosperity, continuously meet the people's ever-growing material and cultural needs on the basis of the growth of production and social wealth and promote people's all-around development. Development is the Party's top priority in governing and rejuvenating the country. The general starting point and criterion for judging all the Party's work should be how it benefits development of the productive forces in China's socialist society, adds to the overall strength of socialist China and improves the people's living standards. The Party must respect work, knowledge, talent and creation and ensure that development is for the people, by the people and with the people sharing in its fruits. The beginning of the new century marks China's entry into the new stage of development of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and accelerating socialist modernization. The Party must promote all-around economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress in accordance with the overall plan for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The strategic objectives of economic and social development at this new stage in the new century are to consolidate and develop the relatively comfortable life initially attained, bring China into a moderately prosperous society of a higher level to the benefit of well over one billion people by the time of the Party's centenary and bring the per capita GDP up to the level of moderately developed countries and realize modernization in the main by the time of the centenary of the People's Republic of China.

[9] 我国正处于并将长期处于社会主义初级阶段。这是在经济文化落后的中国建设社会主义现代化不可逾越的历史阶段，需要上百年的时间。我 国的社会主义建设，必须从我国的国情出发，走中国特色社会主义道路。在现阶段，我国社会的主要矛盾是人民日益增长的物质文化需要同落后的社会生产之间的矛 盾。由于国内的因素和国际的影响，阶级斗争还在一定范围内长期存在，在某种条件下还有可能激化，但已经不是主要矛盾。我国社会主义建设的根本任务，是进一 步解放生产力，发展生产力，逐步实现社会主义现代化，并且为此而改革生产关系和上层建筑中不适应生产力发展的方面和环节。必须坚持和完善公有制为主体、多 种所有制经济共同发展的基本经济制度，坚持和完善按劳分配为主体、多种分配方式并存的分配制度，鼓励一部分地区和一部分人先富起来，逐步消灭贫穷，达到共 同富裕，在生产发展和社会财富增长的基础上不断满足人民日益增长的物质文化需要，促进人的全面发展。发展是我们党执政兴国的第一要务。各项工作都要把有利 于发展社会主义社会的生产力，有利于增强社会主义国家的综合国力，有利于提高人民的生活水平，作为总的出发点和检验标准，尊重劳动、尊重知识、尊重人才、 尊重创造，做到发展为了人民、发展依靠人民、发展成果由人民共享。跨入新世纪，我国进入全面建设小康社会、加快推进社会主义现代化的新的发展阶段。必须按 照中国特色社会主义事业总体布局，全面推进经济建设、政治建设、文化建设、社会建设。在新世纪新阶段，经济和社会发展的战略目标是，巩固和发展已经初步达 到的小康水平，到建党一百年时，建成惠及十几亿人口的更高水平的小康社会；到建国一百年时，人均国内生产总值达到中等发达国家水平，基本实现现代化。

Paragraph 9 is long and complex. It bears the scars of criticism and self-criticism that marked the maturation of the CCP, its theory and working style, from its prerevolutionary and revolutionary periods through the emergence of the current stage of CCP development of its vanguard role. But it is a paragraph that is itself ripe for analysis in the face of changing historical conditions and may no longer reflect entirely the "facts" from which its "truth" is derived. I begin with a short description of the paragraph contents and then draw insights from that reading, insights that will connect the statements of ¶ 9 back to foundation theory and forward to the elaboration of the CCP line under current historical conditions in China and the world.

The paragraph is structured as a long historical-theoretical-policy-justificatory narrative designed to move from "facts" to "truth" in two respects--the first justifying the current iteration of theoretical approaches to the CCP's political work, and the second justifying the current development of the CCP line within the context of theoretical imperatives (socialist modernization, reunification, and engagement).

The first three sentences set the historical context. It emphasizes the location of China's development as still situated in its formative stage, thus underlining the dynamic element in both theory and the shaping of the CCP line ("China is in the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a long time to come"). It also infers significant insights from that historical positioning. The first is that historical development must run in accordance with its own logic and cannot be managed instrumentally, even by a Leninist vanguard ("This is a historical stage which cannot be skipped in socialist modernization in China"). The second is that the determination of position is relational, and gauged against the historical situation in advanced developed states, and now principally the United States (China "is backward economically and culturally"). The third is that the process will require patience and assessment must be realistically grounded on the pace of forward movement, which is expected to be slow (at least by human reckoning) ("It will last for over a hundred years").

The next two sentences then direct the insights of history and position to the justification of the CCP line ("In socialist construction the Party must proceed from China's specific conditions and take the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics"). But the imperative of socialist modernization keyed to current historical conditions produce contradiction, that is it produces a disjunction between the CCP's obligation to the people in the short run and its obligations to society in the long run ("At the present stage, the principal contradiction in Chinese society is one between the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the people and the low level of production").

The next sentences then confront the contradiction between socialist modernization in this early stage of development and the obligations of the CCP to the people within socialist principles that eschew exploitation of labor that mimics capitalist systems. First, it admits that the current movement toward socialist modernization exacerbates class struggle. Indeed, it asserts that both socialist modernization and the open up policy necessarily produces enhanced class tensions in the early stages of development. But precisely because this contradiction is inevitable but transitory that it is also no longer a central contradiction that must be centered within the theory or the CCP line. And because the contradiction producing class struggle is embedded in the processes of socialist modernization, rather than produced by the historical process of conflict between capitalist and socialist systems (because, in other words, it is embedded within socialism) it cannot be approached the way the CCP approached class conflict during the revolutionary period, a historical stage now confined to history ("Owing to both domestic circumstances and foreign influences, class struggle will continue to exist within a certain scope for a long time and may possibly grow acute under certain conditions, but it is no longer the principal contradiction").

More importantly they confront the quite specific movement from a focus on class struggle--in theory and action--to one grounded in socialist modernization. But the movement away from class struggle is not meant to be a repudiation of class struggle but a redirection. That redirection shifts focus from relational issues of class to contextualized issues of production. It changes the direction of the CCP's attention from the consequences of production to production itself. It is in this sense that, to some extent, it is possible to understand the insight of developing productive forces as the more robust way of engaging in class struggle by directing the leadership focus to those aspects of economic life from out of which class struggle arises ("In building socialism, the basic task is to further release and develop the productive forces and achieve socialist modernization step by step by carrying out reform in those aspects and links of the production relations and the superstructure that do not conform to the development of the productive forces").

Developing societal productive forces, then, is the key to socialist modernization. Or developing productive forces might be more usefully understood as the source from out of which socialist modernization is activated. That is the subject of the next several sentences. That consequential insight then drives theory and the formation of the CCP line ("In building socialism, the basic task is to further release and develop the productive forces and achieve socialist modernization step by step by carrying out reform in those aspects and links of the production relations and the superstructure that do not conform to the development of the productive forces"). That this is the key requires one to recall the fundamental purpose and the basis of legitimacy of a Leninist vanguard party--to serve as the advanced elements of societal forces that direct the state, nation and people towards the construction of a communist society., But that communist society is not attainable in a poor nation only a few generations removed from a feudal societal and political structure. What is needed--the marker of the stages of historical development which cannot be skipped in socialist modernization--is wealth. It is to the production of wealth that the productive forces must be developed. But that development is not meant to produce bourgeois wealth that is personal wealth amassed and protected to a selective class (including the political class of privileged members of the CCP itself (a severe breach of the representation obligation at the core of CCP duty)). Instead it is meant to produce societal wealth sufficient to make it possible to move from one historical stage to another, one closer to the possibility of establishing a communist economic, social and political order. It is to that end that the CCP retains its legitimacy--and from out of which its fundamental mandate is set. And it is on the road toward that accumulation of wealth that the contradictions of socialist class struggle may appear ("The Party must uphold and improve the basic economic system, with public ownership playing a dominant role and different economic sectors developing side by side, as well as the system of distribution under which distribution according to work is dominant and a variety of modes of distribution coexist, encourage some areas and some people to become rich first, gradually eliminate poverty, achieve common prosperity, continuously meet the people's ever-growing material and cultural needs on the basis of the growth of production and social wealth and promote people's all-around development").

It follows that developing productive forces must be the "Party's top priority in governing and rejuvenating the country." But that is only the beginning of the analysis for shaping the CCP's approach to developing productive forces in the service of socialist modernization. The next several sentences then frame the CCP's role in its leadership role for this task. Paragraph 9 offers an assessment formula for determining both the forward movement of developing productive forces and for judging the success of the CCP's leadership in that respect, one that looks to value added ("The general starting point and criterion for judging all the Party's work should be how it benefits development of the productive forces in China's socialist society, adds to the overall strength of socialist China and improves the people's living standards"). But this leaves the issue that animated the earlier part of the paragraph--the contradiction of a socialist class struggle. This internal class struggle musty also be ameliorated as the CCP leads the state toward socialist modernization. That leadership requires sensitivity to class based prejudice, to the substitution of material wealth for societal talent and ability to contribute. This produces a heavy burden on the CCP, especially for cadres at the provincial and local levels that remains very much a work in progress ("The Party must respect work, knowledge, talent and creation and ensure that development is for the people, by the people and with the people sharing in its fruits").

That discussion of the current state of the progress of socialist modernization, and its intersection with (and redirection of) class struggle, provides the basis for the CCP leadership line moving forward. It is to that which the last sentences of paragraph 9 are directed. First the notion of the historical stages in which China finds itself is recast in the wake of the end of the 20th century ("The beginning of the new century marks China's entry into the new stage of development of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and accelerating socialist modernization"). This modifies, perhaps in some substantial respect, the idea of the first sentences of the paragraph--indeed, ¶ 9 can be seen structured like a short time line, starting with class struggle and the genesis of socialist modernization, through the efforts to begin to understand and direct the development of productive forces, to the institutionalization of that development, its assessment, and its transformative absorption of 20th century class struggle political lines. But the 21st century, a new stage of historical development can be seen, and with it a new stage in the leadership responsibilities of the CCP in the direction of the development of productive forces ("The Party must promote all-around economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress in accordance with the overall plan for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics"). For the CCP, the early 21st century and this new stage of historical development is one of consolidation and protection of the economic advances that had been produced in prior generations. It is the objective of the CCP to spread wealth among all Chinese people to a level appropriate to its level of development, with the understanding that this level development will remain uneven for a long time to come ("The strategic objectives of economic and social development at this new stage in the new century are to consolidate and develop the relatively comfortable life initially attained, bring China into a moderately prosperous society of a higher level to the benefit of well over one billion people by the time of the Party's centenary and bring the per capita GDP up to the level of moderately developed countries and realize modernization in the main by the time of the centenary of the People's Republic of China").

There are several general themes that emerge from this reading of ¶ 9.

The first focuses on the class struggle element of Chinese constitutional and political theory. In a way that parallels the development of theory from out of European Marxism-Leninism, through Mao Zedong Thought to Deng Xiaoping Theory, Sange Daibiao and the scientific outlook on development, class struggle has evolved from the central organizing principle of the CCP line, to an aspect of the larger project of socialist mobilization, one through which class struggle itself can be overcome. That overcoming will occur through the development of productive forces and the accumulation of wealth. This change in focus from the objects of production to production itself--from class difference to socialist production has tremendous effects on the substantive approaches to CCP's line and the style of its leadership.

The second focuses on production and productive forces shifts the focus of theory as well, from one grounded on those societal structures that must be changed to the cultivation of the forces of change. European socialism has tended to be backwards looking--constantly fighting the class demons from a revolutionary or pre-revolutionary period. But that ritualized warfare against the past does little to move society forward. It deploys the productive forces of the vanguard party on a fruitless battle against the past, with the ironic result of making progress impossible. (See, e.g., here). And ultimately, it causes the vanguard party to eat its own children. Refocusing on production and productive forces opens the possibility that the political work of the vanguard party may be effectuated through the instrumental generation of wealth than through the management of individuals.

The third focuses on the style of planning necessary to advance the development of productive forces. Socialist modernization, the development of productive forces, is a concept quite distinct from European Marxist notions of central planning. The CCP's role is to lead; it is not to displace productive forces. The focus away from class struggle makes it possible, as well, to focus away from central planning and to structure and oversee "all-around economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress."

The fourth focuses on accountability. Theory that permits a vanguard party to hide behind principle and remain aloof from accounting for its decisions and positions will breach a fundamental principle of Chinese constitutional and political theory. The criticism and self-criticism of CCP cadres extends to the CCP itself in its institutional role. Theorizing accountability within the context of socialist modernization serves to discipline the CCP within its cage of principles and policy. It provides the basis for legitimate collective analysis and legitimate collective decision making within the changing context of Chinese development. In the absence of this accountability--robust and accurate--the CCP will be unable to fulfill its fundamental obligation as a vanguard party.

The last focuses on the concept of consolidation. Consolidation ought to have sounded somewhat out of step with the rest of the paragraph, one that speaks to development, advancement, forward motion, etc. Yet in the face of an operational style that is dynamically forward moving, the CCP speaks to consolidation as well. The reason may be fairly straightforward, and toes the end of the paragraph with its beginning. Consolidation is a leveling operation. It is a moment to pause and ensure that all are in step with development and that productive forces are being advanced in ways that are consonant with the overall objectives of the CCP. It provides an opportunity to reduce the class effects of socialist modernization by ensuring more even distribution of wealth as the nation moves toward its ultimate objective.

It is to the role of the CCP within this complex that we turn next.

**III. From Principles to Policy: The CCP's Basic Line (¶¶ 10-13)**

**A. The Basic Line of the CCP (¶ 10 General Program).**

With Paragraph 10 we come to the first full expression of the Communist Party line in the context of the current stage of development of China. This is an important shift of focus in the General Program. And it follows a quite specific conceptual line--from broadest principles, to standards to policy and then to operationalization. That is the conceptual spine that supports the coherence of the General Program and unites all of its parts. It is also a structure for reading the General Program--every problem of ideology, of constitutional and political dimension must be approached by starting with the specific problem in the context of its specific application, then informed by operational policy, which must be applied by reference to the broader standards, that are themselves constrained in their interpretation-application by the principles at the heart of the theoretical foundations of the CCP (and nation).

Paragraph 10 provides:

[10] The basic line of the Communist Party of China in the primary stage of socialism is to lead the people of all ethnic groups in a concerted, self-reliant and pioneering effort to turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern socialist country by making economic development the central task while upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and the reform and opening up policy.

[10] 中国共产党在社会主义初级阶段的基本路线是：领导和团结全国各族人民，以经济建设为中心，坚持四项基本原则，坚持改革开放，自力更生，艰苦创业，为把我国建设成为富强民主文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家而奋斗

Together with ¶¶ 11-13, these paragraphs spell outline focus of the operationalization of the theory in Chinese context developed in ¶¶ 1-9. It is a very condensed and compact expression of the expression of theory molded to context and times and focused on a specific set of objectives the purpose of the attainment of which is to make possible the next stage of socialist modernization (which will require in its turn a new basic line).

First, Paragraph 10 is directed to the CCP. It is not directed to the state apparatus (National People's Congress, provincial officials, administrative ministries, etc.) or the People's Liberation Army. It is directed to the CCP in its entirety, not just to the leadership. It underlines that the expressions of collective wisdom that rejects a Shepard-sheep working style in favor of collective work under principles of democratic dictatorship. But it is not a rigid, text bound direction.

Second, ¶10's statement of the form of the CCP's basic line is operational only for so long as China remains in the primary stage of socialism. We understand from ¶ 9 that this stage may last a long time. But it might not. Truth from facts requires modification if 100 years is condensed to 50, or 20 years. And it is the collective obligation of the CCP to ensure that it understands and correctly analyzes the correct stage of socialism in which China may find itself.

Third, ¶ 10 sketches out the basic line of the CCP. It does not describe the CCP's line in its entirety. It is not to be read as sacred text, or rigidly, especially in the face of challenges arising from changing conditions. This does not mean that the CCP's line can be whatever the CCP wants it to be. The CCP's line may be modified in the face of changing conditions but it cannot escape from the cage of principles-policy that serve as the legitimating framework of the CCP's leadership role.

Fourth, the basic line declares that the fundamental role of the CCP is to "lead." The basic line of the CCP is not to operate the apparatus of state; it is not to command; it is not to rule. That requires a relationship to state, people and nation than that of a direct personal control. The CCP is then perhaps best understood as the incarnation of the cage of principles and policy that give structure to the vanguard objectives to which all of the productive forces of the state are directed. In effect, then, the highest productive value of the CCP as a productive force, the paramount form of development of the CCP itself in the cause of socialist modernization, is to serve as the cage of principles and policies within which socialist modernization may be achieved and a communist society attained.

Fifth, the CCP's leadership is directed to "the people of all ethnic groups." Socialist modernization and the path toward a communist society has a societal and cultural element as well as an economic and political one. Societal collectivity is the principal element of societal cohesion, which is itself a necessary element to the most efficient development of productive forces. It is therefore basic to the CCP's line that its actions center societal cohesion (uniting 团结 people) and the development of a society harmonized within all of its elements.

Sixth, the CCP's role to lead and unite all people is structured to take economic development as the central task ("以经济建设为中心"). This naturally follows from the elaboration of ¶¶ 5-9. But the responsibility to center economic development is caged within the principles of the four cardinal principles and reform and opening up (¶5). Thus while the basic line requires economic development to be centered--economic development is a legitimate part of socialist modernization only when it is applied consistently with the four cardinal principles and the reform and opening up principles to which the CCP must adhere (or persist) ("坚持四项基本原则，坚持改革开放"). Here then is an acknowledgement of the central importance of the cage of principle in forming the CCP's basic line.

Seventh, the working style to be furthered, self-reliance and hard work (自力更生，艰苦创业) points to both collective and individual action. Yet there is ambiguity as well. First, if self-reliance and hard work are central to the CCP's working style then it must be integrated into the fundamental principle of collectivity at the heart of Leninism. There may be a parallel to the essence of democratic centralism here. Second, if self-reliance and hard work are central to popular cultures through which economic development can be realized then it implicates the CCP's leadership role in society and culture. But that presents a difficulty--because these characters may only be embedded in society generally if they are deeply embedded first in the CCP itself. To do otherwise is to abdicate the CCP's leadership role--if the people lead in developing the characteristics of hard work and self-reliance then the CCP fails in its essential vanguard role. In both applications, it is likely that self-reliance and hard work ought to be understood as read within the four cardinal principles. And that may explain the deviation between the English and Chinese language versions of the ¶ 10, at least in part.

Eighth, the CCP's basic line is directed toward a very specific goal--to struggle to build China into a prosperous, democratic, civilized and harmonious modern socialist country (为把我国建设成为富强民主文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家而奋斗). Note the dynamic conditionality of the objective--the role of the vanguard is to struggle or fight for the immediate term objective, one already intimated in ¶ 8, suggests the transformation of struggle from its specific historical context to a general one. In place of class struggle, the struggle for modernization, the struggle for CCP's basic line, the struggle for the development of productive forces, the struggle for harmonious society, etc. Each of these characteristics are further developed in succeeding paragraphs to which we turn next.

**B. The CCP Basic Line-Economic Development (¶ 11 General Program).**

With Paragraph 11, the General Program begins the elaboration of the CCP's basic line, starting with economic development as the central task.

[11] In leading the cause of socialism, the Communist Party of China must persist in taking economic development as the central task, making all other work subordinate to and serve this central task. The Party must lose no time in speeding up development, implement the strategy of rejuvenating the country through science and education, the strategy of strengthening the nation with trained personnel and the strategy of sustainable development, and give full play to the role of science and technology as the primary productive force. The Party must take advantage of the advancement of science and technology to improve the quality of workers and promote sound and rapid development of the national economy.

[11] 中国共产党在领导社会主义事业中，必须坚持以经济建设为中心，其他各项工作都服从和服务于这个中心。要抓紧时机，加快发展，实施科 教兴国战略、人才强国战略和可持续发展战略，充分发挥科学技术作为第一生产力的作用，依靠科技进步，提高劳动者素质，促进国民经济又好又快发展。

Paragraph 11 is intended to amplify the CCP's basic line relating to the centrality of economic development within socialist modernization. As a central element of the CCP line, as the core of its work, the CCP is reminded of its obligations to be aggressive in accelerate the opportunities to advance productive forces. To that end, the CCP has rolled out a number of strategies which must be implemented which are referenced in ¶ 11. These strategies become the face of economic development, and the basis from which economic development is understood. These strategies include rejuvenating the country through science and education strategy (实施科 教兴国战略); a human resources development strategy (人才强国战略); and sustainable development strategies (和可持续发展战略). Science and technology strategies are to play a principle role (充分发挥科学技术作为第) as a primary engine of developing productive forces (生产力的作用). Reliance on scientific and technological progress (依靠科技进步) and the improvement of worker quality (提高劳动者素质) are the key to the promotion of sound and fast economic development (促进国民经济又好又快发展).

The CCP's basic line, then, refines the general objective of economic development to a set of more detailed operational elements that focus on the development of quite specific productive forces--human talent, science and technology as the drivers of socialist modernization in the current stage of China's development. That provides the framework within which the CCP will assert its leadership role to guide the national People's Congress, the ministries, and CCP cadres in private industry, respecting the choices they make in their decision making. Indeed, paragraph 11 might be most usefully understood as framework or objectives regulations leaving it to administrative units, the state apparatus at all levels, and cadres in their private activities, to implement in accordance with the logic of their own operations. Science and technology are well understood objectives, even in a socialist context--and the methodologies of reaching for that objective fairly well mapped. On the other hand, the development of human productive capacity, the improvement of worker quality, and the human resources strategies around which they may be wrapped are a bit more open ended. What it should trigger are obligations to expend substantial state resources on education and cultural development. What it appears to target are the sort of short term training that produces easily visible results in industry but little long term benefit for attaining the next historical stage of development.

Those longer term objectives become clearer when this direction is read closely together with Sange Daibiao (¶ 6). Economic development is understood as the necessary foundation on which socialist democracy and socialist culture can be built. There is thus built into the CCP an ordering of objectives starting with economic development and leading toward political (¶ 15) and cultural (¶ 16) progress. An empty belly makes for poor politics and even poorer cultural expression. At the same time, focusing on economic development as the central task serves as a reminder that economic development is not the exclusive task of CCP leadership. Indeed, economic development is highly dependent on its operational aspect--to develop productive forces. But that development cannot itself create distortions that ultimately inhibit the entire project of socialist modernization. It follows that development of productive forces must be understood as referencing all productive forces. These include those more narrowly understood as economic in nature, as well as those productive forces that may be more political and cultural in nati8re. Among the most important of the productive forces that must be developed is the CCP itself. A failure to develop the CCP as a productive force makes it impossible for the CCP itself to assert an authentic leadership over the central task of economic development. It would have no basis for leading such development because it itself has failed in its fundamental obligation to develop itself as a central productive force of China. To understand economic development as a central task, then, requires a substantial understanding that centrality here implies leadership rather than privilege, and that centrality implies an obligation to ensure that economic development remains attached to political and cultural development as well. That failure to adhere to this line would produce a fundamental contradiction with the objectives of socialist modernization (¶ 5), the CCP's basic representation obligations (¶ 6) and the overall duty to produce development in a sustainable and scientific manner (¶ 7).

**C. The CCP Basic Line-The Four Cardinal Principles (¶ 12 General Program).**

With Paragraph 12, we come to the second amplification of the CCP basic line--the four cardinal principles.

[12] The Four Cardinal Principles - to keep to the socialist road and to uphold the people's democratic dictatorship, leadership by the Communist Party of China, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought - are the foundation on which to build the country. Throughout the course of socialist modernization the Party must adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles and combat bourgeois liberalization.

[12] 坚持社会主义道路、坚持人民民主专政、坚持中国共产党的领导、坚持马克思列宁主义毛泽东思想这四项基本原则，是我们的立国之本。在社会主义现代化建设的整个过程中，必须坚持四项基本原则，反对资产阶级自由化。

Beyond its complex and nuanced history, the four cardinal principles serve as a quite precise shorthand of the foundational principles of Chinese constitutional and political theory. Together these four cardinal principles serve as the foundation of the nation (是我们的立国之本). Their foundational character is based on the role of the four cardinal principles in constraining self-constitution of the state, its government, purposes, organization and normative structures.

But there is also a danger in the constitution of the four cardinal principles. Reduced to slogan, the four cardinal principles can be reduced to irrelevance. Yet that would constitute a fundamental betrayal, not of the CCP basic line but of the substantial entirety of the structures of legitimacy of the CCP as a vanguard party, a party in power in China. Virtually all of the errors of individual cadres, and of misdirection by the collective leadership in times of great shifts on historical context may be explained by a failure to adhere strictly to the four cardinal principles, or to cynically use them to ill effect.

Each is fairly straightforward within the context of Chinese constitutional theory. To adhere to the socialist road (坚持社会主义道路) constrains the approaches to economic policy. Adherence to socialism means rejection of feudalism, capitalism and the like. But such adherence and rejection mat not be as easy as it sounds. To reject capitalism, for example, may not necessarily require a rejection of markets. Nor need it require a rejection of private ownership of property, even property that might be central to the development of productive forces. Adherence to socialism rejects the primacy of capital over labor for the purpose of individual rather than societal advancement toward the objective of fashioning a communist society. Beyond that, the issue of technique requires only a fidelity to the ultimate utilization of capital and productive forces.

Similarly to adhere to the people’s democratic dictatorship (坚持人民民主专政) constrains the approaches to political policy. It is central to the organization of power in a Party-State system. And it suggests the fundamental principle of division of power, which marks socialist-Leninist systems as distinct from capitalist-republican systems. A people’s democratic dictatorship places the whole of sovereign power in the Leninist vanguard party, which retains political authority but which delegates administrative authority to the apparatus of state (NPC, ministries, and provincial administrations). Administrative power may then be divided functionally along legislative, executive and prosecutorial-judicial lines. Democracy is filtered through and within the vanguard party and might be exercised with respect to constrained choices that might be made within the administrative apparatus of state. The people’s democratic dictatorship is essential to socialism precisely because the state is an instrument of the overall popular objective of establishing a communist society. That fundamental direction itself constrains popular democratic expression and makes necessary the vesting of leadership authority in a vanguard party—as and to the extent that party remains loyal to that objective in all of its actions. In contrast, capitalist-Republican states are grounded in the preservation of custom and tradition without any particular direction for societal development. Within this context the state need not be directed to any particular objective. All popular sovereign authority may then be vested in the governmental apparatus. The only constraint is to ensure that such a governmental apparatus remains loyal to the people from whom its power is derived. And traditionally the most efficient approach to those constraints is to divide power functionally among judicial, legislative and executive lines. Additionally because politics has no object but the maintenance of an apparatus response to popular expressions of custom, tradition and societal expectations within broad principles of societal norms, politics can be reduced to contests among individuals and factions seeking office on the basis of their assertions that they best represent the current iteration of popular sensibilities of how it understands itself.

The third of the four cardinal principles merely identifies the vanguard party. It constrains approaches to constitutional policy in its organizational sense. To adhere to the leadership of the communist party (坚持中国共产党的领导), however, is a conditional requirement. Adherence is required as and to the extent that the CCP continues to fulfill its obligations as a vanguard party—to adhere to its own line and to the core principles on which the state was founded. One has an obligation to adhere to a communist party, but no obligation to adhere to any party that styles itself communist but does not practice the appropriate fundamental line. That conditionality, of course, is emphasized in ¶ 1 of the General program and embedded within the four cardinal principles as an operational condition of operationalizing the CCP’s basic line.

The conditionality of the third of the four cardinal principles is underlined by the last principle—to adhere to Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and the four cardinal principles themselves (坚持马克思列宁主义毛泽东思想这四项基本原则). This last cardinal principle constrains popular self-constitution that is it constrains normative policy. That is both a reminder of the fundamental role of the principles described in ¶ 2, but of their direct applicability in the implementation of the CCP’s basic line.

The relational nature of the four cardinal principles is also made clear in ¶ 12. The paragraph ends with an admonition: Throughout the process of socialist modernization drive We must adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles and Against bourgeois Liberalization (在社会主义现代化建设的整个过程中，必须坚持四项基本原则，反对资产阶级自由化). That admonition is directed inward to CCP cadres (including its leadership) and outward to the CCP’s relations with the masses and the world beyond China. It sets up the binary opposition of classical early Marxism—between socialism and bourgeois liberalization as a necessary reminder that while the techniques of socialist modernization may be similar to those of bourgeois liberal systems, they are not deployed to the same ends. That is to be taken up in more detail in the succeeding paragraphs to which we turn next.

**D. The CCP Basic Line-Reform and Opening Up (¶ 13 General Program).**

With Paragraph 13 we consider reform and opening up as an aspect of the CCP's basic line.

[13] Reform and opening up are the path to a stronger China. Only reform and opening up can enable China, socialism and Marxism to develop themselves. The Party must carry out fundamental reform of the economic structure that hampers the development of the productive forces, and keep to and improve the socialist market economy; it must also carry out corresponding political restructuring and reform in other fields. The Party must adhere to the basic state policy of opening up and assimilate and exploit the achievements of all other cultures. It must be bold in making explorations and breaking new ground in reform and opening up, make its reform decisions more scientific, better coordinate its reform measures and blaze new trails in practice.

[13] 坚持改革开放，是我们的强国之路。要从根本上改革束缚生产力发展的经济体制，坚持和完善社会主义市场经济体制；与此相适应，要进行 政治体制改革和其他领域的改革。要坚持对外开放的基本国策，吸收和借鉴人类社会创造的一切文明成果。改革开放应当大胆探索，勇于开拓，提高改革决策的科学 性，增强改革措施的协调性，在实践中开创新路。

Reform and opening up, like economic development, have been the twin key pillars of socialist modernization after 1979. It represents the principle that China must engage with the world if it is to most efficiently develop its productive forces. More importantly, perhaps, it is through engagement that China might best advance its productive forces where indigenous talent is less well developed. But reform and opening up is not undertaken for its own sake, or for the sake of making solidarity with those places to which China opens. That is, reform and opening up are techniques utilized for the objective of economic development, and economic development is a key sector of socialist modernization. Thus the CCP's basic line with respect to opening up is geared toward absorbing and learning from other societies and civilizations (吸收和借鉴人类社会创造的一切文明成果), not to mimic but to transpose learning into the Chinese context. The essence of opening up, then, is to import and transform knowledge, to attach Chinese characteristics to knowledge and expertise in the service of the fundamental objectives of the vanguard party for social development as a whole. And that enterprise, in turn, is tied to the great fundamental principles of Chinese political ideology.

Since 1978, when the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee was convened, the CPC, with great political courage, has firmly promoted reforms in the country's economic, political, cultural, social and ecological systems, as well as in the system of Party building. China's opening up has also been continuously promoted. . . . Facts have proved that reform and opening up is a critical choice that has determined the destiny of contemporary China, and also an important instrument for the undertakings of the CPC and the Chinese people to catch up with the times in great strides. There will never be an end to practice, to emancipation of the mind, and to reform and opening up. (Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, Jan. 16, 2014)

That set of fundamental relationships between reform and opening up, economic development and socialist modernization sets the framework within which the CCP's line is applied to China's engagement with the world, and the shape of the reforms necessary to effectuate that advantageous engagement (坚持改革开放，是我们的强国之路). None of this, of course, is understood as criticism. Rather it suggests that key foreign economic policy is necessarily intimately tied to the ideological structures from out of which must emerge Chinese policy. Indeed, the last sentence of ¶ 13 resonates with the admonition of ¶ 5 against rigidity and textualism. It appears as an application of the principle of emancipating the mind through the emphasis of boldness and innovation (改革开放应当大胆探索，勇于开拓，提高改革决策的科学 性，增强改革措施的协调性，在实践中开创新路). The objectives of regulatory coherence and coordination (增强改革措施的协调性), and assessment to the basic line (决策的科学 性). To avoid sloganeering, the move toward reform and opening up must be undertaken in a way that may be assessed, analyzed and replicated throughout the economy.

Opening up is essential to reform, to ensure the appropriate development of the socialist market economic system (社会主义市场经济体制). That development is not to produce a capitalist system (recall the constraints of the four cardinal principles), but rather to deploy those techniques that produce wealth for capitalist systems, but to bend them to socialist objectives. The distinction here between technique and objective is quite essential. It is confusion and more often conflation, of the two quite autonomous aspects that produce sloppy analysis. Socialist market economic systems may deploy the same set of techniques as capitalist systems, but they are bound to be directed toward different ends, and their overall direction is set by the CCP constrained by the principles of the General Program and its quite objectives based understanding of the place of this development within the umbrella of socialist modernization. It is in this sense that one can understand the connection between opening up, reform of the socialist market economic system, economic development, and reform of the political system (要进行 政治体制改革和其他领域的改革).

**IV. From Policy to Implementation: The CCP's Leadership Role (¶¶14-19)**

**A. CCP Leadership-The Socialist Market Economy (¶ 14 General Program).**

With Paragraph 10 we come to the first full expression of the CCP's basic line in the context of the current stage of development of China. The subsequent paragraphs amplify the basic line. Paragraph 11, the General Program begins the elaboration of the CCP's basic line, starting with economic development as the central task. Paragraph 12, we come to the second amplification of the CCP basic line--the four cardinal principles. Paragraph 13 we consider reform and opening up as an aspect of the CCP's basic line. These four paragraphs are meant to provide a declaration of the CCP's basic line--the product of the more general statements of principle and historical context of Paragraphs 1-9 provide guidance--and a more detailed elaboration of its more important elements.

The CCP's basic line goes to the substantive objectives of the party in fulfilling its role as the party in power. What is the CCP's working style? How is it expected to act? Working style can be divided along two distinct but related lines. The first goes to the working style of CCP cadres, from the most junior to cadres to those serving in the most senior roles. Working style in this sense has been the subject of both the foundational paragraphs (¶¶ 1-8) and those establishing the CCP's line (¶¶ 9-13). In its second sense, working style goes to the working style of the CCP in its institutional manifestation; that is, it goes to the working style of a vanguard Leninist party within the context and subject to the constraints of its objectives (socialist modernization) and normative principles, its guidebook (¶ 2).

The foundation of the CCP's grounding working style is leadership. Paragraphs 14-19 elaborate the character and practice of the nature and practice of leadership by the CCP as an institutional actor. Paragraphs 14-19 construct the CCP's leadership obligations key specific general areas of activity; ¶ 14 (socialist market economy); ¶ 15 (socialist democracy); ¶ 16 (socialist culture); ¶ 17(harmonious socialist society); ¶ 18(socialist ecological progress); and ¶ 19 (People's Liberation Army). We consider each in turn. We start with ¶ 14.

[14] The Communist Party of China leads the people in developing the socialist market economy. It unwaveringly consolidates and develops the public sector of the economy and unswervingly encourages, supports and guides the development of the non-public sector. It gives play to the basic role of market forces in allocating resources and works to set up a sound system of macroeconomic regulation. The Party works to balance urban and rural development, development among regions, economic and social development, relations between man and nature, and domestic development and opening to the outside world; adjust the economic structure, and transform the growth model. It is dedicated to promoting harmonized development of industrialization, IT application, urbanization and agricultural modernization, building a new socialist countryside, taking a new path of industrialization with Chinese characteristics, and making China an innovative country.

[14] 中国共产党领导人民发展社会主义市场经济。毫不动摇地巩固和发展公有制经济，毫不动摇地鼓励、支持、引导非公有制经济发展。发挥市 场在资源配置中的基础性作用，建立完善的宏观调控体系。统筹城乡发展、区域发展、经济社会发展、人与自然和谐发展、国内发展和对外开放，调整经济结构，转 变经济发展方式。建设社会主义新农村，走中国特色新型工业化道路，建设创新型国家，建设资源节约型、环境友好型社会。

The focus of the § 14 is the construction of the CCP's leadership role in developing the socialist market economy. Leadership is the core principle now brought forward from the basic theoretical principle of CCP legitimacy in ¶ 1 (CCP is the "core of leadership for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics") to an operational level. To that end ¶ 14 appears first to define the socialist market economy itself, the contours of which are now well understood for the purpose of framing the CCP's leadership. The leadership role, then, provides the constraints within which the CCP may form policy and advance specific agendas in the service of socialist modernization in the economic sphere. Paragraph 14 elaborates these constraints within a well expressed net of principles.

First, leadership in the socialist market economy requires balance. There is balance in leadership style between public sector and private sector activities. In each case the CCP must unwavering (毫不动摇) in its efforts. The CCP fails in its leadership role it does not maintain a balance among public and private sectors, it devotes or privileges one over the other. The overall leadership of the CCP embraces all productive factors, whatever their character. As such, the CCP abdicates its leadership role by favoring one class or productive forces for another. The socialist market economy requires equal efforts directed toward all productive forces--including the productive force that is represented by the CCP itself.

Second, the thrust of those unwavering efforts are different with respect to the public and private sector economies. With respect to the public sector those efforts are directed toward consolidation and development (地巩固和发展). With respect to the private sector those efforts are directed toward encouragement, support and guidance (地鼓励、支持, 引导). Yet both efforts are united by a fundamental constraint--the acceptance of the basic role of market forces in the allocation of resources (发挥市 场在资源配置中的基础性作用).

Third, the balancing inherent in the leadership role extends to substantive policy areas. These areas reflect the current focus of policy-making for which the leadership of the CCP. This is necessary to prioritize and manage the legislative and administrative agendas of the state sector. And that prioritization itself reinforces the principles under which the CCP's working style may be manifested.

Fourth, the techniques of leadership emphasize regulation and not centralized planning (建立完善的宏观调控体系). And regulation is to be used in the service of harmonized development through the obligation of promoting a very specific list of policy priorities "Building a new socialist countryside, taking a new path of industrialization with Chinese characteristics, building an innovative country and a resource-saving and environment-friendly society" (建设社会主义新农村，走中国特色新型工业化道路，建设创新型国家，建设资源节约型、环境友好型社会。).

Fifth, the paragraph itself is written to provide the analytical style that should mark the approach of the CCP to the development of policy and assertion of its leadership role. This style moves from principles to theory to policy to operationalization. That is it moves from the most general to the most specific, and it moves from the most authoritative and constraining to the least constraining. It suggests a working style in which the greatest flexibility for leadership choices is possible at the operational level, and the least flexibility for leadership role flexibility is at level of basic principles. In a sense that insight reflects the organization of the General Program itself, moving from foundational principles (¶¶ 1-2), to normative theory (¶¶ 3-8), to policy (¶¶ 9-13), to operationalization (¶¶ 9-1). That, in turn reflects the normative principles of democratic centralism to which we turn below.

**B. CCP Leadership-Socialist Democracy (¶ 15 General Program)**

[15] The Communist Party of China leads the people in promoting socialist democracy. It integrates its leadership, the position of the people as masters of the country, and the rule of law, takes the path of political development under socialism with Chinese characteristics, expands socialist democracy, improves the socialist legal system, builds a socialist country under the rule of law, consolidates the people's democratic dictatorship, and builds socialist political civilization. It upholds and improves the system of people's congresses, the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation under its leadership, the system of regional ethnic autonomy, and the system of self-governance at the primary level of society. It makes people's democracy more extensive, fuller in scope and sounder in practice. It takes effective measures to protect the people's right to manage state and social affairs as well as economic and cultural programs. It respects and safeguards human rights. It encourages the free airing of views and works to establish sound systems and procedures of democratic election, decision-making, administration and oversight. It improves the socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics and strengthens law enforcement, so as to bring all work of the state under the rule of law.

[15] 中国共产党领导人民发展社会主义民主政治。坚持党的领导、人民当家作主、依法治国有机统一，走中国特色社会主义政治发展道路，扩大 社会主义民主，健全社会主义法制，建设社会主义法治国家，巩固人民民主专政，建设社会主义政治文明。坚持和完善人民代表大会制度、中国共产党领导的多党合 作和政治协商制度、民族区域自治制度以及基层群众自治制度。切实保障人民管理国家事务和社会事务、管理经济和文化事业的权利。尊重和保障人权。广开言路， 建立健全民主选举、民主决策、民主管理、民主监督的制度和程序。加强国家立法和法律实施工作，实现国家各项工作法治化。

Socialist Democracy is an important element of socialist modernization. It is a central element of the CCP's political work. Its central element is democratic politics (民主政治)--democracy. But this complicated paragraph is subtly contingent, and quite dynamic in its foundation. Like ¶ 14, it is grounded in the leadership obligations of the CCP (referencing again the core theoretical responsibility in ¶ 1) but now set in operational motion.

First, ¶ 15 the CCP's leadership has as its objective the development (发展) of democracy or democratic politics. There is a parallel here with the development of the socialist market economy. Both are essential to socialist modernization (along with socialist culture (¶ 16)). Together they represent the totality of the representational character of the CCP and the scope of its obligation under the normative structures of Sange Daibiao (¶ 6). Applying this parallel, one can see how the CCP's leadership assumes that China's democratic development is at the same primary stage as its economic development (¶ 9). The attainment of socialist democracy, like the attainment of socialist market economy, will remain a work in progress for a long time. But that the process of constructing socialist democracy has a long path does not mean that this path leads nowhere or that progress must be measured in micro-millimeters. The adoption of the language of modernization carries with it the same obligation to produce measurable forward movement in the project of socialist democratic modernization as it does for socialist economic modernization--all, of course, within the fundamental ordering constraints of the CCP's basic line.

Second, it follows that democratic politics has a quite specific orientation within the normative foundation of the political system of China. Paragraph 15 reinforces the notion that socialist democracy at its core involves the operationalization of the CCP's basic line. But to avoid tautology (the thing defined by reference to itself), something more is required. Here that something more is an aggregation of a number of key policy initiatives that had been undertaken since reform and opening up (¶¶ 8, 10, 13). In effect, ¶ 15 bridges the broad policy of the CCP's basic line (¶ 10) with key implementation objectives.

Third, the principal implementation objectives reflect the CCP's basic line and work style--it requires adherence (坚持), a core focus, on several key strategic policy approaches. The first is the CCP¡s leadership, already well emphasized in the General program, first as theory, then as policy, and now as operational principle. The second focus for which adherence is required relates to the position of the people as masters of the country. While there is a sense of the people (人民) alone (当家) deciding (作主), the meaning within Chinese socialist theory is quite different. That is, though the people alone may decide, their decisions must be informed by and through the leadership of the CCP, and must be undertaken, if it is to be considered authoritative and legitimate, within the constraints of the guiding theory which frames Chinese law, politics, economics, society and culture (¶ 2). The third is adherence to the rule of law (依法治国有机统一). This can be understood normative as focusing on the proper (coherent) administration of the state apparatus. The three together form what might be usefully understood as the "three adherence principles" (三个坚持) of ¶ 15.

Fourth, the "three adherence principles" of ¶ 15 provides the conceptual lens through which the policy objectives of socialist democracy may be realized. The first, "take the road of political development under socialism with Chinese characteristics," echoes the operationalization framework for economic development but in the political sphere. The second, "expand socialist democracy" drives policy toward continual reform within the conceptual constraints of the CCP's basic line in general and the three adherence principles of ¶ 15 in particular. The third and fourth focus on more concrete policy objectives aimed at ordering the administrative apparatus of the state along socialist rule of law (administrative) lines. Both "improve the socialist legal system" and "build a socialist country ruled by law" aim at the creation of an administrative apparatus that must in turn be constrained in that development by the fundamental constraint to avoid bureaucratism and rigidity (¶ 5). The last two, "consolidation of the people's democratic dictatorship" and "build a socialist political civilization" focus both on the parameters of the overall construction of a socialist governance apparatus (a government under the leadership of the CCP which is itself constrained by its grundnorm, the General Program). Indeed building a socialist political civilization (¶ 6) must be built atop a socialist legal system that is itself legitimated by consistency with the basic political constitution of the politico-social order.

Fifth, the administrative apparatus must be organized and operated within these broad operational parameters. Thus to "uphold and improve the people's congress system, the multi-party cooperation and political consultation system under the leadership of the Communist Party of China's regional ethnic autonomy system and grassroots self-government system" suggests an architecture of administrative governance geared toward the implementation of the policy and policy objectives developed under the leadership of the CCP (and constrained thereby) to serve the basic core objectives for which the state is organized and the CCP leads--socialist modernization through the development of productive economic, political and cultural forces to move people, state and nation toward a communist system. The object, of course is also specified--to effectively protect (切实保障) popular engagement in the management of "state and social affairs as well as economic and cultural programs."

Sixth, the CCP leadership line situates the respect for and protection of human rights (尊重和保障人权) squarely within the ambit of socialist democracy. But by doing so, it anchors human rights protection within the constraints of the three adherences (三个坚持) principles, the CCP's basic line, and of the core normative foundations of the economic, political and cultural organization of the state. As such, human rights is neither unmoored, nor is it detachable. More importantly, as deeply embedded within socialist democracy, it appears substantially buffered from the development of human rights normative structures at the international level. The intermeshing between Chinese and international normative approaches to human rights--in scope, definition, implementation and authority--must be mediated through the logic of the grundnorms of the socialist legal system emerging from the cage of principles and policies that is the General Program. That buffering effect substantially transforms human rights from an internationalist project with objectives focused on the articulation of the parameters of human dignity and their constraining consequences for states and other actors, to a national project focused on the development of productive forces, including the individual, bent to the purpose of socialist modernization. Human rights as an engine of socialist modernization may not be the same thing as human rights as an international project for establishing a normative framework for legalizing the relationship between individuals and aggregated power sources (whether states or other actors). This is likely to remain a point of substantial friction only in those areas where there are differences in result in their respective application. ird, those markers of development cannot serve as a substitute for the objective of socialist democracy itself. The markers--rule of law, people's democratic dictatorship, etc.--are the techniques rather than the expression of socialist democracy.

Seventh, thus understood, socialist democracy becomes more clearly conceived as a system emerging from a pyramidal structure of norms, the most general of which affecting the discretionary space of the more narrow provisions down to the operational level. In the case of socialist democracy that means that democracy cannot be understood by reference to Western terminology, ideology, history or practice. Instead it must be understood as the expression of the specific application of the Leninist principles of CCP leadership, guided by a set of dynamic normative principles that have been ordered into a policy program understood through the CCP basic line. Thus when ¶ 15 speaks to the role of the CCP to "encourage the free airing of views and to work to establish sound systems and procedures of democratic election, decision-making, administration and oversight"--that "encouragement" and "work" must be understood as targeting the production of airing of views, democratic elections and administration that themselves conform to the basic principles of CCP leadership, of the constraining guidance of core theory, and of the CCP's basic line. That necessarily produces expressions of democracy quite distinct from those in the West.

Eighth, there is a strong distinction made in Paragraph 15 between rule of law (依法治国有机统一) and legalization (法治化), though both terms appear to be the same in the English version. The first appears more focused on conceptual notions of organic unity of the country governed according to the law. The second appears to focus more on the administrative manifestation of a rule system over a system grounded in the discretionary authority of individuals. The latter position is quite important. Traditional European Marxist states built bureaucracies whose operation was centered on the power of officials to exercise broad discretionary authority with substantial impunity. That appears to be the case in Cuba immediately before the current transition. Paragraph 15 is notable for its implicit rejection of an administrative and legal system grounded in discretion in favor of one in which official power must be asserted within the cage of regulation (here)--that they must enforce that tat must be enforced against them.

**C. CCP Leadership-Socialist Culture (¶ 16 General Program).**

We continue with ¶ 16 (Socialist Culture).

[16] The Communist Party of China leads the people in developing an advanced socialist culture. It promotes socialist cultural and ethical progress, combines the rule of law and the rule of virtue in running the country and works to raise the ideological and moral standards and scientific and educational levels of the entire nation so as to provide a powerful ideological guarantee, motivation and intellectual support for reform, opening up and socialist modernization, and develop a strong socialist culture in China. It promotes core socialist values, adheres to Marxism as its guiding ideology, fosters the common ideal of socialism with Chinese characteristics, promotes patriotism-centered national spirit and the spirit of the times centering on reform and innovation and advocates the socialist maxims of honor and disgrace. It works to enhance the people's sense of national dignity, self-confidence and self-reliance, resist corrosion by decadent capitalist and feudal ideas and wipe out all social evils so that the people will have high ideals, moral integrity, a good education and a strong sense of discipline. It also needs to imbue its members with the lofty ideal of communism. The Party strives to develop educational, scientific and cultural programs, carry forward the fine traditional culture of the Chinese nation, and develop a thriving socialist culture.

[16] 中国共产党领导人民发展社会主义先进文化。建设社会主义精神文明，实行依法治国和以德治国相结合，提高全民族的思想道德素质和科学 文化素质，为改革开放和社会主义现代化建设提供强大的思想保证、精神动力和智力支持。坚持马克思主义指导思想，树立中国特色社会主义共同理想，弘扬以爱国 主义为核心的民族精神和以改革创新为核心的时代精神，倡导社会主义荣辱观，增强民族自尊、自信和自强精神，抵御资本主义和封建主义腐朽思想的侵蚀，扫除各 种社会丑恶现象，努力使我国人民成为有理想、有道德、有文化、有纪律的人民。对党员还要进行共产主义远大理想教育。大力发展教育、科学、文化事业，弘扬民 族优秀传统文化，繁荣和发展社会主义文化。

Socialist culture, like socialist democracy (¶ 15) and socialist economic development (¶ 14) form the core of the categories of productive forces whose successful mobilization are central to the project of socialist modernization. Each is an expression of the vectors for operationalizing socialist modernization within the theoretical and policy constraints of fundamental principle and the CCP basic line. Each must be read as the specific application of policy--not autonomous of that policy or those principles. The core objective is dynamic--to develop advanced socialist culture (发展社会主义先进文化)

Like socialist democracy, socialist culture or civilization (文明) touches on the broad understanding of the productive forces whose development are central to the project of modernization (¶ 6). The development of culture must be bent to the overall project of building toward a communist society and thus involves the logic of Leninist hierarchy. That requires (¶ 1) CCP leadership, guided by policy (¶ 2) and expressed in the CCP basic line (¶ 10) of the means by which culture will be mobilized and developed along socialist lines.

First, socialist culture is a political and normative project. It pairs (相结合) culture and ethics on the one hand (建设社会主义精神文明), and rule of law and virtue on the other hand (实行依法治国和以德治国) “to raise the ideological and moral standards and scientific and educational levels of the entire nation." But the utilization of rule of law, a core part of socialist democracy (¶ 15), ethics and virtue is bent to a quite specific purpose: to provide an ideological guarantee (的思想保证), spiritual impetus (精神动力) and intellectual support (智力支持)for the entire project of socialist modernization and opening up.

Second, socialist culture, then, is political culture. It is an integral part of the holistic effort to develop productive forces toward a singular end. To interpret the obligation to develop as requiring anything else is to call into question the normative foundation of ¶¶ 1-2. It is in this sense that one understands the core operational objectives of the leadership role of the CCP to develop advanced socialist culture ("It promotes core socialist values, adheres to Marxism as its guiding ideology, fosters the common ideal of socialism with Chinese characteristics").

Third, the construction of socialist culture does more than bend culture to a specific overarching purpose. Socialist culture is also a culture of patriotism; it is a culture of innovation; and it is a culture that produces a socialist aspect to honor and disgrace ("promotes patriotism-centered national spirit and the spirit of the times centering on reform and innovation and advocates the socialist maxims of honor and disgrace"). These are to be understood again within the overarching context of the basic objectives of the CCP in their vanguard role and consonant with the CCP basic line. Culture is understood as those societal factors--values, self-constitution, customs, traditions, behavior norms--that like other productive forces must be shaped by the particular circumstances and historical context of China and deployed to the ends of socialist modernization.

Fourth, as an aspect of socialist modernization, the ultimate objective of which is the establishment of a communist society, socialist culture may play its most important role in socializing people to that end, starting with CCP cadres (对党员还要进行共产主义远大理想教育). Socialist culture, then, is a means of socializing both party cadres and (eventually all) people in the lofty ideals of communism and to embed those ideals in the societal sphere ("It works to enhance the people's sense of national dignity, self-confidence and self-reliance, resist corrosion by decadent capitalist and feudal ideas and wipe out all social evils so that the people will have high ideals, moral integrity, a good education and a strong sense of discipline"). And indeed the imbuing of communist ideals to all people is a fundamental means of developing the cultural aspects of the productive force of culture and is also reflected in the three represents opening of party membership to a broad mass of people (e.g. here).

Fifth, there is a conscious and strong connection between traditional culture and socialist culture. The former, shorn of decadent capitalist and feudal ideals, serves as a foundation for the later. They provide the basis for the sinification of the characteristics of the Leninist project of development of cultural forces to " -->develop a thriving socialist culture."

**D. CCP Leadership-Harmonious Socialist Society (¶ 17 General Program)**

We continue with ¶ 17 (Harmonious Socialist Society).

[17] The Communist Party of China leads the people in building a harmonious socialist society. In accordance with the general requirements for democracy and the rule of law, equity and justice, honesty and fraternity, vigor and vitality, stability and order, and harmony between man and nature and the principle of all the people building and sharing a harmonious socialist society, the Party focuses its efforts on ensuring and improving the people's wellbeing by solving the most specific problems of the utmost and immediate concern to the people, works to enable all the people to share in more fruits of development in a more equitable way, and strives to create a situation in which all people do their best, find their proper places in society and live together in harmony. The Party strengthens and makes innovations in social management. It strictly distinguishes between the two different types of contradictions - those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people - and works to handle them correctly. It will strengthen comprehensive measures to maintain law and order, and resolutely combat criminal activities that endanger national security and interests, social stability and economic development and bring criminals to justice in accordance with the law, so as to maintain lasting social stability.

[17] 中国共产党领导人民构建社会主义和谐社会。按照民主法治、公平正义、诚信友爱、充满活力、安定有序、人与自然和谐相处的总要求和共 同建设、共同享有的原则，以改善民生为重点，解决好人民最关心、最直接、最现实的利益问题，努力形成全体人民各尽其能、各得其所而又和谐相处的局面。严格 区分和正确处理敌我矛盾和人民内部矛盾这两类不同性质的矛盾。加强社会治安综合治理，依法坚决打击各种危害国家安全和利益、危害社会稳定和经济发展的犯罪 活动和犯罪分子，保持社会长期稳定。

The CCP leadership role, central to the building of a socialist economy, democracy and culture, is also central to the building of a socialist harmonious society. This leadership obligation serves as a nexus point of sorts. It reflects an obligation of coordination that produces an aggregation of economics, politics and culture that is the sum of a social order. That is the purpose and essence of Paragraph 17 ("general requirements for democracy and the rule of law, equity and justice, honesty and fraternity, vigor and vitality, stability and order, and harmony between man and nature and the principle of all the people building and sharing a harmonious socialist society").

First, ¶ 17 announces a principle of responsive government ("ensuring and improving the people's wellbeing by solving the most specific problems of the utmost and immediate concern to the people"). This represents the operationalization of the efficiency principle derived from the principles of putting people first (¶ 7) and the prioritization of popular needs in socialist modernization (¶ 9; "development is for the people, by the people and with the people sharing in its fruits"). This is central as well to the building of socialist democracy (¶ 15; "protect the people's right to manage state and social affairs as well as economic and cultural programs").

Second, ¶ 17 transforms class struggle into an administrative program of wealth or income transfer. This is not the sort of transfer common to European Marxist states. Rather, the CCP has wide discretion to develop mechanisms, including socialist market mechanisms, for levelling wealth distribution ("works to enable all the people to share in more fruits of development in a more equitable way").

Third, ¶ 17 points to harmonious a socialist society as one directed toward sorting population and placing them in an appropriate place within the social order ("strives to create a situation in which all people do their best, find their proper places in society and live together in harmony"). But that, in turn, must be grounded on a principle that individuals all individuals are necessarily able to be slotted within any one of a well understood number of societal roles. There is a danger here of rigidity, text worship and bureaucratization that stifles innovation to the extent that the principle of slotting individuals in accordance with central planning inhibits the possibility of individuals resisting sorting to produce innovation that itself would move socialist modernization forward. A quiet society may be one that appears harmonious but that actually betrays the fundamental objective of societal harmony--to create the basis for innovation that propels the development of productive forces (including individuals (in the service of socialist modernization in the economic, political or cultural spheres. Here is an area that require substantial criticism and self-criticism within the CCP and an obligation to understand the way that ¶ 2 and 5 must be read into ¶ 10 and ¶ 17. And indeed, this is recognized as an important element of ¶ 17 ("The Party strengthens and makes innovations in social management").

Fourth, social harmony has an important security element. If socialist social harmony is the expression of the objectives of the CCP basic line in the context of the scope of the CCP's leadership respo0nsibilities, then a consequence of that responsibility is the further responsibility to protect the social order from potential and actual disruption. This responsibility, of course, then colors everything--from the assertion of the use of societal space for space, the control of agitation, the exercise of human rights, and the way in which people communicate their opinions, judgments and suggestions about the effectiveness of the state apparatus or the CCP itself, in meeting their respective obligations. And there lies the great danger for the CCP. The open ended statement at the end of ™ 17 suggests the contradiction (矛盾) ("It will strengthen comprehensive measures to maintain law and order, and resolutely combat criminal activities that endanger national security and interests, social stability and economic development and bring criminals to justice in accordance with the law, so as to maintain lasting social stability"). Reading ¶ 17 in isolation suggests that the CCP, and the state apparatus it leads, have unlimited discretion in applying techniques. Yet the General Program itself, and its interpretive structures, suggest that this cannot be right. First, the mass line itself serves as a constraint--demanding a space for popular expression and discipline but reserving to the CCP and the state the determination of the form that this expression may assume. Second, such an unlimited discretion would inhibit the core objective of the CCP basic line--to avoid rigidity, self-aggrandizement and remain responsive to the people and promote innovation and forward movement in the service of socialist modernization.

Fifth, this potential contradiction (矛盾) is resolved in a quite specific way in ¶ 17. First, the CCP's working style must be focused on innovation ("The Party strengthens and makes innovations in social management"). That suggests both the objective (to strengthen innovation) and the techniques through which this is accomplished (social management). This serves as a reminder that while social harmony might not become a straitjacket and mask for control, it is for the state and the CCP, rather than for the people, to manage the form and scope of popular engagement that may serve the useful purpose of moving society forward but with the cost of some societal disruption. Second, the CCP measures the success of its approach to the management of social harmony (and the space left for societal innovation) through a specific set of markers: the CCP "strictly distinguishes between the two different two types of contradictions - those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people - and works to handle them correctly." The basis of resolution depends, in the first instance on determining correctly the character of the societal disruption (两类不同性)--whether friend or foe, that is whether the action stems from a basic antagonism to the fundamental orientation of the CCP, the state and its core objectives (敌我). The second are not antagonistic to the system, they do not present a threat to systemic order. But they might produce error that can corrected, or they may reference the sort of ordinary anti-social behavior that has been the subject of the criminal and civil authority to control in virtually all jurisdictions on earth. With respect to fundamental threats, the CCP leadership sees itself obligated to eradicate those contradictions with full force. With respect to popular contradictions--either via political error or anti-social behavior, the obligation requires a more corrective rather than a response grounded in simple suppression. The essence of these distinctive contradictions, of course, lie in the old approach to class struggle with its traditional original applications to the mass line. But both concepts have necessarily been scientifically developed and transformed through the important movement toward socialist modernization and the overall objective to develop productive forces toward the goal of establishing a communist society.

Sixth, though ¶ 17 is silent about the standards or techniques that the CCP must utilize to correctly distinguish between the two distinct types of contradictions, the General Program itself may provide the necessary guidance. We start with the most specific obligation/duty and then interpret that with reference to the more general and authoritative. The specific is the core obligation to lead the people in building a harmonious socialist society. Within the scope of that obligation, the duty to protect the project of social harmony is reduced to a second order responsibility--to a technique that must be bent to the core objective to which it is directed. Thus the CCP does not have an unlimited power to discipline society or social actors. Its authority is most legitimately asserted only when those techniques are directed solely and correctly to achieve the objective--building a harmonious socialist society. That was one of the great lessons of the Cultural Revolution, one written into Deng Xiaoping theory and refined through the three Represents and the scientific outlook on development. The techniques of safeguarding the building of a harmonious society directed toward the development of productive forces in the economic, political and cultural spheres may be asserted only in harmony with the basic line of the CCP. That basic line incorporated reform and opening up, the centrality of economic development and the four cardinal principles. Each of these, in turn, oblige the CCP to put people first in the construction of programs designed to develop productive forces and lead China toward the next stage ion the path toward perfected socialism. The operational basis of that leadership is embedded in the people's democratic dictatorship. As such, the enemies of the state and the CCP--the enemies of the people--are no longer understood in class struggle terms (¶ 9: "Owing to both domestic circumstances and foreign influences, class struggle will continue to exist within a certain scope for a long time and may possibly grow acute under certain conditions, but it is no longer the principal contradiction"). In the place of class struggle as a central element, is the struggle for socialist modernization. State enemies are no longer understood in simple terms of class (see especially Sange Daibiao) but instead in their fidelity to the objectives of the vanguard part to develop productive forces in economic, political and cultural spheres under the principles of people's democratic dictatorship to build a communist society. Everyone else may commit error, which must be corrected, but are not enemies of the state and Party. In effect, the obligation of the CCP is not so much to find enemies as to train its people in fidelity to its vanguard mission. That is both the essence of the CCP's political work and the basis of the construction of a harmonious socialist society.

**E. CCP Leadership-Socialist Ecological Progress (¶ 18 General Program)**

We continue with ¶ 18 (Socialist ecological Progress).

[18] The Communist Party of China leads the people in promoting socialist ecological progress. It raises its ecological awareness of the need to respect, accommodate to and protect nature; follows the basic state policy of conserving resources and protecting the environment and the principle of giving high priority to conserving resources, protecting the environment and promoting its natural restoration; and pursues sound development that leads to increased production, affluence and a good ecosystem. The Party strives to build a resource-conserving, environmentally friendly society; and preserves China's geographical space and improves its industrial structure and mode of production and the Chinese way of life in the interest of conserving resources and protecting the environment. All this is aimed at creating a good working and living environment for the people and ensuring lasting and sustainable development of the Chinese nation.

[18] 中 国共产党领导人民建设社会主义生态文明。树立尊重自然、顺应自然、保护自然的生态文明理念，坚持节约资源和保护环境的基本国策，坚持节约优先、保护优先、 自然恢复为主的方针，坚持生产发展、生活富裕、生态良好的文明发展道路。着力建设资源节约型、环境友好型社会，形成节约资源和保护环境的空间格局、产业结 构、生产方式、生活方式，为人民创造良好生产生活环境，实现中华民族永续发展。

This is a more recent addition and evidence of the possibilities when the CCP asserts its leadership role to emancipate the mind in the service of socialist modernization. It grows naturally out of the CCP basic line and the scientific outlook on development. It grows from the consequences of advancing economic development and the need to reorder that progress in a way that permits sustained growth. Ecological progress is only possible in the face of economic success and thus represents an example of a response to a new historical stage in the progress of socialist modernization. But that movement form stage to stage must be undertaken within the constraints of cultural development, socialist democracy and the objective of social harmony. Each of these is evident in ¶ 18.

First, the extent of the CCP's leadership role is constrained by its scope: to promote progress. That suggests a role for environmental matters that moves it up from irrelevance--the price paid for developing productive forces--to an object that itself taxes socialist modernization (by making the attainment of socialist harmonious society more difficult, for example). This is an important step, but its importance is constrained by this limitation of scope. The environment and environmental sustainability has become a factor in the development of productive forces, but that is also the extent of its significance. The object is not to achieve some sort of level of environmental sustainability--¶ 18 is careful not to describe this part of the CCP's leadership line as socialist sustainability--but to embed sustainability costs into the calculus of the CCP's leadership. At some point, though, one may see socialist sustainability as a CCP in the next stage of historical development.

Second, ecological progress is given priority in policy, but only to the extent that such policy drives ecological progress "pursues sound development that leads to increased production, affluence and a good ecosystem." It is in this respect that one can understand the constraints the CCP's leadership role in raising awareness of the "need to respect, accommodate to and protect nature." Likewise it frames the understanding of the "basic state policy of conserving resources and protecting the environment." Lastly, it shapes the character of the "principle of giving high priority to conserving resources, protecting the environment and promoting its natural restoration." Taken together, the policy speaks to developing productive resources less wastefully and more efficiently over a long time horizon. That is the sense in which ecological progress must be understood. Ecological protection for its own sake is not contemplated. Ecological progress must be justified by its effect on enhancing economic progress and socialist modernization ("All this is aimed at creating a good working and living environment for the people and ensuring lasting and sustainable development of the Chinese nation").

Third, ¶ 18 specifies a number of particular policy choices for environmental sustainability, and a regulatory framework within which the appropriate ministries and legislative bodies may act under the leadership of the CCP. "The Party strives to build a resource-conserving, environmentally friendly society; and preserves China's geographical space and improves its industrial structure and mode of production and the Chinese way of life in the interest of conserving resources and protecting the environment." The objective is to strive to build--it is not to accomplish. The verb sounds in long term rather than short term goals. Striving does not require anything more than some forward movement and not accomplishment of the underlying goal. Nor does it require, once the goal is sustained, that such progress is preserved. One can expect then some measures but most looking to attainment in the future. The policy measures are quite specific: resource conservation, and societal awareness of environmental sustainability. Neither is an onerous objective. The first suggests a confirmation of long term policy to seek out and control resources outside of China. The second is bound up in both the scientific outlook on development and the CCP leadership line of building a socialist harmonious society.

Fourth, the object of the CCP environmental line is given scope and direction by the overall policy of conserving resources and protecting the environment. It is important to understand that environmental protection is not an autonomous goal. Rather, it is a dependent goal. It is tied directly to economic progress and to the CCP line on technological and industrial innovation. Environmental protection is thus tied to conservation of resources and industrial production. Environmental protection, then, is a factor in the development of productive economic resources. It is a factor in the development of productive societal resources. And by contributing to a harmonious society, it is also a factor in the development of socialist democracy. But it is not itself a development of productive forces. Nor is environmental protection, of itself, an objective requiring the leadership of the CCP. Ecological progress is a dependent progress.

**F. CCP Leadership-People's Liberation Army (¶ 19 General Program)**

We continue with ¶ 19 (People's Liberation Army).

[19] The Communist Party of China persists in its leadership over the People's Liberation Army and other armed forces of the people, builds up the strength of the People's Liberation Army, ensures that it accomplishes its historic missions at this new stage in the new century, and gives full play to its role in consolidating national defense, defending the motherland and participating in the socialist modernization drive.

[19] 中国共产党坚持对人民解放军和其他人民武装力量的领导，加强人民解放军的建设，切实保证人民解放军履行新世纪新阶段军队历史使命，充分发挥人民解放军在巩固国防、保卫祖国和参加社会主义现代化建设中的作用。

Paragraph 19 is both old and has shifted in focus as the CCP has moved from the revolutionary and civil war stage of its development, through the stage of protecting the new revolutionary government against external threat and internal opposition, to the current stage in which China is faced with remaking its military to conform to its role as a great military power. That produces both challenges and constraints that were unknown in prior historical stages. This transformation to the current historical stage of development provides on the great challenges of the operationalization of the CCP's line, a danger that unattended can substantially reshape the character of the authority and objectives of a Leninist vanguard party (see, e.g., here). "There are three worth noting in Paragraph 19.

The first is the issue of control. The objective is to adhere and persist (坚持) in the leadership of the CCP over all of the structures of military power in China. The objective is clear here that leadership requires perhaps a change of technique but not of scope of the control arrangements between CCP and the military command hierarchy. And in a sense that coordination is necessary not just as a matter of sound organizational structuring but also because, like every other productive force in China, the military is an important productive force the development of which must be in harmony with and contribute to the project of socialist modernization. This control relationship becomes all the more acute with respect to those activities of the military that have direct or indirect economic effects (和参加社会主义现代化建设中的作用).

Control is evidenced in another important respect, in the CCP's leadership in military affairs to consolidate national defense (人民解放军在巩固国防). This applies, of course, in the traditional sense of preparedness against external threats, but also to threats from non-conventional external sources (discussed in the next paragraph). More importantly for purposes of the control function of ¶ 19 follows form another consequence of the change in the character of foreign threats to the domestic order--internal threats connected to external actors. The Chinese military's role in national defense may force it to look inside as well as outside for the defense of the nation. This is particularly important perhaps in the Western autonomous territories. But it is of equal importance wherever such threats by self-organized communities may appear. The preparedness of ¶ 19 and the leadership role of the CCP in that regard, then, connects most intimately both with the obligations of the CCP with respect to socialist democracy, socialist culture, and harmonious socialist society. ¶¶ 15-19 then may well work together form the perspective of developing specific operational approaches to guide both the state apparatus and the military. The issue of control, then, goes to the scope of the internal use of the military to control internal enemies and in that respect is especially dependent on the CCP's obligations to correctly distinguish between enemies of error, a concept at the heart of ¶ 17 and socialist harmonious society.

The second is the issue of purpose. Paragraph 19 here makes clear that the role of the military has changed since the 1970s, and in some significant respect. The People's Liberation Army and all military sectors must be lead in the fulfillment (履行) of their historical mission (历史使命). The most interesting transformation of purpose involves the response to changes in this new historical stage of the character and sources of external threats. But in the 21st century, sovereign states are not necessarily the most potent external threat. This is a century of asymmetric and unconventional transnational warfare against communities only some of which are organized as states. National defense may well target these in new ways, and require the development of the military as a defensive productive force in new ways.

But that historical mission might mean to help reclaim all territories that China claims for itself, however disputed such claims may be by others. That creates a contradiction with China's foreign policy (discussed in the paragraphs that follow) which can only be resolved if the General Program's directions can be arranged hierarchically, or if they may be balanced against each other. But if the CCP's leadership obligations can only be reconciled through balancing the factors to be taken into account must also be specified--to avoid yet another contradiction with socialist democracy and democratic centralism. In that case, the higher principles of the General Program must serve as a guide (¶ 2) that directs efforts to apply the CCP basic line in peculiar cases. In this case, ¶ 19 itself provides a clue, referencing the military mission as associated with a new historical stage (新世纪新阶段). That might suggest, as evident over the last two years, with a more aggressive push toward boundary disputes, or it might also suggest leveraging the Chinese military to protect Chinese interests abroad. That would, ironically, require China to develop a policy that mimics in form the UK and US policies of the 19th and 20th centuries of gunboat diplomacy--that is of deploying Chinese military strength to protect and leverage Chinese economic interests projected abroad through the "Go Out" policy. Yet that also would pose a contradiction to the CCP's internationalist line of non-interference and respect for sovereignty. Resolution of that contradiction might require a "new century" approach to this "old century" issue. There is evidence of this "new century technique" as well--the use of the Chinese navy to protect against piracy and keep international trade routes open; the use of Chinese military for disaster relief, and the use of the military for technical assistance and training.

The third is the overall issue of ideology. We have already noted that ideological coherence demands bending control and purpose to the larger project of developing productive forces in the service of socialist modernization (社会主义现代化建设中的作用). Indeed, the CCP's leadership role requires ensuring the participation of (or joining of the Chinese military) (参加) in socialist modernization. That can take a variety of forms, two of which are worth considering in more detail. The first centers on the role of the military as an institutional participant in economic development. This may be driven by technological innovation, or the ownership and control of sensitive sectors of the economy. Managerial and technological innovation is defense driven in many political and national systems. But that later role itself presents a contradiction to the extent that such direct control may affect both its ability to be evenhanded in assisting potential competitors inside and outside China (thus adversely affecting the CCP's social harmony policy). The second centers on the role of the military as a productive force that itself requires development under the leadership of the CCP. In a sense, the military serves as the other governmental apparatus that is both the object and a subject of the people's democratic dictatorship. Together with the CCP itself and the state organs, the military represents a string institutional force that must itself be developed to contribute to economic, `political, societal and cultural development. This may be the key insight to ¶ 19, without which, the nature of the CCP's leadership of this complex organism, would be difficult to frame. That development of the military as a productive force in its own right, then, requires CCP leadership to move the military to effective use in the new stage of historical development and to ensure that it remains within rather than apart from the political and cultural development of the state--through the CCP itself.

**V. Outside Relations (¶¶20-22)**

**A. Socialist Ethnic Relations (¶ 20 General Program)**

With Paragraph 20 the General Program moves into new, though related, territory--socialist ethnic relations. These, in turn, are part of a larger project that frames party building, the organization framework and working style of the CCP itself taken up in ¶¶ 23-27. Between Paragraphs 20 and ¶23, ¶ 21 focuses on political and territorial unification--the United Front and national unification, and ¶ 22 focuses on foreign relations and communist internationalism. The General Program ends with ¶ 28's treatment of the meaning and practice of leadership.

Paragraph 20 lays out the basic CCP line relating to inter-ethnic relations:

[20]The Communist Party of China upholds and promotes socialist ethnic relations based on equality, solidarity, mutual assistance and harmony, actively trains and promotes cadres from among ethnic minorities, helps ethnic minorities and ethnic autonomous areas with their economic, cultural and social development, and ensures that all ethnic groups work together for common prosperity and development. The Party strives to fully implement its basic principle for its work related to religious affairs, and rallies religious believers in making contributions to economic and social development.

[20] 中国共产党维护和发展平等团结互助和谐的社会主义民族关系，积极培养、选拔少数民族干部，帮助少数民族和民族地区发展经济、文化和社会事业，实现各民族共同团结奋斗、共同繁荣发展。全面贯彻党的宗教工作基本方针，团结信教群众为经济社会发展作贡献。

Socialist ethnic relations can be understood as a refinement of an implication at the heart of the CCP's leadership responsibilities to build socialist democracy, economic development, culture and harmonious society. Socialist ethnic relations can be understood as a cluster of related goals touching on the societal, cultural, political and economic relations among ethnic groups in China -- equality, solidarity, and mutual assistance and harmony. Each of these policy goals can be understood and applied quite specifically in terms of economic development (more efficient development of productive forces), democracy (defining socialist political civilization), culture (developing a national socialist culture), and harmonious society (resolving the contradictions of class/ethnic divisions).

There are three intertwined strands that make up the CCP's leadership line relating to ethnic minorities. The CCP "uphold" and "promotes"

The first is the CCP's own internal approach to the issues of ethnic relations inside the CCP apparatus. That is tied to the primary objective of achieving internal democracy and good order within the structures of the CCP. And indeed that is essential for the CCP in its vanguard role. The CCP must lead by example. It reflects both the current stage of development of China and its movement toward its aspirational goals. A CCP that is itself mired in inter-ethnic conflict, or that privileges certain ethnic groups over other--in form or effect--will not be acting in accordance with its fundamental obligations as a vanguard (¶ 1). The CCP's principal technique is recruitment and training that focuses on integration of ethnic groups within its ranks ("actively trains and promotes cadres from among ethnic minorities"). The object of internal recruiting and training, ensuring "that all ethnic groups work together for common prosperity and development" applied with equal strength to inner CCP organization. That objective refines the working style of the CCP in its inward manifestation. It also serves as a structure which the CCP can also push outward in its leadership roles advancing socialist economic development, democracy, culture, ecological progress and harmonious society. This internal obligation is especially important in the context of the leadership of the military forces of the nation--like the CCP, the military must reflect both the multicultural but unified character of the basic societal institutions of governance. To do otherwise is to invite contradiction at a fundamental level of theory and the operative principles that vest the vanguard party with legitimacy.

The second is the CCP's approach to ethnic relations outside of its institutional structures. The CCP's external leadership on matters of ethnic relations must mirror its internal approaches. That obligation serves the same ends: "that all ethnic groups work together for common prosperity and development." However the means are slightly different: "helps ethnic minorities and ethnic autonomous areas with their economic, cultural and social development." The CCP's ethnic relations line then, has substantial ramifications for state policy. It suggests the principled basis for the "Go West" and Manchuria development projects, as well as others targeting economic development in more backwards areas. It also suggests an ethnic minorities based program of equalizing the availability of economic development. But it also suggests the assimilation nature of that project--ethnic groups may retain their culture, but only within the principles of socialist economic development, democracy, culture, harmonious social ordering, and ecological progress. This suggests the outer constraints within which ethnic relations are understood and applied as policy. There are some important consequences. The first is that ethnic relations to require a substantial amount of deviation from the application of the CCP line, manifested as policy, will not be tolerated. The second is that ethnic relations are driven by socialist modernization and bent to the immediate tasks of common prosperity and development. That suggests that disparities among ethnic groups may be tolerated as long as all groups in the aggregate are moving toward prosperity and development. The timeline for advancement may differ significantly among ethnic groups. Third, a significant focus are the autonomous areas. The policy does not speak to the preservation of ethnic autonomy in any respect, but instead its opposite, that notwithstanding ethnic differences, all groups must work toward the commonalities of socialist economic development, democracy, culture, harmonious society, ecological development, etc. The autonomous areas may not preserve their character, way of life or status quo; instead ethnic communities may continue to exist and practice their ways of life to the extent consonant with these greater principles.

The third is the relationship between CCP, the state organs, religion and religious minorities. Religion is singled out for special treatment in¶ 20. That in part touches on religion as a principal distinguishing mark among certain ethnic groups. It also suggests the special, and sometimes contentious, relationship between religion and the CCP's vanguard role. The CCP is instructed to fully implement (全面贯彻) its basic line with respect to religion. The masses of believers (信教群众) must participate in socialist modernization under the leadership of the CCP. That requires in the first instance a need to contribute (作贡献) to economic and social development (为经济社会发展). This produces quite specific contours to the relationship between CCP, state, and religious communities. The first is that religious communities necessarily subordinate religious practice to the greater objectives of socialist modernization--in the same way that ethnic minorities are expected to the same with respect to customs and social practices. The second is that belief systems and practice systems may be separated and treated differently. The third is that the oppositional nature of resistance on religious grounds will be characterized as political objection--either as error to be corrected or as evidence of the enemy character of the practice or the religion behind it (consonant with ¶ 17). All of this suggests the possibility of accommodation, but within fairly strictly demarcated boundaries for religious expression. The approach is substantially distinct from that in the West or in theocratic states. There is no "opt out" on the basis of religions for the work of socialist modernization and the building of a socialist civilization. Religion may accommodate itself to these tasks, and the CCP will tolerate distinct expressions, but opposition, in the last analysis is understood in political terms, rather than in terms of conscience.

**B. Political and Territorial Unity (¶ 21 General Program)**

Paragraph 21 lays out the basic CCP line relating to reunification and class issues. In this sense it is related to the fundamental project of unifying the nation, the task to which ¶ 20 is centered.

[21] The Communist Party of China rallies all workers, farmers and intellectuals, and all the democratic parties, personages without party affiliation and the patriotic forces of all ethnic groups in China in further expanding and fortifying the broadest possible patriotic united front embracing all socialist workers, all builders of the cause of socialism and all patriots who support socialism or who support the reunification of the motherland. The Party will constantly strengthen the unity of all the Chinese people, including the compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions and in Taiwan as well as overseas Chinese. It will promote long-term prosperity and stability in Hong Kong and Macao and complete the great cause of reunifying the motherland in conformity with the principle of "one country, two systems."

[21] 中国共产党同全国各民族工人、农民、知识分子团结在一起，同各民主党派、无党派人士、各民族的爱国力量团结在一起，进一步发展和壮 大由全体社会主义劳动者、社会主义事业的建设者、拥护社会主义的爱国者、拥护祖国统一的爱国者组成的最广泛的爱国统一战线。不断加强全国人民包括香港特别 行政区同胞、澳门特别行政区同胞、台湾同胞和海外侨胞的团结。按照“一个国家、两种制度”的方针，促进香港、澳门长期繁荣稳定，完成祖国统一大业。

Paragraph 21 focuses on two core political elements of the CCP's vanguard role. Both are expressions of a basic principle of unity, one that is central to Leninism. The first touches on political unity in the service of the nation and its progress, the united front--the alliances necessary to build a united society moving toward the goal of a communist system. The second touches on territorial unity, and is an expression of the long term project of territorial unification grounded in part in Chinese notions of irredenta and of the territorial march of imperial history.

Political unity builds on the revolutionary role of the CCP as the vanguard force at the center of an effort to bring together progressive forces of society--workers, farmers (peasants), intellectuals, members of the old democratic parties (from the revolutionary period), unaffiliated persons, and the vanguard forces of ethnic nationalities--in the fight against the Japanese, other foreign elements, and then for control of the state itself. After 1949 the work of political unification continued but now transformed in line with the new stages of historical development in China. In its current version, ¶ 21 transforms the old united front and progressive classes alliances, and the work of the CCP, toward the work of building socialism in China. Unity, in this sense, can be understood as a means of developing the productive forces of shared goals in the service of socialist modernization. It also points to the constraints on political unity. The principle of political unity is a consequential principle; it arises from and is constrained by the vanguard party's overarching objective of driving socialism forward. As and to the extent that the development of a politics of unity work to aid the development of socialism, then it is to be encouraged. But only if that is the case. Yet this also suggests a deeper insight--socialism is also a means to a greater ends. It is through the path of socialism that the possibility of building a communist society is possible. Socialism is itself, then a productive force to be developed. The principle of political unity serves those ends.

Territorial unity builds on the a nation building project, as well as on a project of purging colonialism and the accretions of foreign influence acquired within those unequal relationships. It requires a unification of those territories claimed by successive governments of China as irreversibly Chinese. It is an ethno-historical theory of political unification that saw its apogee in the 20th century but endures in the twin notions of unity of ethnic groups into a single nation (¶ 20), the unity of likeminded people under the political banner of progressive attainment of socialism, and the unification of the territory that these unities claim as their own. In a sense, these three unities (三个统一) describe the outward manifestation of the CCP's vanguard role within China but across internal divides. Like political unity, territorial unity is essential for the full development of socialism in China. But at the same time, unity no longer means uniformity. The historical politics of the united front, the principle of political unity cemented by a common set of objectives, permits a certain level of difference, and opens the possibility of autonomy--political, economic, cultural, and societal--even within a China territoriality unified. "One country, two systems" creates the possibility of a territorial "united front" by analogy. It suggests the necessary connection between political and territorial unity, and the similarity of their characteristics--sharing common goals but not necessarily sharing the same path toward those goals. In return for "long term prosperity and stability", the principles of political and territorial unity permit distinct paths toward the same goal--socialism directed toward the building of a communist state. Whether the CCP can continue to exercise the self-discipline necessary to permit the development of distinct paths and to guide them towards the same goals remains to be seen. The ability to promote distinctiveness within a unifying enterprise has proven most difficult, and yet it is central to the CCP's policy vision for this stage of historical development.

**C. Foreign Relations and Communist internationalism (¶ 22 General Program)**

Paragraph 22 speaks to China's outward relations and the ideological framework within which these outward relations are to be maintained, and the ends to which they are sought.

22The Communist Party of China adheres to an independent foreign policy of peace, follows the path of peaceful development and a win-win strategy of opening up, takes both the domestic and international situations into consideration, and vigorously develops relations with other countries in order to bring about a favorable international environment for China's reform, opening up and modernization. In international affairs, it safeguards China's independence and sovereignty, opposes hegemonism and power politics, defends world peace, promotes human progress, and pushes for the building of a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. It develops relations between China and other countries on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. It strives for the constant development of good-neighborly relations between China and the surrounding countries and for the strengthening of the unity and cooperation between China and other developing countries. The Communist Party of China develops relations with communist parties and other political parties in other countries in accordance with the principles of independence, complete equality, mutual respect and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

22 中国共产党坚持独立自主的和平外交政策，坚持和平发展道路，坚持互利共赢的开放战略，统筹国内国际两个大局，积极发展对外关系，努 力为我国的改革开放和现代化建设争取有利的国际环境。在国际事务中，维护我国的独立和主权，反对霸权主义和强权政治，维护世界和平，促进人类进步，努力推 动建设持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐世界。在互相尊重主权和领土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利、和平共处五项原则的基础上，发展我国同世界各国的关 系。不断发展我国同周边国家的睦邻友好关系，加强同发展中国家的团结与合作。按照独立自主、完全平等、互相尊重、互不干涉内部事务的原则，发展我党同各国 共产党和其他政党的关系。

The foundational principle of inter-state relations marked by ¶ 22 is national self-interest. This self-interest is, of course, unremarkable in the context of state practice over the last several centuries. Paragraph 22, however, seeks to frame the internal principles that ought to drive choices among foreign policy choices. It provides an overall framework and direction that can serve to help understand some of the foreign policy decisions taken, and at the same time assess the extent to which foreign policy adheres to the principles within which it is to be developed and applied.

First, the application of the principle of peaceful relations should be understood in context. It is centered on and filtered through the overall project of socialist modernization. Peaceful relations, then, can be understood as an aspect of the “unities” principles that marks ¶¶ 20-22. In this case unity or coordination in outward relations must be understood in its role as a means of invoking its international aspect of opening up (“vigorously develops relations with other countries in order to bring about a favorable international environment for China's reform”).Thus coordination references both external coordination of policy, and the coordination or unity of external and internal policy. This refines a core part of the CCP Basic Line (¶ 10). Thus beyond the usual instrumentalism of foreign policy, it suggests that the principle of peaceful relations is valuable and to be pursued only as and to the extent that it furthers internal obligations related to reform and opening up, and those in turn serve the greater project of socialist modernization. But the principle also suggests its converse: the principle of peaceful relations can be pursued only as long as it converges with the CCP’s basic line with respect to reform and opening up (and the larger project of socialist modernization). Where they do not converge, or where there is a contradiction between the two, peaceful relations will give way to the more important internal obligations of the CCP line.

Second, the principle of peaceful relations is mediated by the requirements of the other unities of ¶¶ 20-22. This is particularly true with respect to political and territorial unity. Thus for example, peaceful relations may be subordinated to the need to protect claims in the South China Sea and require China to adopt a more aggressive policy that may not further peaceful relations but furthers the obligations of territorial unification and protection of sovereign claims (“safeguards China's independence and sovereignty”). Thus the principle of peaceful relations is subsumed within both the overall project of socialist modernization and the specific requirements of the policies of the unities (ethnic relations, political unity and territorial unity). It is perhaps in this sense that one can understand the framework within which the foreign relations of China are “independent.”

Third, the five principles of international relations (“mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence”), now an ancient formula for structuring outbound relations within the public sphere does little to suggest the ways in which contradictions or conflicts among these principles can be resolved. The Indian territorial problem provides a case in point. Respect for territorial integrity is challenged by conflicting claims each of which are strongly held by China and India. Non-aggression and peaceful co-existence suggests that such conflicts be peacefully resolved in equality and mutual benefit. Yet the history of that dispute suggests that these principles, from China-s perspective, must be applied in a way that favors internal Chinese policies and principles. Given that hierarchy of interest, all the principles permit is a long stalemate with no resolution—at best, and conflict at worst. It also opens, and necessarily, interference in internal affairs as part of any negotiation process and it does not forbid decisions that may appear quite provocative to international rivals. Again, then, these principles are mediated by context and applied within and following the overarching objectives of Chinese ideological structures and its formulation as policy that may change with the changes in the historical stages in which China finds itself.

Fourth, ∆ 22 deals only with external relations with other sovereign states. It has little to offer for relationships with governance entities that are not states. With respect to these—civil society, economic enterprises, international public and private organizations—the foreign policy structures of paragraph 22 cannot apply. Instead, CCP ideology requires that they be folded into the organizational and power hierarchies developed within the General Program itself and its ideological core. It is this reflex that translate foreign organization within the vocabulary of Chinese political-ideological structures (the internal construction of understanding) that is central to placing these organizations within Chinese political culture. In other words, it naturalizes these organizations within the Chinese context for absorption or response within China. But at the same time it produces the same sort of ideological blinders that make it impossible for China to correctly understand and respond to these organizations as they have come to be developed within their own political-culture. That latter point has caused problems especially where the internal reconstruction of the meaning and place of these organizations is contradicted by both the self-understanding of these entities and the meaning given to them outside of China. And that has impeded the ability of China to effectively deploy the standards and principles of paragraph 22 outside of the state-public sector. An useful example touches on the character of multinational corporations//these may be understood in China either as the creatures of the states in which the head offices of these enterprises are located \*and thus treated as a department of the home state for formulating policy, or they may be treated as wholly private grouping with no self-constituting structures or effects. Both, of course, fail to capture the way in which multinational corporations now are constituted and operate within the logic of globalization outside of China. Even more dangerous is the failure to capture the transformation of civil society, especially powerful global civil society actors that under the General Program must either be treated as a subset of states or as a private movement that then underestimates or over estimates the effect of these organizations, and misunderstands their role in governance outside of China.

Fifth, this blindness to the role of non-state actors in international affairs in their own right is particularly ironic in the face of the careful policy developed from out of old communist internationalism relating to the relationships between the CCP and other communist parties abroad (“Communist Party of China develops relations with communist parties and other political parties in other countries in accordance with the principles of independence, complete equality, mutual respect and noninterference in each other's internal affairs”). Effectively, Paragraph 22 recognizes the extra-national and autonomous character of foreign communist party organizations, and develops a policy for relations that mirror those China reserves to state to state relations. One can see here a quite useful template that could be extended to other international actors, or other foreign non-state actors. Certainly the conceptual door is opened in Paragraph 22, and opened even wider by the inclusion of other “political” parties in the principle of communist international relations. This is a provision still trapped in some respects within the strictures of European and especially Soviet Marxism//one which viewed with suspicion other non-state organizations as threats to the vanguard role of the communist party. But such a simple and early 20th century view no longer accords with the facts of global organization from which Chinese foreign policy theory must be based, especially if it is remain true to the fundamental principles of Paragraphs 2 and 5.

Sixth, conversely, the principle of communist party internationalism creates a fundamental contradiction with the basis of foreign relations grounded in non-interference. The coordination of relations with foreign communist parties, which may be in conflict with or the objects of suppression in foreign states, and the objective of positive peaceful relations must be reconciled. And that reconciliation is likely to be made by weighing the way in which a decision will impact both internal Chinese objectives and the legitimacy of its vanguard role. In that balancing, and at times, that may reduce the importance either of the principle of peaceful coexistence or that of non-interference.

**VI. Party Building (¶¶23-28)**

**A. Framework for Party Building (¶ 23 General Program)**

With Paragraph 23 the General Program turn inward to the methods and objectives, to the techniques and principles, of party building. These are the provisions that elaborate the conditions for CCP self-constitution, institutionalization, operation and perpetuation. Together they apply the principles of socialist modernization, especially in its principles of developing productive forces to the productive capacities of the CCP itself. These paragraphs suggest something deeper as well; they suggest that the CCP itself must be at the center of the movement to and embody the practices necessary for socialist modernization as an economic, political, cultural, and societal project. If the CCP cannot lead by example then it fails in its core responsibility as a vanguard party under Paragraph 1 of the General Program.

Paragraph 23 provides the framework within which the CCP's party building work is undertaken.

[23] In order to lead the people of all ethnic groups in China in attaining the great goal of socialist modernization, the Communist Party of China must adhere to its basic line, strengthen its governance capability, advanced nature and purity and comprehensively carry forward the great new undertaking to build itself in a spirit of reform and innovation. The Party must make all-around efforts to strengthen itself ideologically and organizationally and improve its conduct; and it must become better able to combat corruption and uphold Party integrity and improve Party rules and regulations, thus making Party building more scientific in all respects. It must steadfastly build itself for public interests, exercise governance for the people, practice self-discipline, be strict with its members, and carry forward its fine traditions and style of work. It must constantly improve its art of leadership and governance, raise its ability to resist corruption, prevent degeneration and withstand risks, constantly strengthen its class foundation, expand its mass base and enhance its creativity, cohesion and combat effectiveness, and build itself into a learning, service-oriented and innovative Marxist governing party, so that it will stand forever in the forefront of the times and make itself a strong nucleus that can lead all the Chinese people in the unceasing march along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In building itself, the Party must be determined to meet the following four essential requirements:

[23] 中国共产党要领导全国各族人民实现社会主义现代化的宏伟目标，必须紧密围绕党的基本路线，加强党的执政能力建设和先进性建设，以改 革创新精神全面推进党的建设新的伟大工程。坚持立党为公、执政为民，坚持党要管党、从严治党，发扬党的优良传统和作风，不断提高党的领导水平和执政水平， 提高拒腐防变和抵御风险的能力，不断增强党的阶级基础和扩大党的群众基础，不断提高党的创造力、凝聚力、战斗力，使我们党始终走在时代前列，成为领导全国 人民沿着中国特色社会主义道路不断前进的坚强核心。党的建设必须坚决实现以下四项基本要求：

Paragraph23 serves as both the culmination of the General Program and its most intimately self-referential. It is meant to bring the CCP's work home--home in the sense that it turns the CCP's foundations, basic line, principles and policies in on itself as a productive force also in need of constant development, of constant criticism and self-criticism. It is here that one sees the framework for internal CCP democracy and a model of socialist democracy practiced by the vanguard party as a model for the future for China--at the appropriate historical stage. But it also suggests, as did the CCP's line on Socialist Democracy, that democratization within a vanguard party will follow a path substantially different from that of the West. And the reason for that, of course, is grounded in the foundational ¶¶1-2. Unlike Western democracies, China has embraced a party-state model because it is a society self-constituted for a very specific purpose to which all of its resources, must be devoted--the establishment of a communist society. The moment that is no longer the core objective of the CCP, it will no longer have valid claim to leadership or to assert a vanguard role in the Chinese constitutional order.

Paragraph 23 is integrated with ¶¶ 24-28, which comprise a single sub-unit of the General Program. Together, these frame the way the CCP's General Program must be applied to the CCP itself. That is fundamentally necessary to establish the legitimacy of the CCP as a vanguard party and to constrain and manage the operation of the CCP in its leadership role to those actions that enhance its legitimacy. Those legitimacy enhancing actions must be tied to the "great goal of socialist modernization." Paragraph 23 provides the overall direction and focus; the others develop these in detail. More importantly, it is directed toward the vanguard work of the CCP not just for the leading elements of Chinese society--in the class struggle language of the revolutionary period, workers, peasants and intellectuals--but to the people and nation as a whole ("In order to lead the people of all ethnic groups in China"). This both creates symmetry with ¶ 1 and also emphasizes the progress from the centering of the CCP's work on class struggle in the revolutionary period, to the centering on socialist modernization for the entire nation in the current stage of Chinese development--development, it cannot be overemphasized, and that must have as its object the establishment of a communist society.

To that end, ¶ 23 develops the cage of principles and policy that both constrain the CCP itself and that serve as the strong foundation of its legitimacy. One is impossible without the other. In the absence of constraints--the cage--the CCP devolves into little more than a mass of individuals seeking to perpetuate themselves in power and to amass wealth for their personal benefit, and socialist modernization is transformed into a veil behind which feudal exploitation re-emerges in new form. In the absence of principled constraints--the cage--then, the CCP is left without purpose to the nation (only to itself) and the nation is left with no basis for embracing the larger project entrusted to the CCP. The cage of principles is thus both the mandate of heaven and the sure knowledge that the mandate will be revoked if its servants fail in their obligations to the people.

Paragraph, 23, then, starts with the embedding of the foundational principles of the General Program as the basis for the CCP's own internal constitution.

First, it lists the core policies that together make up in the aggregate the policies through which it may gauge and direct its leadership: adherence to the CCP basic line, strengthening governance capabilities. The first is, of course, obvious. The second is more important, especially for its deeper embedding of core Leninist principles within the organizational constitution of the CCP apparatus. This appears to take Lenin's notion of the professional revolutionary to the next stage--the stage of the post-revolutionary vanguard party. It requires a move from the notion of professional revolutionaries, to the notion of a professional apparatus of vanguard leadership. It points the transformation of the solitary individual loosely tied to soviets in revolutionary struggle--an organism of professionalized individuals-- to a collective. The institutionalization of that collective notion, already inherent in the building of theory (for example those of Mao Zedong Thought) become an essential ingredient of legitimacy. To govern means to govern collectively; to enhance governance capabilities requires the collectivization of leadership in the service of the vanguard obligations that define CCP leadership. Governance capability and vanguard role go hand in hand ("加强党的执政能力建设和先进性建设").

Second, the core policies of CCP leadership and self-constitution requires an avoidance of bureaucratism and rigidity. It suggests the need for internal institutional constitution that focuses on innovation and that internalizes reform and opening up in its own operation ("advanced nature and purity and comprehensively carry forward the great new undertaking to build itself in a spirit of reform and innovation"). This suggests that the foundation of Leninist organization building avoids stasis; Leninism requires constant forward motion--not directionless forward motion but motion pointed toward the attainment of the fundamental goal for which the party was formed, the establishment of a communist society ("So that our party has always been ahead of the times" 使我们党始终走在时代前列). Leninism, then, requires both collectivization of leadership and a dynamic approach to self-constitution of the collective organization. The organization is not constituted for its advancement, but to lead the development of productive forces that are to be put to the task of constructing a communist society. Anything else is neither Leninism, nor legitimate.

Third, the object of these efforts is party building ("全面推进党的建设新的伟大工程"). Party building is essential to the development of the productive capacities of the CCP itself. The CCP must build itself for two distinct reasons. The first, of course, is to enhance its ability to successfully meet its leadership responsibilities. That requires the sort of institutional self-constitution that includes a substantive and procedural component--the CCP must move from a collection of people to a collective institution. But perhaps more important, party building is an essential part of socialist modernization in the sense that the CCP itself serves as a transitional institution--its object is ultimately to make itself obsolete. That cab be possible only if the CCP can continue to build itself, as it builds Chinese society, until the point where the CCP itself merges into the people it leads, The object of party building then must be the building of the people, the state and the nation to the point where everyone is a member of the communist party. At that point party and policy merges likely at the cusp of the realization of a communist society.

Fourth, the parameters of self-constituting a Leninist collective vanguard party impose a number of obligations and pose a number of challenges that must be recognized and confronted. These are identified as well in ¶ 23. These parameters are identified as to "strengthen itself ideologically and organizationally and improve its conduct; and it must become better able to combat corruption and uphold Party integrity and improve Party rules and regulations, thus making Party building more scientific in all respects." We come to corruption below, As for the rest, strengthening the CCP ideologically is fundamental to autonomous self-constitution., The CCP fails to exist autonomously as a vanguard force in its own right in the absence of a self-referencing framing ideology. And the framing ideology is of little use prettily framed in a document that has limited application to the operational culture of the CCP. That ideology is tied to conduct reinforces the notion of the constituting nature of the CCP General Program and the ideology it reveals. The constituting nature of ideology is then tied to its techniques--rules and regulations, and enhancement of CCP integrity. The cage of principles is operated through a cage of rules. And this double cage then serves as the foundation of legitimacy, and thus if enhancing the integrity of the CCP as an autonomous body and a legitimate leading force.

Fifth, the problem of corruption (提高拒腐防变和抵御风险的能力) is most potent in a Leninist organization whose operating basis is collective action, it poses the greatest risk to the legitimacy of the CCP and its ability to serve the nation in its vanguard role. In a sense, the issue of corruption is probably the one area where the CCP requires greater attention to the application of its ideological line relating to harmonious society (¶ 17). The CCP line requiring the CCP to confront contradiction in ¶ 17--the CCP "strictly distinguishes between the two different types of contradictions - those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people - and works to handle them correctly distinguish between enemy and error"--requires application as well to CCP cadres, and with greater ferocity. Corruption is not merely error that can be corrected through instruction; it is a betrayal of the CCP line and the collective obligations of cadres to advance the institutional mission of the CCP. Corruption is the means by which the CCP ceases top act as a collective enterprise; it is a means through which socialist modernization is transformed into a means for personal or oligarchic enrichment; it is the means through which a revocation of the mantle of vanguard role of the CCP can occur. That is the greatest contradiction and the greatest risk to the CCP's leadership role; it is the greatest threat to socialist modernization and progress toward the goal of establishing a communist society.

Sixth, the obligation to "constantly enhance the Party's class foundation and expand its mass base ("不断增强党的阶级基础和扩大党的群众基础") appears at first bluish to revert back to the old class struggle line of the CCP, one that itself has been transformed by the CCP's basic line. For that reason it might be better to read that obligation to enhance the CCP's class foundations and mass base with the "and build itself into a learning, service-oriented and innovative Marxist governing party, so that it will stand forever in the forefront of the times and make itself a strong nucleus that can lead all the Chinese people in the unceasing march along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics." Taken together, it appears that the CCP continues to adhere to the traditional Leninist perspective of drawing on non-capitalist classes as the core of its leadership. On the other hand, the post-revolutionary obligation of the CCP, and the fundamental obligation of the CCP to develop productive forces, would require that it begin from its core and expand outward to draw in all of the Chinese nation in the project of socialist modernization. That, of course, is the center of the logic of Sange Daibiao. And Sange Daibiao cannot be read out of this section of ¶ 23, without breaching the core obligation to follow the CCP basic line. Thus, to enhance the CCP's class foundation may be understood as referencing sensibilities of class, the ideological foundation that class represents, rather than a specific per-revolutionary class structure itself. To do otherwise is to move not toward socialist modernization but back toward the internal class divisions, the contradictions of which defined revolutionary struggle.

What is party building then? It appears to be the self-constitution of a collective whose understanding of itself is grounded in an autonomous ideology from which it can build towards its function--to develop the productive forces of the nation toward the establishment of a communist society. The goal of party building, then, is not to build the party, but to lead the people of China toward a communist society. The CCP become corrupt, as an institution, when it seeks to build itself rather than to build for the nation. The individual cadre becomes corrupt, when she seeks to build herself rather than the party. The state apparatus becomes corrupt when it is built to enhance its authority rather than develop its productive capacity for the ends of socialist modernization. And the individual becomes corrupt, when she seeks to substitute purely personal success at the expense of the collective obligation of the nation.

**B. Party Building Framework: The CCP Line (¶ 24 General Program)**

These are the provisions that elaborate the conditions for CCP self-constitution, institutionalization, operation and perpetuation. Together they apply the principles of socialist modernization, especially in its principles of developing productive forces to the productive capacities of the CCP itself. These paragraphs suggest something deeper as well; they suggest that the CCP itself must be at the center of the movement to and embody the practices necessary for socialist modernization as an economic, political, cultural, and societal project. If the CCP cannot lead by example then it fails in its core responsibility as a vanguard party under Paragraph 1 of the General Program. To lead the people the CCP must build itself.

With Paragraph 24 the General Program turns to the first requirement for the CCP to build itself--the ideological framework that shapes and constrains the undertaking of CCP party building.

[24] First, adhering to the Party's basic line. The whole Party must achieve unity in thinking and action with Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development, and the Party's basic line, and persevere in doing so for a long time to come. The Party must integrate the reform and opening up policy with the Four Cardinal Principles, carry out its basic line in all fields of endeavor, implement in an all-around way its basic program for the primary stage of socialism and combat all "Left" and Right erroneous tendencies, maintaining vigilance against Right tendencies, primarily against "Left" tendencies. The Party must intensify the building of leading bodies at all levels, selecting and promoting cadres who have scored outstanding achievements in their public service and have won the trust of the masses in reform, opening up and the modernization drive, and train and cultivate millions upon millions of successors to the cause of socialism, thus ensuring organizationally the implementation of the Party's basic theory, line, program and experience.

[24] 第一，坚持党的基本路线。全党要用邓小平理论、“三个代表”重要思想和党的基本路线统一思想，统一行动，深入贯彻落实科学发展观， 并且毫不动摇地长期坚持下去。必须把改革开放同四项基本原则统一起来，全面落实党的基本路线，全面执行党在社会主义初级阶段的基本纲领，反对一切“左”的 和右的错误倾向，要警惕右，但主要是防止“左”。加强各级领导班子建设，选拔使用在改革开放和社会主义现代化建设中政绩突出、群众信任的干部，培养和造就 千百万社会主义事业接班人，从组织上保证党的基本理论、基本路线、基本纲领、基本经验的贯彻落实。

If Paragraph 23 declares that the goal of party building is not to build the party, but to develop the productive force of the CCP to lead the people of China toward a communist society, then ¶¶ 24-27 describes how that is to be done. These directions take the form of four essential requirements.

The first requirement is set out in Paragraph 24, which directs the CCP to follow its own line ("坚持党的基本路线"). Though this seems obvious in the context of the General Program, the object of ¶ 24 may point in a different direction. First, ¶ 10 of the General Program, which describes the scope of the CCP basic line, is pointed outward, to the obligation of the CCP in China. ¶ 24 then, points ¶ 10 inward to the CCP as a productive force. Second, this inward trajectory of the CCP basic line also reinforces the fundamental collectivist principle of Leninist organization. To turn the CCP line inward, then, suggests that the collective efforts of the CCP itself is to serve as the model of the collectivity at the center of socialist modernization. To "lead the people of all ethnic groups in a concerted, self-reliant and pioneering effort to turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern socialist country by making economic development the central task while upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and the reform and opening up policy" (¶ 10), the CCP will first have to lead itself in the same concerted a self-reliant and pioneering effort. The CCP cannot lead without following. And what the CCP must follow is its own--it must ensure that it operates as a vanguard both within and beyond its own structures and organization.

First, to follow its own line, the CCP must seek to achieve within its organization what it must produce in the nation--unity of thought and action, that is, unity of organizing principle and national purpose (the "whole Party must achieve unity in thinking and action"). There are several strands here that merit unpacking. The first is the wholeness of CCP action--the CCP cannot operate through faction. The internal organization of a Leninist party is not to serve as the interiorization of the methods and techniques of Western political parties. Leninist vanguardism posits singularity of purpose and direction. It does not permit the sort of contests between factions. That, in turn, is grounded in the notion that political party factionalism may be grounded more in a politics of personality than of purpose (considered here). Thus whole party unity is founded on a commonality of purpose, of ideology and of practice. But unity does not imply uniformity. The former is tied to notions of collectivity. The latter is tied to rigid ossification in which no room for innovation is available. The avoidance of rigidity and ossification--of an approach to the substance of the vanguard role centered on preservation of a particular ideological basis (and its implementary line) is made clear by the obligation to apply to the organization and operation of the CCP itself the dynamic obligations of emancipating the mind and finding truth from facts that are inherent in the foundational principles of the CCP, its guidelines at ¶ 2. Thus, in building itself, the CCP must organize itself to avoid the error of factionalism and the error of ossification.

Second, the innovation implied by the obligation to unity in thinking and action is refined by the obligation to embed reform and opening up with the core political line of the CCP, its four Cardinal Principles ("The Party must integrate the reform and opening up policy with the Four Cardinal Principles, carry out its basic line in all fields of endeavor, implement in an all-around way its basic program for the primary stage of socialism"). Thus, in building itself, the CCP must embed both reform and opening up and the Four Cardinal Principles in the building. This is to be done by organizing its leadership to "carry out its basic line in all fields of endeavor, implement in an all-around way its basic program for the primary stage of socialism."

Third, the obligation to discover and combat contradiction and error, an obligation at the center of the leadership role of the CCP in developing socialist harmonious society (¶ 17) has an interior element as well ("combat all "Left" and Right erroneous tendencies, maintaining vigilance against Right tendencies, primarily against "Left" tendencies"). To build the CCP, the CCP must organize itself to produce unity in ideology and action. We have seen how unity in action is furthered; but unity ideologically requires the sort of criticism and self-criticism that produces unity in its program for achieving socialist modernization. That, in turn, requires a constant unifying conversation about the appropriate path for progress given the historical context on the Chinese path toward developing productive forces. It follows that such constant conversations will necessarily produce error in the search for truth, and especially ideological truth, from the facts of China's reality. Left tendencies pull China backwards toward policies of cult of personality, of developing CCP power at the expense of national power, and of bureaucratism unconstrained by the cage of principle and regulation. Right tendencies produce movement toward an abandonment of the core objective of the Chinese vanguard, to establish a communist society, and to replace that obligation with the purposelessness of Western state organization. In either case, the CCP would cease to work for the people and would instead work for its own enhancement or those of certain members. But the search for error may itself reduce error. To build itself, the CCP must avoid the error of using the threat of error to suppress the emancipation of the mind. All emancipation will produce error--but such error can be identified and corrected without consequence to cadres willing to do their duty. To punish rather than correct error of this sort is to commit left error. Conversely, to fail to suppress error that moves from tendency to rejection of the CCP line is to commit right error. Only by constant criticism and self-criticism can the CCP build itself by exercising self-control and good judgment in the balancing of emancipation of the mind and avoidance of error.

Fourth, the internal governance of the CCP provides a space through which the CCP must practice its own basic line ("The Party must intensify the building of leading bodies at all levels, selecting and promoting cadres who have scored outstanding achievements in their public service and have won the trust of the masses"). The CCP cannot lead the people, state and nation on the road toward socialist modernization if it is unable to organize itself for that purpose. The CCP cannot serve in a vanguard role it doesn't practice the everyday organization of vanguard action. The CCP cannot lead in the development of productive forces it is unable to develop its own productive force. To build the CCP, its institutionalization must practice its own line. The CCP must practice reform and opening up to ensure that its operation provides a model for the rest of the social order to follow.

**C. Party Building Framework: The Ideological Line (¶ 25 General Program)**

With Paragraph 25, then, the articulation of the techniques and objectives of party building turn to the all-important issues of working style. To build the CCP it is necessary to ensure that all cadres emancipate the mind.

[25] Second, persevering in emancipating the mind, seeking truth from facts, keeping up with the times, and being realistic and pragmatic. The Party's ideological line is to proceed from reality in handling all matters, to integrate theory with practice, to seek truth from facts, and to verify and develop the truth through practice. All Party members must adhere to this ideological line, explore new ways, boldly experiment with new methods, go in for innovation, work creatively, constantly study new situations, review new experience and solve new problems, enrich and develop Marxism in practice, and advance the endeavor to adapt Marxism to Chinese conditions.

[25] 第二，坚持解放思想，实事求是，与时俱进。党的思想路线是一切从实际出发，理论联系实际，实事求是，在实践中检验真理和发展真理。 全党必须坚持这条思想路线，弘扬求真务实精神，积极探索，大胆试验，开拓创新，创造性地开展工作，不断研究新情况，总结新经验，解决新问题，在实践中丰富 和发展马克思主义，推进马克思主义中国化。

Paragraph 25 describes the working style necessary to successfully engage in the development and implementation of the ideological project of ¶ 24 in the service of the greater objectives of self-constitution in ¶ 23. The critical insight is that for the CCP to build itself, all cadres must build themselves as well. The aggregation of cadres that constitute the singularity of the unified institutional structures of the CCP that must seek unity in thinking and action (¶ 24) requires cadres that can think and act. The incarnation of the CCP as an institutional purpose, in other words, requires that every individual cadre contribute to that singular purpose in an effective way. It is in this Paragraph 25, then, that the CCP confronts the great institutional issue of Leninist vanguard parties--the working style necessary to develop unity in thought and action by many individuals who must autonomously come together to produce collective thought and action from out of the mass of individuals.

To that end, and to build cadres, the focus moves from the structures and objectives for developing the state to that of developing the individual. The development of the individual cadre, in turn, is a function of the cadre’s willingness to transform himself even as the CCP transforms society. And in the same way that the collective operates to develop societal productive forces toward socialist modernization, the cadre must develop himself to effectively contribute to the collective. That produces the second insight of ¶ 25: to build the cadre, development of individual capabilities must be bent toward the embrace of collective unity. Just as the CCP does not build itself for itself, neither does the individual cadre build himself for himself. Individuation, then, must serve collective ends--the self, in this sense, is understood as a variation of the expression of an undifferentiated self whose purpose is fundamentally collective in nature--the individual perfects himself to better contribute to the collective aims of the community.

The methods of that project of individual self-improvement to attain the singular collective aims of the community of cadres are straightforward--"

-->emancipating the mind, seeking truth from facts, keeping up with the times, and being realistic and pragmatic." These techniques are central elements that mark the transformation of the CCP from a revolutionary party to a party in power, from an emphasis on the individual in class struggle to the society in transition collectively. This is embodied in Deng Xiaoping Theory (¶ 5). Indeed, Paragraph 25 is a reminder of the profound internal and external effect of Deng Xiaoping theory for the constitution of the CCP's mission to move the state people and nation forward toward a collective goal. That movement, the dynamism inherent in the project of socialist modernization, in turn, requires an institutional and individual approach that is also equally dynamic. Emancipation of the mind rejects rigidity in thought and rigid textualism in action; it is founded on the notion that the past provides a guide and that ideology must advance even as it brings the nation closer to its goals. It suggests a dynamic process of intertwined engagement from the past to the present and for the future.

Doctrine is not meant to strangle modernization, it is meant to enhance the development of productive forces in economic make it possible. This process is possible only through the techniques of seeking truth from facts. To emancipate the mind, it is necessary to fearlessly seek truth from facts. It requires rejection of the converse--the reconstruction of facts from predetermined truth. This relationship becomes more understandable in light of ¶ 5, which reminds cadres that emancipation of the mind by seeking of truth from fact emancipated the CCP to socialist modernization, "ushering a new era of development in the cause of socialism"(¶ 5). But emancipating the mind seeking truth from facts is not unmoored from the work of transforming the insights of truth to fact. To that end cadres must balance "keeping up with the times, and being realistic and pragmatic."

This dialectical conversation between truth and facts, activated through the exercise of emancipating the mind (freeing it from an irrational attachment to past practice, behaviors, techniques, etc.) then frames the techniques that cadres must use to contribute to the CCP's requirement that it build itself. That frames the larger dialectic between individual cadres and the collective wisdom and action of a unified party. It is the cadre's exercise of appropriate dialectical techniques that make it possible for the CCP itself to engage in such techniques. The technique for managing this dialectical process--democratic centralism--is discussed at ¶ 27. But the process objectives produce the ideological line as a dynamic interaction between facts, and truth, whose every interaction founded on emancipation of the mind (singular and collective) produce the basis from which further dialectic inevitably occur on the path through socialist modernization of the establishment of a communist society. "The Party's ideological line is to proceed from reality in handling all matters, to integrate theory with practice, to seek truth from facts, and to verify and develop the truth through practice."

It is that dialectical process, then, that forms the heart of the systemic qualities of the CCP's working style. That dialectic transforms the ideas "emancipation of the mind", "seeking truth from facts", "keeping up with the times", "being realistic," and "being pragmatic" from hollow slogans or autonomous self-referencing insights into components of a process of dialectical engagement that connects past to present within the logic of the vanguard party's fundamental objective of leadership. That process element of the dialectical system also connects the autonomous actions of CCP cadres and the unified aggregated action of the CCP as a vanguard party. That connection is at the heart of the last section of ¶ 25; "All Party members must adhere to this ideological line, explore new ways, boldly experiment with new methods, go in for innovation, work creatively, constantly study new situations, review new experience and solve new problems, enrich and develop Marxism in practice, and advance the endeavor to adapt Marxism to Chinese conditions." We move from the constitution of the individual cadre, to the constitution of the collectivization at the heart of the unified action of the CCP. That, in turn, as we have seen, is the foundation of the leadership of the CCP. To build the CCP, one must build the cadre; the cadre must build himself; to build himself the cadre builds the CCP. The CCP builds itself by building its cadres. The task of building both requires individual effort directed toward collective action ("All Party members must cherish the path, the theories and the socialist system that the Party has explored and created after going through all the hardships; and they must keep to them all the time and continue to develop them." (¶ 8)).

**D. Party Building Framework: The Relationship to the People (¶ 26 General Program)**

With Paragraph 26, the focus on building the CCP turns from the ideological framework and working style to the relational issue--who does the CCP serve. It provides an answer to the question--for whom does the CCP build itself. It then describes the relationship between the CCP, CCP building and the objects of its service--the people.

[26] Third, persevering in serving the people wholeheartedly. The Party has no special interests of its own apart from the interests of the working class and the broadest masses of the people. At all times the Party gives top priority to the interests of the people, shares weal and woe with them, maintains the closest possible ties with them, and persists in exercising power for them, showing concern for them and working for their interests, and it does not allow any member to become divorced from the masses or place himself or herself above them. The Party follows the mass line in its work, doing everything for the masses, relying on them in every task, carrying out the principle of "from the masses, to the masses," and translating its correct views into action by the masses of their own accord. The biggest political advantage of the Party lies in its close ties with the masses while the biggest potential danger for it as a governing party comes from its divorce from them. The Party's style of work and its maintenance of ties with the masses of the people are a matter of vital importance to the Party. The Party will establish a sound system for punishing and preventing corruption by fighting it in a comprehensive way, addressing both its symptoms and root cause and combining punishment with prevention, with the emphasis on prevention. The Party will persistently oppose corruption and step up efforts to improve its style of work and uphold integrity.

[26] 第三，坚持全心全意为人民服务。党除了工人阶级和最广大人民群众的利益，没有自己特殊的利益。党在任何时候都把群众利益放在第一 位，同群众同甘共苦，保持最密切的联系，坚持权为民所用、情为民所系、利为民所谋，不允许任何党员脱离群众，凌驾于群众之上。党在自己的工作中实行群众路 线，一切为了群众，一切依靠群众，从群众中来，到群众中去，把党的正确主张变为群众的自觉行动。我们党的最大政治优势是密切联系群众，党执政后的最大危险 是脱离群众。党风问题、党同人民群众联系问题是关系党生死存亡的问题。党坚持标本兼治、综合治理、惩防并举、注重预防的方针，建立健全惩治和预防腐败体 系，坚持不懈地反对腐败，加强党风建设和廉政建设。

The fundamental objective of the CCP, in its vanguard role, is the establishment of a communist society (¶ 1). That objective is vested in the CCP in its representational role--that is the essence of the Leninist conception of the vanguard. That vanguard role is expressed not through control, but through leadership, the object of ¶ 28. But vanguardism, representation, without context is an empty vessel--the CCP represents people ("the Chinese working class and of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation"), objects ("orientation of China's advanced culture"), and processes ("the development trend of China's advanced productive forces"). Most importantly, though, the CCP's vanguard role imposes on it the burden of representing the "fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people" (¶ 1). It is to that requirement of representing the people and their interests that ¶ 26 is directed.

First, this paragraph emphasized both the dialectical process of representation, and the way that this dialectical process is impossible in the absence of cadres who have emancipated their minds and seek truth form facts (¶ 25) oriented to the fundamental ideological structures of the CCP as it builds itself (¶ 24) to serve the people (¶ 26). Here, at least, one sees the dynamic element of the CCP's General Program--the processes that activate a passive set of principles into a dynamic framework for political organization that is fundamentally goal drive. Here is, at bottom, the fundamentally necessary and dynamic dialectic between emancipation of the mind, seeking truth from facts and the mass line (the obligation to serve the people).

Second, Paragraph 26 announces its objective--the CCP must persevere (an on-going task) to serve the people wholeheartedly. But the CCP is not the servant of the people, in the manner of 18th century European absolutist monarchs or 19th century democratic elites. Rather, as a vanguard party, serving the people requires a dialectical communication from the people and to the people--the essence of the mass line, now bent to the overarching obligations of the CCP under its basic line (¶ 10). It is in describing the structures of that dialective that the rest of ¶ 26 is focused.

Third, reinforcing what had been implicit in ¶¶ 24 and 25, is the fiduciary principle at the heart of Leninist vanguardism--"The Party has no special interests of its own apart from the interests of the working class and the broadest masses of the people." The CCP may not cultivate its own special interests (特殊的利益), apart from serving the people. Thus for the CCP to build itself, it must avoid the error of building for itself and build itself to serve the collective which it has been created to represent and lead. This principle turns both to the mass line, and expresses the fundamentally political nature of corruption--that is of turning the CCP for personal interests and gain. Corruption, in this sense, is not an economic crime, but rather a betrayal of the fundamental objectives for which the CCP was created. There is an element of treason, then, in corruption. This is treason, not in the Western or traditional sense of serving another master, but in the sense of betraying the fundamental obligations of CCP membership in its fiduciary role. The centrality of corruption to legitimacy is emphasized in ¶ 26. "The Party will establish a sound system for punishing and preventing corruption by fighting it in a comprehensive way, addressing both its symptoms and root cause and combining punishment with prevention, with the emphasis on prevention. The Party will persistently oppose corruption and step up efforts to improve its style of work and uphold integrity." Here one encounters corruption on two levels--first, as a failing of the individual cadre who fails in her duties (¶ 25) and second as a systemic failure of the CCP in its obligation to build itself (¶ 25) for the purpose of achieving its core responsibilities (¶ 1) through the application of its basic line (¶10).

Fourth, it is in this sense that one can understand the "positionality" of party cadres relative to individuals ("At all times the Party gives top priority to the interests of the people, shares weal and woe with them, maintains the closest possible ties with them, and persists in exercising power for them, showing concern for them and working for their interests, and it does not allow any member to become divorced from the masses or place himself or herself above them"). This fiduciary obligation, however, must be read in the broader context of the Leninist vanguard role--the CCP represents the masses because it is necessary for the overall purpose of leading them toward the establishment of a communist society. Just as the CCP cannot build itself for itself, the CCP cannot represent the people merely to reflect their desires. It represents the interests of the people understood as contextually constrained and subject to development as society progresses toward a communist society.

Fifth, the dynamic element of this fiduciary duty is embedded in the dialectic that is the mass line ("The Party follows the mass line in its work, doing everything for the masses, relying on them in every task, carrying out the principle of "from the masses, to the masses," and translating its correct views into action by the masses of their own accord"). The CCP acts for the masses, relies on the masses, but translating the raw material of the mass view at any given stage of historical development within the interpretive matrix of the ideological framework of the CCP, which is then applied by the masses. Consider the details of the dialectical process in a simplified version of its motion:

(1) From the masses: to lead the masses the CCP must seek the truth necessary for the effective application of leadership from the facts that is the lived existence of. What is received from the masses are not merely opinion, sentiment, reactions, desires, needs, etc., but also the facts fundamentally necessary to derive truth. In the absence of these facts, the truth which is essential in the progress of socialist modernization will produce error. Socialist modernization is impossible if it remains aloof to the actual conditions of the masses. Here is the context in which "Chinese characteristics" is understood. The mass line's "from the people" is then essential for the factual context that is the foundation of the Chinese context within which the CCP's vanguard leadership is undertaken.

(2) To the masses: The facts and received from the masses are not embedded unfiltered within the CCP's leadership obligation. The facts must be contextualized, analyzed, understood and interpreted. To that end, the CCP must apply a mind or framework freed from rigidity or mindless historicist ossification, the CCP must emancipate the mind. That emancipation makes it possible to derive truth from the facts produced by and through the masses. But that truth, like the mass line, cannot be understood as existing separate and autonomous of the ideological context in which truth is understood and advanced. An emancipated mind attains truth by applying the guidelines that is the fundamental ordering ideology (¶ 2) on the basis of which the social, political, economic and cultural order is established for the eventual attainment of a goal (¶ 1). It is this truth that is then the basis for the leadership of the CCP that is responsive to the masses and legitimately implemented.

(3) From the masses, again: Returned to the masses in the form of leadership the mass interest is served and applied. This generates additional facts now grounded in the new context in which the masses find themselves. If well executed and correct, this new position evidences an advance down the path toward socialist modernization. If it does not, the evidence of error will be apparent in the failure to move the socialist modernization project forward. These are then the facts that must be received again from the people top develop truth. Here the process begins again but from a more advanced position.

Sixth, the mass line cannot be treated as a separate and autonomous principle unconnected either to the basic ideological framework of the CCP's vanguard role, or of the fundamental principles of the CCP's working style--emancipation of the mind and seeking truth from facts. These are all deeply embedded together to animate the dialectic that produces cadre building, Party building and the forward movement of socialist modernization. It is on this dialectic, applied without error, on which the integrity and legitimacy of both cadres and the CCP itself is founded ("The Party will persistently oppose corruption and step up efforts to improve its style of work and uphold integrity").

Seventh, the understanding of that connection is central to an understanding of the contextual nature of the CCP's principle of popular responsiveness. The CP must serve or respond to the masses. It cannot remain oblivious to mass criticism or to the conditions of the masses. But that responsiveness must be built on an appropriate interpretation. To respond to the masses requires first knowledge of information from the masses, but that information can only be appropriately interpreted, that it is can only be given meaning, by interpreting it within the framework of the CCP's basic line. And it is that meaning--that interpretation--that forms the second leg of the obligation of the CCP under the mass line, the obligation to speak truth to the masses from out of the facts that have been received from the masses. And then that generates the further obligation to listen again and respond to the masses in light of the truth delivered and the respond generated from masses. But this dialective process also contains an important consequential element--the responsibility to assess and correct error--first the error of failing to listen to the masses and second the error of failing to respond correctly. The mass line, then, includes an accountability principle--the CCP¡s obligation to self-criticism is a call to account, to assess, to test, the correctness both of the duty to listen and the responsibility to respond. And error must be acknowledged and corrected--or the people will lose confidence in the strength of the CCP's leadership role.

Eight, this responsiveness element can then be understood as the articulation of the self-referential character of CCP self-constitution. And from that, the self-constitution of the nation. Self-constitution in this sense points to the erection of the basic principles from which subsidiary policies and their application to the community self-constituted may be developed, but only through reference to the constituting structures of the community itself. That, of course, is the essence of constitutionalism, whether of states or of non-state actors (see, e.g., here and here). The process of socialist modernization, and the development of rules as a productive force, then are internally driven within a system that is complete in itself. That does not mean that the system is isolated, only that it is autonomous of others. As ¶ 22 makes clear, however, systemic isolation is itself error--as theory would also suggest. Thus, in the language system of the General Program: to build itself, the CCP must be responsive to the people; the nature of that response requires the application of facts to truth; the truth of that responsiveness can also be tested from facts; to build itself the CCP must assess its response to the people and to correct error; that dialectic in turn pushes the CCP's internal dialectic to develop its own productive force; that internal development is essential to fulfill the CCP's responsibility as the representative of the most advanced productive forces in society. And thus the self-constituting self-referencing dynamic element that is meant to move society forward toward the goal of establishing a communist society in China.

**E. Party Building Framework: Democratic Centralism (¶ 27 General Program)**

With Paragraph 27, the focus on building the CCP turns from the ideological framework, working style and the dialectic of serving the people to the disciplining of decision making within a vanguard party. It treats the question of democracy in a Leninist organization that itself requires balancing the development of productive forces through engagement and debate, and the need for the CCP to act with a single mind and in unison in moving forward the project of socialist modernization.

[27] Fourth, upholding democratic centralism. Democratic centralism is a combination of centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized guidance. It is the fundamental organizational principle of the Party and is also the mass line applied in the Party's political activities. The Party must fully expand intra-Party democracy, respect the principal position of its members, safeguard their democratic rights, and give play to the initiative and creativity of Party organizations at all levels as well as its members. Correct centralism must be practiced so as to ensure the solidarity, unity and concerted action in the whole Party and prompt and effective implementation of its decisions. The sense of organization and discipline must be strengthened, and all members are equal before Party discipline. Oversight of leading Party organs and of Party members holding leading positions, particularly principal leading cadres, must be strengthened and the system of intra-Party oversight constantly improved. In its internal political activities, the Party conducts criticism and self-criticism in the correct way, waging ideological struggles over matters of principle, upholding truth and rectifying mistakes. Diligent efforts must be made to create a political situation in which there are both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness.

[27] 第四，坚持民主集中制。民主集中制是民主基础上的集中和集中指导下的民主相结合。它既是党的根本组织原则，也是群众路线在党的生活 中的运用。必须充分发扬党内民主，保障党员民主权利，发挥各级党组织和广大党员的积极性创造性。必须实行正确的集中，保证全党的团结统一和行动一致，保证 党的决定得到迅速有效的贯彻执行。加强组织性纪律性，在党的纪律面前人人平等。加强对党的领导机关和党员领导干部的监督，不断完善党内监督制度。党在自己 的政治生活中正确地开展批评和自我批评，在原则问题上进行思想斗争，坚持真理，修正错误。努力造成又有集中又有民主，又有纪律又有自由，又有统一意志又有 个人心情舒畅的生动活泼的政治局面。

Paragraph 27 tales on again the problem of collectivization that is at the heart of the Leninist enterprise. It is most significant for the way in which it evidences the determination to liberate Leninism from its historical context and to add to it the Chinese characteristics necessary for application within the current (and eventually future) stage of development. It suggests, in this way, the dynamic element of the evolution of theory suggested between ¶¶ 4 to 5 (between the historically contextualized foundation of Mao Zedong Thought and the contemporary foundation of Deng Xiaoping Theory. It focuses not on the substance of that development of the productive force of theory, but on its Leninist element--the development of collectivization of decision making as a productive force.

First, democratic centralism is intimately connected to the problem of party building. To build itself the CCP must solve the contradiction of collective action. It must harmonize the necessity for innovation with the requirement for unified action both of which are required for the construction of the quality of leadership best suited to the task of moving China forward along the path of socialist modernization toward the establishment of a communist society. To that end, the rigidity and ossification of mere unity of thought produces little more than that cage of primitive societies imprisoned in its past and bounded by traditions, practices and habits that ensure that what was done yesterday is done tomorrow. That is the sort of political construction that is essentially feudal. And that was the ultimate failing of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution--by stressing an unchanging unity of thought it fell into the error of feudal thinking that required the correction of the emancipation of the mind. And the emancipation of the mind on two levels--at the level of the cadre and at the institutional level of the party itself. At the same time, an unstructured embrace of emancipation of the mind that is undisciplined might produce a thousand flowers without connection or purpose. That purposelessness--to exist to exist producing momentary combinations that reflect the passing of the wind, is possible in societies the object of which is to enhance the momentary sense of purpose, defined as the sum of the individual preferences of individuals constrained only by societal norms. This is the condition of Western capitalist societies, a state of seeking temporally limited welfare maximization without purpose other than the attainment of maximization that itself can only reflect the desires of the present and must inevitably change as the present recedes into the past. But Leninism is grounded in the fulfillment of the Marxist insight that the state and society ought to be bent to a singular purpose--the establishment of a communist society ("Diligent efforts must be made to create a political situation in which there are both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness"). To that end collectivization is not consequential, as it is in the West, but central to the problem of government and its normative structures. The necessity of collective action, then, confines the emancipation of the mind, the individual, and the party-state, directing it towards the ultimate goal of society (¶ 1). The contradiction, then, between individual thought and action, and the need for the individual to act collectively in the service of society--the vanguard role of Leninism--requires a mediation of the individual and the collective that is understood through the techniques of democratic centralism.

Second, democratic centralism is not unique to Chinese communism, nor is it incompatible with market and competitive activities. Indeed, one of the most dynamic spaces for the concept of democratic centralism is the Western corporation rather than the communist party and its theorists. To understand the concept of modern democratic centralism, one must start with Lenin, but one must understand that Lenin, like Mao Zedong, spoke to his time. In the current stage of development of both Marxist and Capitalist society, democratic centralism is understood as the mechanism by which the productive force of individual cadres (or employees) is developed to fully build the party, or the enterprise, so that it can serve its purpose (to maximize profits or to lead society toward socialist modernization). In either case, both institutions cultivate a vigorous internal conversation about policy and direction--the ingestion and analysis of facts from the masses or consumers or investors or other stakeholders--and then produces truth (policy, direction, advances in implementation strategies) that serve as the basis for unified action to which all cadres (or employees) must serve and implement in uniform way. Neither CCP nor corporation can tolerate dissent or opposition, neither can tolerate factionalism that weakens the unity represented by decisions taken after consideration by the party (or the enterprise). Such opposition is considered in either case as disloyal and suppressed. Just as a corporate board of directors speaks for a unified enterprise, so the leadership of the CCP speaks for a unified vanguard as each seeks to fulfill its historic role either in public or private spheres. To build the CCP, then, requires innovation in formation and discipline in implementation. The absence of the discipline weakens the vanguard's ability to meet its fundamental obligation to lead the state, people and nation to the ultimate goal to which it is directed. Democratic centralism, in this sense, is a marker for the times, and an extraordinarily important technique for organizations charged with objectives-based responsibilities. It is the way that organizations mediate between its autonomous role as a single organism and the reality that this autonomous is itself the product of the collective activity of its critical stakeholders. It is a disciplinary technique in which the efforts of the many are managed and directed toward the unified purpose of the organism of which they are a part. But it is also the technique through which the organism communicates back through its component parts (cadres, employees) in the operationalization of its collective decisions.

Third, Democratic centralism is the way in which the mass line is activated within the CCP ("It is the fundamental organizational principle of the Party and is also the mass line applied in the Party's political activities"). The critical connection here is between the notion of organizing principle and outward activities. Consider what this suggests. Democratic centralism is an organizing principle in the sense that it expresses the methods through which the individual cadres are organized for collective action and decision making, and thus the means through which the CCP can be understood to exist and act autonomously of its cadres. It is the application, the operationalization, of the mass line the sense that it expresses the aggregate policy and determinations of the CCP, autonomous of that of its cadres, and thus the means through which the CCP engages with individuals and institution outside of the CCP. This dual role of democratic centralism thus looks to an internal dialectic necessary to fulfill the CCP's responsibility as a vanguard element of society and an external communication with the masses to ensure that it meets its obligation to serve the people in the cause to which it is dedicated. It is in this dual role that the value of democratic centralism is best understood.

a. On the one hand, democratic centralism provides the method by which the CCP expresses its own conscious will apart from those of its cadres. It is a method of avoiding the factionalism and simple mindedness of substituting the factional will of shifting majorities for the blended expression of consensus. The CCP does not build itself through the application of majority will. Democratic centralism rejects majoritarianism as the error of temporal factionalism and a contained form of chaotic decision making with no long term objective. Democratic centralism might be better understood as the expression of the fundamental notion of the mass line now turned inward--from the masses to the masses is now transformed into from the cadres to the cadres. That dialectical process produces a dynamic engagement between cadres and CCP leadership in which cadres produce the facts necessary to derive truth, which is understood as the policies developed and decisions made through the process of interpreting facts through the normative structures of the social, economic and political order (¶ 2). This, then, becomes the expression of the common position of the CCP, its autonomous thought, which is then becomes the CCP's line to which cadres adhere. That adherence in turn generates new facts, new gaps, new opinion which must in turn be engaged with and from out of which the CCP continues to develop its basic line, policy and implementation strategies. It is democratic in the sense of the engagement of all cadres in the determination of the CCP line. It is centralism in the sense that what is decided then is binding and in binding generates the conditions for its own continued modification.

b. On the other hand, democratic centralism is the technique that makes it possible for the CCP to speak with one voice to those to whom it has responsibilities in the state and nation. It is the means through which the autonomous voice of the CCP apart from its individual members is heard. It serves both as the sourcing of authoritative communication and as the means through which information (facts) are received from beyond the CCP for internalization in the process of moving the nation forward to meet the overall objective of socialist modernization. One can understand this in structural terms. The CCP as organism constitutes its voice through the mechanics of democratic centralism--so that it speaks with one voice. It is also the means through which it receives communication from those outside the CCP for the purpose of fulfilling the responsibilities of the mass line. It is the means, in other words, through which structural coupling is possible between CCP as organism (apart from its members) and the societal and productive forces which it both serves and manages in the service of the vanguard cause (the establishment of a communist society). Democratic centralism, then, is autonomy building both internally and externally for the self-constitution and autonomous self-referencing operation of the CCP within and beyond the society it serves. That, of course, is the modern essence of the vanguard role in an objectives driven political order like China.

Fourth, democracy acquires a meaning that must be understood within the ideological context on which the Chinese political order is founded ("The Party must fully expand intra-Party democracy, respect the principal position of its members, safeguard their democratic rights, and give play to the initiative and creativity of Party organizations at all levels as well as its members."). That, of course, produces an understanding democracy quite distinct from that in Western capitalist societies. First, democracy must be understood as a technique for the most effective means of producing inclusive collective action. It is a means of engagement that is meant to serve the people through the dual dialectics of democratic centralism and the mass line to move society forward along the path of socialist modernization. That both cabins and directs the technique. Democracy is not the end product, the fundamental objective toward which society is directed; instead democracy is the means through which the fundamental objectives of society are attained. Second, it follows that democratic techniques must be directed, in the first instance, toward the internal operation of the CCP itself. Democracy is the means through which collective action is made possible. Because it serves collective, elections and voting are not central components of democratic practice. Instead engagement is centered in the process of democratic decision making within the CCP. Majoritarianism is implicitly rejected as merely an institutionalized form of factionalism, inimical to the fundamental working style of a vanguard that is based on collective consensus. This presents what might be an unbridgeable difference with Western political notions, but not with Western notions of corporate democracy. Third, this notion of consensus is operationalized around the notion of emancipation of the mind, as much as it is around the principle of seeking truth form facts. Consensus in the absence of debate is a fiction--that was the basic error in the distortion of democratic centralism in European Marxist States, principally the Soviet Union. And it presents the danger of remoteness that is itself a betrayal of the mass line. Paragraph 27, then, represents the scientific development of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism from beyond its European historical context to serve better within the contemporary context of Chinese conditions. To build the CCP, the party must listen to itself.

Fifth, but once the CCP speaks, there must be a unity of action in applying the CCP's policies outside of the CCP. To achieve this balance--openness inside and unity outside--the CCP must protect cadres in their engagement role within the CCP, and suppress a cadre's engagement outside the CCP ("Correct centralism must be practiced so as to ensure the solidarity, unity and concerted action in the whole Party and prompt and effective implementation of its decisions"). The object of solidarity is twofold. First, it is the only effective way of incarnating the autonomous position of the CCP beyond its cadres. The CCP must exist, like all political organization, above and beyond the aggregation of its members. To that end, it must seek a method for distilling the engagement of its members into its own. It must transform the collective wisdom of its parts into positions and actions that serve itself rather than the aggregation of its members. To build itself, the CCP must liberate itself from its cadres. It must act for itself and not for any cadre, faction of cadres or the aggregation of cadres. The CCP, if it is to represent the state, people and nation, if it is to serve its ultimate representational responsibilities in the serve of its fundamental mission, it must fuse the wisdom of its cadres into its own.

Sixth, the role of democratic centralism in mediating democratic action is driven by a more fundamental principle of collectivity, the principle against cults of personality ("The sense of organization and discipline must be strengthened, and all members are equal before Party discipline. Oversight of leading Party organs and of Party members holding leading positions, particularly principal leading cadres, must be strengthened and the system of intra-Party oversight constantly improved"). Organizational discipline requires that "tigers" and "flies" be treated the same within the context of their responsibilities. It suggests as well that the voices of some ought not to displace those of others merely by reference to their position within the hierarchy of CCP organization. This is a lesson that runs deeply in Chinese history and the ill effects of cultivating cults of personality on the core responsibility of Leninist parties has been much in evidence in the collapse of Party-State Marxist Leninist regimes in other parts of the world. The CCP does not merely discipline its "flies", it must pay attention to its "tigers" both in the exercise of democratic centralism's responsibility to engage and in the CCP's responsibility to ensure that the system of democratic centralism is correctly applied and not abused.

Seventh, rigidity and ossification, the reduction of Marxism-Leninism to a ritual demonstrated in parades and public spectacles but internally empty of content, can only be avoided if the CCP itself avoids rigidity and self-worship. To build the CCP, the CCP must build and rebuild itself. That obligation is difficult indeed. Human nature tends toward habit and repetition. Custom and tradition are logical expressions of habits that are valuable because they need not be reconsidered, even when the habit itself may produce difficulties. To avoid rigidity and the worship of repetition requires positive action and an institutional framework that can absorb dynamic change without collapsing on itself. The Soviet Union was incapable of building these structures and foundered on its bureaucratism and fear of change. When change became inevitable given the movement of the Soviet Union to a new historical stage, the institutions were unable to respond and collapsed. What is required to avoid this are institutional structures that can account for and manage challenge to established ideas and ways of doing things. To that end, democratic centralism includes the dynamic principle of challenge ("In its internal political activities, the Party conducts criticism and self-criticism in the correct way, waging ideological struggles over matters of principle, upholding truth and rectifying mistakes"). Not all challenges are successful, not all criticism is correct. But the development of institutional structures to engage with critique internally provides a powerful weapon against ossification and better prepares the Leninist organization for outside challenge. It serves one other critical purpose--criticism-self-criticism is an essential element of the implementation of the mass line. In the absence of this exercise, the ability of the CCP to engage with the masses can become reduced to empty symbolism. Democratic centralism then becomes an expression of the mass line principle as an effective tool of scientifically developing the CCP and of ensuring that it in fact fulfills its responsibilities as representative of the state, people and nation. But it is easy enough to appear to embrace the forms of criticism-self-criticism without internalizing its important objectives. Care must be taken, and ¶ 27 strongly demands, that the essence of democratic centralism, that its spirit, not be reduced to empty symbol or to theater played out for the consumption by a propaganda ministry. Effective fulfillment of the CCP's responsibilities under ¶¶ 24-26 is impossible where democratic centralism ceases to work effectively within the CCP itself.

**F. Party Building Framework: Leadership (¶ 28 General Program)**

With Paragraph 28, the General Program returns to the CCP's leadership role--the essential element of the CCP's vanguard role first elaborated in ¶ 1 of the General Program. There is thus a symmetry in the General Program that ties its beginning to its end. Paragraph 28 elaborates on the role of the CCP in its paramount function as the vanguard of the state, people and nation of China in its march toward the establishment of a communist society in China.

[28] Leadership by the Party means mainly political, ideological and organizational leadership. The Party must meet the requirements of reform, opening up and socialist modernization, persist in scientific, democratic and law-based governance, and strengthen and improve its leadership. Acting on the principle that the Party commands the overall situation and coordinates the efforts of all quarters, the Party must play the role as the core of leadership among all other organizations at the corresponding levels. It must concentrate on leading economic development, organize and coordinate all forces in a concerted effort to focus on economic development and promote all-around economic and social development. The Party must practice democratic and scientific decision-making; formulate and implement the correct line, principles and policies; do its organizational, publicity and educational work well and make sure that all Party members play an exemplary and vanguard role. The Party must conduct its activities within the framework of the Constitution and laws of the country. It must see to it that the legislative, judicial and administrative organs of the state and the economic, cultural and people's organizations work with initiative and independent responsibility and in unison. The Party must strengthen its leadership over trade unions, the Communist Youth League, women's federations and other mass organizations, and give full scope to their roles. The Party must adapt itself to the march of events and changing circumstances, improving its system and style of leadership and raising its governance capability. Party members must work in close cooperation with non-Party persons in the common endeavor to build socialism with Chinese characteristics.

[28] 党的领导主要是政治、思想和组织的领导。党要适应改革开放和社会主义现代化建设的要求，坚持科学执政、民主执政、依法执政，加强和 改善党的领导。党必须按照总揽全局、协调各方的原则，在同级各种组织中发挥领导核心作用。党必须集中精力领导经济建设，组织、协调各方面的力量，同心协 力，围绕经济建设开展工作，促进经济社会全面发展。党必须实行民主的科学的决策，制定和执行正确的路线、方针、政策，做好党的组织工作和宣传教育工作，发 挥全体党员的先锋模范作用。党必须在宪法和法律的范围内活动。党必须保证国家的立法、司法、行政机关，经济、文化组织和人民团体积极主动地、独立负责地、 协调一致地工作。党必须加强对工会、共产主义青年团、妇女联合会等群众组织的领导，充分发挥它们的作用。党必须适应形势的发展和情况的变化，完善领导体 制，改进领导方式，增强执政能力。共产党员必须同党外群众亲密合作，共同为建设中国特色社会主义而奋斗。

Leadership is at the heart of the conceptual and systemic structures of the CCP as entity and of its role as a vanguard leading the state, people and nation towards its long term goal of establishing a communist society through--at this stage--the framework of socialist modernization. The CCP is the core of leadership for the socialist core (¶ 1) whose leadership is expressed by its role in forging the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics (¶ 8), leadership, in essence is the manifestation of the vanguard role of the CCP. Leading the cause of socialism is central to the CCP Basic Line (¶ 10) and to the task of economic development in socialist modernization (¶ 11). Leadership responsibility is one of the four Cardinal Principles that serves as the basis of all politics and policy (¶ 12). The implementation of leadership is carried out in very specific ways. The CCP leads the people (a) in developing the socialist market economy (¶ 14); (b) in promoting socialist democracy, including multiparty cooperation and consultation (¶ 15); (c) in developing advanced socialist culture (¶ 16); (d) in building harmonious socialist society (¶ 17); in promoting socialist ecological progress (¶ 18);and over the People's Liberation Army (¶ 19). Though it doesn't lead, the CCP rallies class elements in the development of productive forces (¶ 21) and leads all ethnic groups in the drive toward socialist modernization (¶ 23). To the end it must improve the art of its leadership (¶ 23). One now understands what leadership means; but ¶ 28 touches on a different matter--what leadership is, that is the conceptual structures of leadership that makes its operational directives through the General Program coherent and manageable. The skeletal structures of the conception of leadership, of the vanguard role of the CCP with Chinese characteristics, is here sketched out in a way that serves to animate the system that has been constructed in Paragraphs 1-27.

Leadership, then, is the central element that joins the conceptual basis of the political order with the realities of its implementation through the institution of the CCP. The conceptualization of leadership, then, is a last necessary step to complete the structures of the self-constitution of the party-state system that the General Program elaborates. It provides the final brick in the structures of a system that produces the political order from which the institutions of both the CCP and the state apparatus may be constructed and operated and from which the system it represents can exist in itself. The skeletal structures of the conception of leadership, of the vanguard role of the CCP with Chinese characteristics, is here sketched out in a way that serves to animate the system that has been constructed in Paragraphs 1-27.

First, the short initial definition of the concept of leadership suggests both functional constraints and flexibility ("Leadership by the Party means mainly political, ideological and organizational leadership"). This provision is remarkable for the clarity of its expression of the basis of the separation of powers within the Chinese constitutional system. The CCP is not the state, and its institutions are not state institutions. Rather the CCP embodies the political and normative authority of the Chinese nation that is manifested administratively (implemented through) an establishment of state organs. The CCP is a political enterprise, it is the source of ideological development and it provides organizational leadership. But it is not the state--nor its government. The apparatus of the CCP is organized for leadership--of the state, people and nation (Discussed here). And that leadership is confined to the exercise of political power (constrained for example, through ¶ 2 and by the normative structures of ¶¶12 and 15), of ideological power (constrained for example, through ¶¶ 25-26 and the normative structures of ¶¶2-8) and organizational /structuring power (constrained for example, through ¶15). Mainly ("主要是"). That mainly adds an important element of flexibility, but it also implies a caution. The flexibility comes from the need to adopt a working style that is innovative (e.g., ¶¶ 14, 16, 23, and 25) but one that is also bound to the core functions of the vanguard role of the CCP (e.g., ¶ 10). Leadership then means guidance in the operation of the state toward a particular end.

Second, ¶ 28 describes broadly the objectives of CCP leadership ("The Party must meet the requirements of reform, opening up and socialist modernization, persist in scientific, democratic and law-based governance, and strengthen and improve its leadership"). The political, ideological and organizational leadership of the CCP is to be used in the service of specific ends, now well described in the General Program. But the selection of objectives, or the privileging of these objectives over the others described in the General Program (e.g., ¶¶ 15, 16, 18, 19, etc.) suggests a hierarchy of objectives in the service of socialist modernization and the development of productive forces. It may suggest as well the formula for policy balancing as the CCP seeks to advance its objectives in the face of contradiction or limited resources. Perhaps of special interest is the focus on the development of leadership as a principal objective of CCP leadership. If, indeed, the principal method of CCP engagement is leadership, and if leadership is undertaken in a dynamic context in which theory and practice must constantly change in the face of the new facts and historical stages to be brought by the progress of socialist modernization, then a principal concern of the CCP must be to prevent its own obsolescence. This is a notion that is woven into other paragraphs as well. That makes sense given the other focus of leadership--reform and opening up, and even scientific, democratic and law-based governance. The latter three suggest the maturing of a system in which the CCP guides but does not undertake a primary role in the organization and operation of state organs, but one in which the innovation of the mass line dialectic is critical. Innovation in law based governance is central to both the task of developing advance socialist democracy (¶ 15) and advance socialist culture (16). In the latter case it blends as well rules of law and virtue, with a necessary reference back to ideologically congruent sources of virtue (¶ 16). Leadership, then, is the embrace of objectives, including self-improvement in the leadership role.

Third, ¶ 28 seats the principle of leadership on in Leninist foundations--the principles of "overall command" (总揽全局) and "coordination" (协调)"--to structure the relationship between the CCP as the organism in command and the state apparatus whose operation the CCP must coordinate ("Acting on the principle that the Party commands the overall situation and coordinates the efforts of all quarters, the Party must play the role as the core of leadership among all other organizations at the corresponding levels."). This provision does two things. First it further defines the concept of leadership and adds context to "mainly" ("主要是"). Second, it suggests the nature of the people's democratic dictatorship (¶ 4, 12, 15). Leadership, then, has elements of overall command and elements of overall coordination. What does the CCP command? That seems fairly clear from the nature of the democratic dictatorship--it commands the political direction and the normative principles on which the state rests and the society is directed. That also represents a necessary transformation of the concept of democratic dictatorship from its origins in the class struggle environment on the founding of the People's Republic (see, here) to one in which the emphasis is on the objective of socialist modernization and the development of productive forces. It also represents a shift in the focus of the engagement of the people form one grounded in Western concepts of voting to engagement through collective action. The CCP then, serves as the centering element of governance, the core of leadership that coordinates all organs of public and societal community. The overall situation is the organization of the political, economic, cultural and societal spheres. The CCP cannot be absent from any of the organized activities of the state, people and nation., That is a concept foreign to the West, but it reflects the basic premise that the whole of the state, people and nation have committed to the development of all of its productive forces to further socialist mobilization. And that, in turn, requires the CCP to be embedded in all potentially productive forces to fulfill its vanguard role--from enterprises to non-state organizations. Leadership means command of the project of moving toward the establishment of a communist society and the coordination of all productive forces to that end, including those organs of state and private power deployed to operationalize leadership.

Fourth, the parameters of coordinating the work of the state apparatus is then outlined--translating the emphasis on socialist modernization to the macro economic planning of state organs ("It must concentrate on leading economic development, organize and coordinate all forces in a concerted effort to focus on economic development and promote all-around economic and social development"). Coordination of all forces looks not merely to the development of economic productive forces, though that is emphasized. It also points to the coordination of all forces to promote economic and social development. Thus the coordination occurs on both the economic and societal planes. They are interrelated in the sense that socialist modernization is understood as a holistic project--and that the development of socialist market economy is in part dependent on the simultaneous development of socialist democracy, culture and harmonious society. Thus the conceptual unity of the CCP's ideology is also reflected in the unity, form out of its aggregate parts, of those societal forces that must be developed simultaneously and in a coordinated way to make it possible to produce not just wealth but the social and cultural wealth necessary for the establishment of a communist society. Leadership requires the coordination of economic and societal development.

Fifth, the working style of leadership is then described ("The Party must practice democratic and scientific decision-making; formulate and implement the correct line, principles and policies; do its organizational, publicity and educational work well and make sure that all Party members play an exemplary and vanguard role"). Leadership requires that the CCP act by example. And this is emphasized. Correctness is a central tenet of the ideological and operational responsibilities of the CCP. Yet the striving for correctness does not means that all CCP determinations must always be viewed as correct--were that true then the notions of emancipation of the mind, of seeking truth form facts, and of reform and opening up with be empty gestures. Yet correctness has meaning within the General Program. It references a normative judgment about the basic laws of the development of history and human society (¶ 3). It serves as an assessment of the historically contextual assessment of the evolution of Marxism through Mao Zedong Thought, proven correct in the practice of the time (¶ 4). It is a command to handle error and contradiction appropriately (¶ 17), one that is grounded on the ability to distinguish between the undermining of the project of socialist modernization and the sometimes rough process of democratic centralism and innovation. (¶ 27) It is an essential component of the dialectical process of the mass line (¶ 26) requiring the appropriate translation of the views of the masses to policy. And it refers to the means of assessing criticism and self-criticism at the heart of democratic centralism. In each case the fundamental notion is not that the action be correct but that the correct action be taken. And correctness is proven by history--from facts. It follows that one cannot know whether one is correct until after the action is taken and in the context of self-assessment. To be correct the CCP must also not be correct but be willing to correct.

Sixth, the relationship between the expression of the CCP line and the structures of rule--the essence of Leninist rule of law, is then specified--that the CCP must follow its own line means that the CCP must follow its own rules, whether expressed in its command role (the General Program) or in its coordination role (the state constitution and the laws/rules enacted thereunder ("The Party must conduct its activities within the framework of the Constitution and laws of the country"). Leadership, then, means that the CCP must apply its line correctly. And that the correct application of its line requires it to apply and ensure the application of the rule systems that, under its leadership, have been developed for the coordination of the organs of state and society. The CCP must conduct its activities within the framework of the Constitution and the laws precisely because the CCP must follow its own line (¶ 12). As the organ in command of the overall situation and with a responsibility to coordinate among all other organs, it has itself declared the rule of law as a core element of its leadership role in promoting socialist democracy (¶ 15). It has also determined, correctly, that rule of law and rule of virtue are essential ingredients in the development of advanced socialist culture (¶ 16) and in building harmonious socialist society (¶ 17). To say that the CCP, demonstrates leadership by conducting its activists within the framework of the Constitution is to say no more than that the CCP evidences its leadership by applying its basic line. But it also suggests that to subject the CCP to the Constitution is merely to subject the CCP to itself.

Seventh, the CCP's coordination role is further developed to ensure that it operates in a manner that parallels the working style of the CCP itself including the development of a democratic centralism style grounded in unity of action (" It must see to it that the legislative, judicial and administrative organs of the state and the economic, cultural and people's organizations work with initiative and independent responsibility and in unison"). Just as the CCP's leadership obligates it to subject itself to itself--in the form of the principles of the state constitution, so it must, in its role of "overall command" (总揽全局) and "coordination" (协调)" lead the state organs implement the CCP's line. This parallels the CCP's own internal obligations to take the aggregation of their cadres and forge unity in thinking (¶ 24).

Seventh, the coordination role extends not just to the state apparatus to all organized activity within China; each a productive force to be bent to the objectives of socialist modernization ("The Party must strengthen its leadership over trade unions, the Communist Youth League, women's federations and other mass organizations, and give full scope to their roles"). Here there is implied a coordination grounded in the CCP's objectives relating to socialist harmonious society ¶ 17. The leadership obligations of the CCP extend not just to coordination and leadership of the state organs to ensure unity in thinking and action along the correct line but to extend that to the operation of all other social, political and cultural organs. This incorporates the unity of socialist development as including both a cultural and societal element. The productive forces of society and culture--especially those tied to mass and class politics, must be coordinated in the overall effort to develop productive forces.

Eight, the dynamic role of leadership is then emphasized ("The Party must adapt itself to the march of events and changing circumstances, improving its system and style of leadership and raising its governance capability"). We have seen how the General Program has emphasized the dynamic in its conceptualization of theory, of the vanguard party charged with its implementation and of the society to which it is to be applied. It stands to reason, now memorized, that the vanguard role requires nimbleness in the face of a project in which stability and preservation are not the key elements. The CCP is meant to be not just capable of reacting to the dynamic element of its dialectical engagement with itself, the state, people and nation, but also to be the vanguard of change in the service of the long term objective which is its primary responsibility. Leadership, then, is the avoidance of ossification in conceptualization, in policy, and in implementation.

Ninth, the leadership role of the CCP relating to non-CCP members is described in terms of both coordination and party building ("Party members must work in close cooperation with non-Party persons in the common endeavor to build socialism with Chinese characteristics"). To build the CCP, the CCP must expand. And, indeed, that is likely the chief method through which the CCP might develop its own productive force--by merging it with the productive force of the people. One can understand here that the ultimate objective of socialist modernization, the near end stage on the eve of the establishment of the communist society, might be marked by the merger of party and people. A CCP that remains merely a revolutionary party, a CCP that remains merely a party in power, betrays its leadership role and fails in its fundamental objective to lead toward the establishment of a communist society. The ultimate object of the CCP is to disappear into the people that is to make itself a naturalized and foundational element in the society, culture and world view of the people. To that end it must lead non CCP members--a coordination function--but it should lead them to CCP membership and the realization of socialist democracy, culture, and harmonious society in which the people may lead themselves by the compass if the normative values of Marxist Leninism with Chinese characteristics. That drives home the point embedded in the General Program that leadership involves teaching and teaching involves the erection of a driving world view that excludes others, a way of thinking, perceiving and analyzing, that already marks the West and eliminates the need for a vanguard--in the end. For a successful vanguard is one that can plot its end when everyone is a CCP cadre.

So what is CCP leadership? How does CCP leadership relate to the fundamental role of the CCP as a vanguard element? Leadership is the mediating language between conception and application, between politics and administration. It is both a normative element of the General Program and a technique for its advancement. Leadership is the way one understands the essence of the Leninist vanguard now updated to the conditions of China in the early 21st century. Leadership is the way that the CCP speaks and acts. A fluid concept, it is the expression of the means through which the CCP remains in "overall command" (总揽全局) and the ways in which it engages in "coordination" (协调)" to achieve unity on thought for the project of socialist modernization. But most of all, it is a reflexive concept. It is an expression of the way that the conceptual program of the CCP is reflected in and through the vanguard. To lead the nation, the CCP must lead itself under the principles of its own leadership.

**Appendix A - General Program of the Chinese Communist Party Constitution**

General Program   
  
[1] The Communist Party of China is the vanguard both of the Chinese working class and of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. It is the core of leadership for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics and represents the development trend of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. The realization of communism is the highest ideal and ultimate goal of the Party.  
  
[2] The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents and the Scientific Outlook on Development as its guide to action.  
  
[3] Marxism-Leninism brings to light the laws governing the development of the history of human society. Its basic tenets are correct and have tremendous vitality. The highest ideal of communism pursued by the Chinese Communists can be realized only when the socialist society is fully developed and highly advanced. The development and improvement of the socialist system is a long historical process. So long as the Chinese Communists uphold the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism and follow the road suited to China's specific conditions and chosen by the Chinese people of their own accord, the socialist cause in China will be crowned with final victory.  
  
[4] The Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, created Mao Zedong Thought by integrating the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Mao Zedong Thought is Marxism-Leninism applied and developed in China; it consists of a body of theoretical principles concerning the revolution and construction in China and a summary of experience therein, both of which have been proved correct by practice; and it represents the crystallized, collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China. Under the guidance of Mao Zedong Thought, the Communist Party of China led the people of all ethnic groups in the country in their prolonged revolutionary struggle against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, winning victory in the new-democratic revolution and founding the People's Republic of China, a people's democratic dictatorship. After the founding of the People's Republic, it led them in carrying out socialist transformation successfully, completing the transition from New Democracy to socialism, establishing the basic system of socialism and developing socialism economically, politically and culturally.  
  
[5] After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Central Committee, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Deng Xiaoping as their chief representative, analyzed their experience, both positive and negative, gained since the founding of the People's Republic, emancipated their minds, sought truth from facts, shifted the focus of the work of the whole Party onto economic development and carried out reform and opening to the outside world, ushering in a new era of development in the cause of socialism, gradually formulating the line, principles and policies concerning the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics and expounding the basic questions concerning the building, consolidation and development of socialism in China, and thus creating Deng Xiaoping Theory. Deng Xiaoping Theory is the outcome of the integration of the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of contemporary China and the features of the times, a continuation and development of Mao Zedong Thought under new historical conditions; it represents a new stage of development of Marxism in China, it is Marxism of contemporary China and it is the crystallized, collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China. It is guiding the socialist modernization of China from victory to victory.  
  
[6] After the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Party Central Committee and in the practice of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Jiang Zemin as their chief representative, acquired a deeper understanding of what socialism is, how to build it and what kind of party to build and how to build it, accumulated new valuable experience in running the Party and state and formed the important thought of Three Represents. The important thought of Three Represents is a continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory; it reflects new requirements for the work of the Party and state arising from the developments and changes in China and other parts of the world today; it serves as a powerful theoretical weapon for strengthening and improving Party building and for promoting self-improvement and development of socialism in China; and it is the crystallized, collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China. It is a guiding ideology that the Party must uphold for a long time to come. Persistent implementation of the Three Represents is the foundation for building the Party, the cornerstone for its governance and the source of its strength.  
  
[7] Since the Party's Sixteenth National Congress, the Chinese Communists with Comrade Hu Jintao as their chief representative, following the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents, have gained a deep understanding of major questions such as what kind of development China should achieve under new conditions and how it should achieve it to meet new requirements for development and answered these questions, and thus developed the Scientific Outlook on Development that puts people first and calls for comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development. The Scientific Outlook on Development is a scientific theory that is both in keeping with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents and is in step with the times. It fully embodies the Marxist worldview on and methodology for development and represents the latest achievement in adapting Marxism to China's conditions. It is the crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China and a guiding ideology that must be upheld and applied in developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.  
  
[8] The fundamental reason behind all of China's achievements and progress since the reform and opening up policy was introduced is, in the final analysis, that the Party has blazed a path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, formulated the system of theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and established the socialist system with Chinese characteristics. All Party members must cherish the path, the theories and the socialist system that the Party has explored and created after going through all the hardships; and they must keep to them all the time and continue to develop them. They must hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and strive to fulfill the three historic tasks of advancing the modernization drive, achieving national reunification, and safeguarding world peace and promoting common development.   
  
[9] China is in the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a long time to come. This is a historical stage which cannot be skipped in socialist modernization in China which is backward economically and culturally. It will last for over a hundred years. In socialist construction the Party must proceed from China's specific conditions and take the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. At the present stage, the principal contradiction in Chinese society is one between the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the people and the low level of production. Owing to both domestic circumstances and foreign influences, class struggle will continue to exist within a certain scope for a long time and may possibly grow acute under certain conditions, but it is no longer the principal contradiction. In building socialism, the basic task is to further release and develop the productive forces and achieve socialist modernization step by step by carrying out reform in those aspects and links of the production relations and the superstructure that do not conform to the development of the productive forces. The Party must uphold and improve the basic economic system, with public ownership playing a dominant role and different economic sectors developing side by side, as well as the system of distribution under which distribution according to work is dominant and a variety of modes of distribution coexist, encourage some areas and some people to become rich first, gradually eliminate poverty, achieve common prosperity, continuously meet the people's ever-growing material and cultural needs on the basis of the growth of production and social wealth and promote people's all-around development. Development is the Party's top priority in governing and rejuvenating the country. The general starting point and criterion for judging all the Party's work should be how it benefits development of the productive forces in China's socialist society, adds to the overall strength of socialist China and improves the people's living standards. The Party must respect work, knowledge, talent and creation and ensure that development is for the people, by the people and with the people sharing in its fruits. The beginning of the new century marks China's entry into the new stage of development of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and accelerating socialist modernization. The Party must promote all-around economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress in accordance with the overall plan for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The strategic objectives of economic and social development at this new stage in the new century are to consolidate and develop the relatively comfortable life initially attained, bring China into a moderately prosperous society of a higher level to the benefit of well over one billion people by the time of the Party's centenary and bring the per capita GDP up to the level of moderately developed countries and realize modernization in the main by the time of the centenary of the People's Republic of China.  
  
[10] The basic line of the Communist Party of China in the primary stage of socialism is to lead the people of all ethnic groups in a concerted, self-reliant and pioneering effort to turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern socialist country by making economic development the central task while upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and the reform and opening up policy.  
  
[11] In leading the cause of socialism, the Communist Party of China must persist in taking economic development as the central task, making all other work subordinate to and serve this central task. The Party must lose no time in speeding up development, implement the strategy of rejuvenating the country through science and education, the strategy of strengthening the nation with trained personnel and the strategy of sustainable development, and give full play to the role of science and technology as the primary productive force. The Party must take advantage of the advancement of science and technology to improve the quality of workers and promote sound and rapid development of the national economy.  
  
[12] The Four Cardinal Principles - to keep to the socialist road and to uphold the people's democratic dictatorship, leadership by the Communist Party of China, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought - are the foundation on which to build the country. Throughout the course of socialist modernization the Party must adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles and combat bourgeois liberalization.  
  
[13] Reform and opening up are the path to a stronger China. Only reform and opening up can enable China, socialism and Marxism to develop themselves. The Party must carry out fundamental reform of the economic structure that hampers the development of the productive forces, and keep to and improve the socialist market economy; it must also carry out corresponding political restructuring and reform in other fields. The Party must adhere to the basic state policy of opening up and assimilate and exploit the achievements of all other cultures. It must be bold in making explorations and breaking new ground in reform and opening up, make its reform decisions more scientific, better coordinate its reform measures and blaze new trails in practice.  
  
[14] The Communist Party of China leads the people in developing the socialist market economy. It unwaveringly consolidates and develops the public sector of the economy and unswervingly encourages, supports and guides the development of the non-public sector. It gives play to the basic role of market forces in allocating resources and works to set up a sound system of macroeconomic regulation. The Party works to balance urban and rural development, development among regions, economic and social development, relations between man and nature, and domestic development and opening to the outside world; adjust the economic structure, and transform the growth model. It is dedicated to promoting harmonized development of industrialization, IT application, urbanization and agricultural modernization, building a new socialist countryside, taking a new path of industrialization with Chinese characteristics, and making China an innovative country.  
  
[15] The Communist Party of China leads the people in promoting socialist democracy. It integrates its leadership, the position of the people as masters of the country, and the rule of law, takes the path of political development under socialism with Chinese characteristics, expands socialist democracy, improves the socialist legal system, builds a socialist country under the rule of law, consolidates the people's democratic dictatorship, and builds socialist political civilization. It upholds and improves the system of people's congresses, the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation under its leadership, the system of regional ethnic autonomy, and the system of self-governance at the primary level of society. It makes people's democracy more extensive, fuller in scope and sounder in practice. It takes effective measures to protect the people's right to manage state and social affairs as well as economic and cultural programs. It respects and safeguards human rights. It encourages the free airing of views and works to establish sound systems and procedures of democratic election, decision-making, administration and oversight. It improves the socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics and strengthens law enforcement, so as to bring all work of the state under the rule of law.   
  
[16] The Communist Party of China leads the people in developing an advanced socialist culture. It promotes socialist cultural and ethical progress, combines the rule of law and the rule of virtue in running the country and works to raise the ideological and moral standards and scientific and educational levels of the entire nation so as to provide a powerful ideological guarantee, motivation and intellectual support for reform, opening up and socialist modernization, and develop a strong socialist culture in China. It promotes core socialist values, adheres to Marxism as its guiding ideology, fosters the common ideal of socialism with Chinese characteristics, promotes patriotism-centered national spirit and the spirit of the times centering on reform and innovation and advocates the socialist maxims of honor and disgrace. It works to enhance the people's sense of national dignity, self-confidence and self-reliance, resist corrosion by decadent capitalist and feudal ideas and wipe out all social evils so that the people will have high ideals, moral integrity, a good education and a strong sense of discipline. It also needs to imbue its members with the lofty ideal of communism. The Party strives to develop educational, scientific and cultural programs, carry forward the fine traditional culture of the Chinese nation, and develop a thriving socialist culture.  
  
[17] The Communist Party of China leads the people in building a harmonious socialist society. In accordance with the general requirements for democracy and the rule of law, equity and justice, honesty and fraternity, vigor and vitality, stability and order, and harmony between man and nature and the principle of all the people building and sharing a harmonious socialist society, the Party focuses its efforts on ensuring and improving the people's wellbeing by solving the most specific problems of the utmost and immediate concern to the people, works to enable all the people to share in more fruits of development in a more equitable way, and strives to create a situation in which all people do their best, find their proper places in society and live together in harmony. The Party strengthens and makes innovations in social management. It strictly distinguishes between the two different types of contradictions - those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people - and works to handle them correctly. It will strengthen comprehensive measures to maintain law and order, and resolutely combat criminal activities that endanger national security and interests, social stability and economic development and bring criminals to justice in accordance with the law, so as to maintain lasting social stability.  
  
[18] The Communist Party of China leads the people in promoting socialist ecological progress. It raises its ecological awareness of the need to respect, accommodate to and protect nature; follows the basic state policy of conserving resources and protecting the environment and the principle of giving high priority to conserving resources, protecting the environment and promoting its natural restoration; and pursues sound development that leads to increased production, affluence and a good ecosystem. The Party strives to build a resource-conserving, environmentally friendly society; and preserves China's geographical space and improves its industrial structure and mode of production and the Chinese way of life in the interest of conserving resources and protecting the environment. All this is aimed at creating a good working and living environment for the people and ensuring lasting and sustainable development of the Chinese nation.  
  
[19] The Communist Party of China persists in its leadership over the People's Liberation Army and other armed forces of the people, builds up the strength of the People's Liberation Army, ensures that it accomplishes its historic missions at this new stage in the new century, and gives full play to its role in consolidating national defense, defending the motherland and participating in the socialist modernization drive.  
  
[20] The Communist Party of China upholds and promotes socialist ethnic relations based on equality, solidarity, mutual assistance and harmony, actively trains and promotes cadres from among ethnic minorities, helps ethnic minorities and ethnic autonomous areas with their economic, cultural and social development, and ensures that all ethnic groups work together for common prosperity and development. The Party strives to fully implement its basic principle for its work related to religious affairs, and rallies religious believers in making contributions to economic and social development.  
  
[21] The Communist Party of China rallies all workers, farmers and intellectuals, and all the democratic parties, personages without party affiliation and the patriotic forces of all ethnic groups in China in further expanding and fortifying the broadest possible patriotic united front embracing all socialist workers, all builders of the cause of socialism and all patriots who support socialism or who support the reunification of the motherland. The Party will constantly strengthen the unity of all the Chinese people, including the compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions and in Taiwan as well as overseas Chinese. It will promote long-term prosperity and stability in Hong Kong and Macao and complete the great cause of reunifying the motherland in conformity with the principle of "one country, two systems."  
  
[22] The Communist Party of China adheres to an independent foreign policy of peace, follows the path of peaceful development and a win-win strategy of opening up, takes both the domestic and international situations into consideration, and vigorously develops relations with other countries in order to bring about a favorable international environment for China's reform, opening up and modernization. In international affairs, it safeguards China's independence and sovereignty, opposes hegemonism and power politics, defends world peace, promotes human progress, and pushes for the building of a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. It develops relations between China and other countries on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. It strives for the constant development of good-neighborly relations between China and the surrounding countries and for the strengthening of the unity and cooperation between China and other developing countries. The Communist Party of China develops relations with communist parties and other political parties in other countries in accordance with the principles of independence, complete equality, mutual respect and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.   
  
[23] In order to lead the people of all ethnic groups in China in attaining the great goal of socialist modernization, the Communist Party of China must adhere to its basic line, strengthen its governance capability, advanced nature and purity and comprehensively carry forward the great new undertaking to build itself in a spirit of reform and innovation. The Party must make all-around efforts to strengthen itself ideologically and organizationally and improve its conduct; and it must become better able to combat corruption and uphold Party integrity and improve Party rules and regulations, thus making Party building more scientific in all respects. It must steadfastly build itself for public interests, exercise governance for the people, practice self-discipline, be strict with its members, and carry forward its fine traditions and style of work. It must constantly improve its art of leadership and governance, raise its ability to resist corruption, prevent degeneration and withstand risks, constantly strengthen its class foundation, expand its mass base and enhance its creativity, cohesion and combat effectiveness, and build itself into a learning, service-oriented and innovative Marxist governing party, so that it will stand forever in the forefront of the times and make itself a strong nucleus that can lead all the Chinese people in the unceasing march along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In building itself, the Party must be determined to meet the following four essential requirements:  
  
[24] First, adhering to the Party's basic line. The whole Party must achieve unity in thinking and action with Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development, and the Party's basic line, and persevere in doing so for a long time to come. The Party must integrate the reform and opening up policy with the Four Cardinal Principles, carry out its basic line in all fields of endeavor, implement in an all-around way its basic program for the primary stage of socialism and combat all "Left" and Right erroneous tendencies, maintaining vigilance against Right tendencies, primarily against "Left" tendencies. The Party must intensify the building of leading bodies at all levels, selecting and promoting cadres who have scored outstanding achievements in their public service and have won the trust of the masses in reform, opening up and the modernization drive, and train and cultivate millions upon millions of successors to the cause of socialism, thus ensuring organizationally the implementation of the Party's basic theory, line, program and experience.  
  
[25] Second, persevering in emancipating the mind, seeking truth from facts, keeping up with the times, and being realistic and pragmatic. The Party's ideological line is to proceed from reality in handling all matters, to integrate theory with practice, to seek truth from facts, and to verify and develop the truth through practice. All Party members must adhere to this ideological line, explore new ways, boldly experiment with new methods, go in for innovation, work creatively, constantly study new situations, review new experience and solve new problems, enrich and develop Marxism in practice, and advance the endeavor to adapt Marxism to Chinese conditions.  
  
[26] Third, persevering in serving the people wholeheartedly. The Party has no special interests of its own apart from the interests of the working class and the broadest masses of the people. At all times the Party gives top priority to the interests of the people, shares weal and woe with them, maintains the closest possible ties with them, and persists in exercising power for them, showing concern for them and working for their interests, and it does not allow any member to become divorced from the masses or place himself or herself above them. The Party follows the mass line in its work, doing everything for the masses, relying on them in every task, carrying out the principle of "from the masses, to the masses," and translating its correct views into action by the masses of their own accord. The biggest political advantage of the Party lies in its close ties with the masses while the biggest potential danger for it as a governing party comes from its divorce from them. The Party's style of work and its maintenance of ties with the masses of the people are a matter of vital importance to the Party. The Party will establish a sound system for punishing and preventing corruption by fighting it in a comprehensive way, addressing both its symptoms and root cause and combining punishment with prevention, with the emphasis on prevention. The Party will persistently oppose corruption and step up efforts to improve its style of work and uphold integrity.  
  
[27] Fourth, upholding democratic centralism. Democratic centralism is a combination of centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized guidance. It is the fundamental organizational principle of the Party and is also the mass line applied in the Party's political activities. The Party must fully expand intra-Party democracy, respect the principal position of its members, safeguard their democratic rights, and give play to the initiative and creativity of Party organizations at all levels as well as its members. Correct centralism must be practiced so as to ensure the solidarity, unity and concerted action in the whole Party and prompt and effective implementation of its decisions. The sense of organization and discipline must be strengthened, and all members are equal before Party discipline. Oversight of leading Party organs and of Party members holding leading positions, particularly principal leading cadres, must be strengthened and the system of intra-Party oversight constantly improved. In its internal political activities, the Party conducts criticism and self-criticism in the correct way, waging ideological struggles over matters of principle, upholding truth and rectifying mistakes. Diligent efforts must be made to create a political situation in which there are both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness.  
  
[28] Leadership by the Party means mainly political, ideological and organizational leadership. The Party must meet the requirements of reform, opening up and socialist modernization, persist in scientific, democratic and law-based governance, and strengthen and improve its leadership. Acting on the principle that the Party commands the overall situation and coordinates the efforts of all quarters, the Party must play the role as the core of leadership among all other organizations at the corresponding levels. It must concentrate on leading economic development, organize and coordinate all forces in a concerted effort to focus on economic development and promote all-around economic and social development. The Party must practice democratic and scientific decision-making; formulate and implement the correct line, principles and policies; do its organizational, publicity and educational work well and make sure that all Party members play an exemplary and vanguard role. The Party must conduct its activities within the framework of the Constitution and laws of the country. It must see to it that the legislative, judicial and administrative organs of the state and the economic, cultural and people's organizations work with initiative and independent responsibility and in unison. The Party must strengthen its leadership over trade unions, the Communist Youth League, women's federations and other mass organizations, and give full scope to their roles. The Party must adapt itself to the march of events and changing circumstances, improving its system and style of leadership and raising its governance capability. Party members must work in close cooperation with non-Party persons in the common endeavor to build socialism with Chinese characteristics.

**Appendix B - 中国共产党党章——总纲**

1中国共产党是中国工人阶级的先锋队，同时是中国人民和中华民族的先锋队，是中国特色社会主义事业的领导核心，代表中国先进生产力的发展要求，代表中国先进文化的前进方向，代表中国最广大人民的根本利益。党的最高理想和最终目标是实现共产主义。

2 中国共产党以马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想作为自己的行动指南。

3马克思列宁主义揭示了人类社会历史发展的规律，它的基本原理是正确的，具有强大的生命力。中国共产党人追求的共产主义最高理想，只 有在社会主义社会充分发展和高度发达的基础上才能实现。社会主义制度的发展和完善是一个长期的历史过程。坚持马克思列宁主义的基本原理，走中国人民自愿选 择的适合中国国情的道路，中国的社会主义事业必将取得最终的胜利。

4以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人，把马克思列宁主义的基本原理同中国革命的具体实践结合起来，创立了毛泽东思想。毛泽东思想 是马克思列宁主义在中国的运用和发展，是被实践证明了的关于中国革命和建设的正确的理论原则和经验总结，是中国共产党集体智慧的结晶。在毛泽东思想指引 下，中国共产党领导全国各族人民，经过长期的反对帝国主义、封建主义、官僚资本主义的革命斗争，取得了新民主主义革命的胜利，建立了人民民主专政的中华人 民共和国；建国以后，顺利地进行了社会主义改造，完成了从新民主主义到社会主义的过渡，确立了社会主义基本制度，发展了社会主义的经济、政治和文化。

5十一届三中全会以来，以邓小平同志为主要代表的中国共产党人，总结建国以来正反两方面的经验，解放思想，实事求是，实现全党工作中 心向经济建设的转移，实行改革开放，开辟了社会主义事业发展的新时期，逐步形成了建设中国特色社会主义的路线、方针、政策，阐明了在中国建设社会主义、巩 固和发展社会主义的基本问题，创立了邓小平理论。邓小平理论是马克思列宁主义的基本原理同当代中国实践和时代特征相结合的产物，是毛泽东思想在新的历史条 件下的继承和发展，是马克思主义在中国发展的新阶段，是当代中国的马克思主义，是中国共产党集体智慧的结晶，引导着我国社会主义现代化事业不断前进。

6十三届四中全会以来，以江泽民同志为主要代表的中国共产党人，在建设中国特色社会主义的实践中，加深了对什么是社会主义、怎样建设 社会主义和建设什么样的党、怎样建设党的认识，积累了治党治国新的宝贵经验，形成了“三个代表”重要思想。“三个代表”重要思想是对马克思列宁主义、毛泽 东思想、邓小平理论的继承和发展，反映了当代世界和中国的发展变化对党和国家工作的新要求，是加强和改进党的建设、推进我国社会主义自我完善和发展的强大 理论武器，是中国共产党集体智慧的结晶，是党必须长期坚持的指导思想。始终做到“三个代表”，是我们党的立党之本、执政之基、力量之源。

7十六大以来，党中央坚持以邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想为指导，根据新的发展要求，集中全党智慧，提出了以人为本、全面协调可 持续发展的科学发展观。科学发展观，是同马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想既一脉相承又与时俱进的科学理论，是我国经济社会 发展的重要指导方针，是发展中国特色社会主义必须坚持和贯彻的重大战略思想。

8 改革开放以来我们取得一切成绩和进步的根本原因，归结起来就是：开辟了中国特色社会主义道路，形成了中国特色社会主义理论体系。全 党同志要倍加珍惜、长期坚持和不断发展党历经艰辛开创的这条道路和这个理论体系，高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜，为实现推进现代化建设、完成祖国统一、维 护世界和平与促进共同发展这三大历史任务而奋斗。

9 我国正处于并将长期处于社会主义初级阶段。这是在经济文化落后的中国建设社会主义现代化不可逾越的历史阶段，需要上百年的时间。我 国的社会主义建设，必须从我国的国情出发，走中国特色社会主义道路。在现阶段，我国社会的主要矛盾是人民日益增长的物质文化需要同落后的社会生产之间的矛 盾。由于国内的因素和国际的影响，阶级斗争还在一定范围内长期存在，在某种条件下还有可能激化，但已经不是主要矛盾。我国社会主义建设的根本任务，是进一 步解放生产力，发展生产力，逐步实现社会主义现代化，并且为此而改革生产关系和上层建筑中不适应生产力发展的方面和环节。必须坚持和完善公有制为主体、多 种所有制经济共同发展的基本经济制度，坚持和完善按劳分配为主体、多种分配方式并存的分配制度，鼓励一部分地区和一部分人先富起来，逐步消灭贫穷，达到共 同富裕，在生产发展和社会财富增长的基础上不断满足人民日益增长的物质文化需要，促进人的全面发展。发展是我们党执政兴国的第一要务。各项工作都要把有利 于发展社会主义社会的生产力，有利于增强社会主义国家的综合国力，有利于提高人民的生活水平，作为总的出发点和检验标准，尊重劳动、尊重知识、尊重人才、 尊重创造，做到发展为了人民、发展依靠人民、发展成果由人民共享。跨入新世纪，我国进入全面建设小康社会、加快推进社会主义现代化的新的发展阶段。必须按 照中国特色社会主义事业总体布局，全面推进经济建设、政治建设、文化建设、社会建设。在新世纪新阶段，经济和社会发展的战略目标是，巩固和发展已经初步达 到的小康水平，到建党一百年时，建成惠及十几亿人口的更高水平的小康社会；到建国一百年时，人均国内生产总值达到中等发达国家水平，基本实现现代化。

10中国共产党在社会主义初级阶段的基本路线是：领导和团结全国各族人民，以经济建设为中心，坚持四项基本原则，坚持改革开放，自力更生，艰苦创业，为把我国建设成为富强民主文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家而奋斗。

11中国共产党在领导社会主义事业中，必须坚持以经济建设为中心，其他各项工作都服从和服务于这个中心。要抓紧时机，加快发展，实施科 教兴国战略、人才强国战略和可持续发展战略，充分发挥科学技术作为第一生产力的作用，依靠科技进步，提高劳动者素质，促进国民经济又好又快发展。

12坚持社会主义道路、坚持人民民主专政、坚持中国共产党的领导、坚持马克思列宁主义毛泽东思想这四项基本原则，是我们的立国之本。在社会主义现代化建设的整个过程中，必须坚持四项基本原则，反对资产阶级自由化。

13坚持改革开放，是我们的强国之路。要从根本上改革束缚生产力发展的经济体制，坚持和完善社会主义市场经济体制；与此相适应，要进行 政治体制改革和其他领域的改革。要坚持对外开放的基本国策，吸收和借鉴人类社会创造的一切文明成果。改革开放应当大胆探索，勇于开拓，提高改革决策的科学 性，增强改革措施的协调性，在实践中开创新路。

14中国共产党领导人民发展社会主义市场经济。毫不动摇地巩固和发展公有制经济，毫不动摇地鼓励、支持、引导非公有制经济发展。发挥市 场在资源配置中的基础性作用，建立完善的宏观调控体系。统筹城乡发展、区域发展、经济社会发展、人与自然和谐发展、国内发展和对外开放，调整经济结构，转 变经济发展方式。建设社会主义新农村，走中国特色新型工业化道路，建设创新型国家，建设资源节约型、环境友好型社会。

15中国共产党领导人民发展社会主义民主政治。坚持党的领导、人民当家作主、依法治国有机统一，走中国特色社会主义政治发展道路，扩大 社会主义民主，健全社会主义法制，建设社会主义法治国家，巩固人民民主专政，建设社会主义政治文明。坚持和完善人民代表大会制度、中国共产党领导的多党合 作和政治协商制度、民族区域自治制度以及基层群众自治制度。切实保障人民管理国家事务和社会事务、管理经济和文化事业的权利。尊重和保障人权。广开言路， 建立健全民主选举、民主决策、民主管理、民主监督的制度和程序。加强国家立法和法律实施工作，实现国家各项工作法治化。

16中国共产党领导人民发展社会主义先进文化。建设社会主义精神文明，实行依法治国和以德治国相结合，提高全民族的思想道德素质和科学 文化素质，为改革开放和社会主义现代化建设提供强大的思想保证、精神动力和智力支持。坚持马克思主义指导思想，树立中国特色社会主义共同理想，弘扬以爱国 主义为核心的民族精神和以改革创新为核心的时代精神，倡导社会主义荣辱观，增强民族自尊、自信和自强精神，抵御资本主义和封建主义腐朽思想的侵蚀，扫除各 种社会丑恶现象，努力使我国人民成为有理想、有道德、有文化、有纪律的人民。对党员还要进行共产主义远大理想教育。大力发展教育、科学、文化事业，弘扬民 族优秀传统文化，繁荣和发展社会主义文化。

17 中国共产党领导人民构建社会主义和谐社会。按照民主法治、公平正义、诚信友爱、充满活力、安定有序、人与自然和谐相处的总要求和共 同建设、共同享有的原则，以改善民生为重点，解决好人民最关心、最直接、最现实的利益问题，努力形成全体人民各尽其能、各得其所而又和谐相处的局面。严格 区分和正确处理敌我矛盾和人民内部矛盾这两类不同性质的矛盾。加强社会治安综合治理，依法坚决打击各种危害国家安全和利益、危害社会稳定和经济发展的犯罪 活动和犯罪分子，保持社会长期稳定。

18 中 国共产党领导人民建设社会主义生态文明。树立尊重自然、顺应自然、保护自然的生态文明理念，坚持节约资源和保护环境的基本国策，坚持节约优先、保护优先、 自然恢复为主的方针，坚持生产发展、生活富裕、生态良好的文明发展道路。着力建设资源节约型、环境友好型社会，形成节约资源和保护环境的空间格局、产业结 构、生产方式、生活方式，为人民创造良好生产生活环境，实现中华民族永续发展。

19中国共产党坚持对人民解放军和其他人民武装力量的领导，加强人民解放军的建设，切实保证人民解放军履行新世纪新阶段军队历史使命，充分发挥人民解放军在巩固国防、保卫祖国和参加社会主义现代化建设中的作用。

20中国共产党维护和发展平等团结互助和谐的社会主义民族关系，积极培养、选拔少数民族干部，帮助少数民族和民族地区发展经济、文化和社会事业，实现各民族共同团结奋斗、共同繁荣发展。全面贯彻党的宗教工作基本方针，团结信教群众为经济社会发展作贡献。

21中国共产党同全国各民族工人、农民、知识分子团结在一起，同各民主党派、无党派人士、各民族的爱国力量团结在一起，进一步发展和壮 大由全体社会主义劳动者、社会主义事业的建设者、拥护社会主义的爱国者、拥护祖国统一的爱国者组成的最广泛的爱国统一战线。不断加强全国人民包括香港特别 行政区同胞、澳门特别行政区同胞、台湾同胞和海外侨胞的团结。按照“一个国家、两种制度”的方针，促进香港、澳门长期繁荣稳定，完成祖国统一大业。

22 中国共产党坚持独立自主的和平外交政策，坚持和平发展道路，坚持互利共赢的开放战略，统筹国内国际两个大局，积极发展对外关系，努 力为我国的改革开放和现代化建设争取有利的国际环境。在国际事务中，维护我国的独立和主权，反对霸权主义和强权政治，维护世界和平，促进人类进步，努力推 动建设持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐世界。在互相尊重主权和领土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利、和平共处五项原则的基础上，发展我国同世界各国的关 系。不断发展我国同周边国家的睦邻友好关系，加强同发展中国家的团结与合作。按照独立自主、完全平等、互相尊重、互不干涉内部事务的原则，发展我党同各国 共产党和其他政党的关系。

23中国共产党要领导全国各族人民实现社会主义现代化的宏伟目标，必须紧密围绕党的基本路线，加强党的执政能力建设和先进性建设，以改 革创新精神全面推进党的建设新的伟大工程。坚持立党为公、执政为民，坚持党要管党、从严治党，发扬党的优良传统和作风，不断提高党的领导水平和执政水平， 提高拒腐防变和抵御风险的能力，不断增强党的阶级基础和扩大党的群众基础，不断提高党的创造力、凝聚力、战斗力，使我们党始终走在时代前列，成为领导全国 人民沿着中国特色社会主义道路不断前进的坚强核心。党的建设必须坚决实现以下四项基本要求：

24第一，坚持党的基本路线。全党要用邓小平理论、“三个代表”重要思想和党的基本路线统一思想，统一行动，深入贯彻落实科学发展观， 并且毫不动摇地长期坚持下去。必须把改革开放同四项基本原则统一起来，全面落实党的基本路线，全面执行党在社会主义初级阶段的基本纲领，反对一切“左”的 和右的错误倾向，要警惕右，但主要是防止“左”。加强各级领导班子建设，选拔使用在改革开放和社会主义现代化建设中政绩突出、群众信任的干部，培养和造就 千百万社会主义事业接班人，从组织上保证党的基本理论、基本路线、基本纲领、基本经验的贯彻落实。

25第二，坚持解放思想，实事求是，与时俱进。党的思想路线是一切从实际出发，理论联系实际，实事求是，在实践中检验真理和发展真理。 全党必须坚持这条思想路线，弘扬求真务实精神，积极探索，大胆试验，开拓创新，创造性地开展工作，不断研究新情况，总结新经验，解决新问题，在实践中丰富 和发展马克思主义，推进马克思主义中国化。

26第三，坚持全心全意为人民服务。党除了工人阶级和最广大人民群众的利益，没有自己特殊的利益。党在任何时候都把群众利益放在第一 位，同群众同甘共苦，保持最密切的联系，坚持权为民所用、情为民所系、利为民所谋，不允许任何党员脱离群众，凌驾于群众之上。党在自己的工作中实行群众路 线，一切为了群众，一切依靠群众，从群众中来，到群众中去，把党的正确主张变为群众的自觉行动。我们党的最大政治优势是密切联系群众，党执政后的最大危险 是脱离群众。党风问题、党同人民群众联系问题是关系党生死存亡的问题。党坚持标本兼治、综合治理、惩防并举、注重预防的方针，建立健全惩治和预防腐败体 系，坚持不懈地反对腐败，加强党风建设和廉政建设。

27 第四，坚持民主集中制。民主集中制是民主基础上的集中和集中指导下的民主相结合。它既是党的根本组织原则，也是群众路线在党的生活 中的运用。必须充分发扬党内民主，保障党员民主权利，发挥各级党组织和广大党员的积极性创造性。必须实行正确的集中，保证全党的团结统一和行动一致，保证 党的决定得到迅速有效的贯彻执行。加强组织性纪律性，在党的纪律面前人人平等。加强对党的领导机关和党员领导干部的监督，不断完善党内监督制度。党在自己 的政治生活中正确地开展批评和自我批评，在原则问题上进行思想斗争，坚持真理，修正错误。努力造成又有集中又有民主，又有纪律又有自由，又有统一意志又有 个人心情舒畅的生动活泼的政治局面。

28 党的领导主要是政治、思想和组织的领导。党要适应改革开放和社会主义现代化建设的要求，坚持科学执政、民主执政、依法执政，加强和 改善党的领导。党必须按照总揽全局、协调各方的原则，在同级各种组织中发挥领导核心作用。党必须集中精力领导经济建设，组织、协调各方面的力量，同心协 力，围绕经济建设开展工作，促进经济社会全面发展。党必须实行民主的科学的决策，制定和执行正确的路线、方针、政策，做好党的组织工作和宣传教育工作，发 挥全体党员的先锋模范作用。党必须在宪法和法律的范围内活动。党必须保证国家的立法、司法、行政机关，经济、文化组织和人民团体积极主动地、独立负责地、 协调一致地工作。党必须加强对工会、共产主义青年团、妇女联合会等群众组织的领导，充分发挥它们的作用。党必须适应形势的发展和情况的变化，完善领导体 制，改进领导方式，增强执政能力。共产党员必须同党外群众亲密合作，共同为建设中国特色社会主义而奋斗。

**Appendix C - The Communist Party of China, Constitution (Program 1920-2012)**

**The primary stage (1921-1928)**

1st congress 1921

Chinese translation based on Russian version: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64553/4427945.html>

Chinese translation based on English version: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64553/4427946.html>

2nd congress 1922

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64554/4428163.html>

3rd congress 1923

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64555/4428213.html>

4th congress 1925

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64555/4428213.html>

5th congress 1927

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64557/4428293.html>

6th congress 1928

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64557/4428293.html>

**The revolutionary stage (1945-1956)**

7th congress 1945

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64559/4442095.html>

8th congress 1956

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64560/65452/6412169.html>

**The conflict stage (1969-1977)**

9th congress 1969

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64561/4429444.html>

10th 1973

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64562/65450/4429427.html>

11th 1977

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64563/4441865.html>

**The restructure stage (1982-1988)**

12th congress 1982

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64565/65448/6415129.html>

13th congress 1987

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64566/65447/4441815.html>

**The new millennium/ socialist modernization stage (1992-2002)**

14th congress 1992

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64567/65446/6415682.html>

15 congress 1997

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64568/65445/4429244.html>

16 congress 2002

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64568/65445/4429244.html>

**The socialist system stage (2007-present)**

17th congress 2007

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/106155/106156/6439183.html>

18th congress 2012

<http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2012/1119/c234123-19618241.html>

1. <http://www.hprc.org.cn/pdf/DSYJ201102008.pdf> CPC is founded under Comintern’s direct assistantship and guidance. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. <http://www.hcpccc.com/manage/uploads/newsimg/201471611510871.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)